

Dayatattwa of Raghunandana

Raghunandana
Bhaṭṭācārya

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DAYATATTWA c†

OF

RAGHUNANDANA.

TRANSLATED

BY

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&c., &c. &c.*

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TO

THE HONOURABLE LOUIS STUART JACKSON,

**ONE OF THE JUDGES OF HER MAJESTY'S HIGH COURT
OF JUDICATURE AT FORT WILLIAM IN BENGAL.**

**THIS TRANSLATION OF THE DAYATATTWA
OF RAGHUNANDANA,**

IS DEDICATED

**AS A SMALL TRIBUTE OF RESPECT FOR HIS
PROFOUND KNOWLEDGE OF THE
LAWS, MANNERS AND CUSTOMS
OF THE HINDUS.**



PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.

MOST of the principal treatises on Hindu Law, have been rendered into English, and the usefulness of these translations has been universally felt and acknowledged. The *Dáyatattwa* has always been regarded as an authority of considerable importance. It is a compendium of the *Dáyabhága*; but there are places in which the author of the *Dáyatattwa* differs from the doctrines of *Jímútaváhana*. It is one of the twenty-eight Chapters of the *Smrititattwa*, the work of Raghunandana Bhattáchárya. The *Dáyatattwa* forms the Chapter on the Law of Inheritance as prevalent in Bengal, and is the most important portion of the work. The reputation of Raghunandana as an authority is very great in Bengal. He is emphatically called the “*Smárta Bhattáchárya*” or the Learned Professor of Law. In speaking of him Colebrooke says :—“The Bengal school alone having taken for its guide *Jimutavahana*’s treatise which is, on almost every disputed point, opposite in doctrine to the *Mitakshara* has no deference for its authority. On this account independently of any other considerations, it would have been necessary to admit into the present volume either his treatise or some one of the abridgements of his doctrine which are in use and of which the best known and the most approved is Raghunandana’s *Dayatattwa*.”

“The *Dayatattwa* or so much of the *Smrititattwa* as relates to inheritance, is the undoubted composition of Raghunandana; and, in deference to the greatness

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of the author's name and the estimation in which his works are held among the learned Hindus of Bengal has been throughout diligently consulted and carefully compared with Jimutavahana's treatise on which it is almost exclusively founded. It is indeed an excellent compendium of the Law, in which not only Jimutavahana's doctrines are in general strictly followed but are commonly delivered in his own words in brief extracts from his text. On a few points, however, Raghunandana has differed from his master ; and in some instances he has supplied deficiencies.

“Now Raghunandana's date is ascertained at about three hundred years from this time ; for he was, pupil of Vasudeva Sarvabhauma, and studied at the same time with three other disciples of the same preceptor who likewise have acquired great celebrity ; viz. Siromani, Krishnanda and Chaitanya ; the latter is the well known founder of the religious order and sect of Vaishnavas so numerous in the vicinity of Calcutta and so notorious for the scandalous dissoluteness of their morals ; and the date of his birth being held memorable by his followers, it is ascertained by his horoscope said to be still preserved, as well as by the express mention of the date in his works, to have been 1411 of the Saka era, answering to Y. C. 1489 : consequently Raghunandana, being his contemporary, must have flourished at the beginning of the Sixteenth Century.” (Colebrooke's preface to the *Dáyabhága*.)

In some cases, the want of a translation of the *Dáyatattwa* has necessitated the filing of authenticated translations of excerpts in the records of suits.

These considerations have led to this attempt to present a translation of the complete work. In preparing this translation the language of Colebrooke, in his translation of such texts as are common to both the *Dáyabhága* and the *Dáyatattwa*, and in the quotations from the *Dáyatattwa* incorporated with his annotations on the *Dáyabhága*, has generally been, with slight variations adopted. For such defects as may have crept into the translation, the indulgence of the generous reader is solicited.

G. C. S.

HIGH COURT, *September*, 1874.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

THIS is the second edition of the English translation of a work on the Hindu Law of Inheritance, which, next to the *Dáyabhága*, is most respected by the people of Bengal, but which for want of an English version of it, had been inaccessible and unknown to the Judges and lawyers without Sanskrit; and so the light it throws on the Bengal law of Inheritance and Succession had been beyond their reach. There was in consequence considerable speculation about the heritable right, and their position in the order of succession, of cognates other than those whose inheritance and succession are set forth by the founder of the Bengal school, either expressly or by necessary implication, in his *Dáyabhága* respected as the work of paramount authority in Bengal. *Jímútaváhana* the author of that treatise, however, left the law in the same state in which it was under the *Mitákshará*, subject to the innovations and modifications introduced by him. This view is corroborated by the exposition of this branch of the law in the *Dáyatattwa* by Raghunandana who was a respectful follower of *Jímútaváhana*, and supplied the deficiencies of the latter's work. The object of the founder of the Bengal school was not to repeat in its entirety the order of succession which had been previously explained in the *Mitákshará* and other commentaries, and was well-understood by the learned at the time he flourished, but to introduce certain modifications of the same, specially by recognising some dear and near cognates as heirs in preference to remoter

agnates, and to set forth the order of succession, so far only, as was necessary for showing the position of these cognates in the same, and to establish this altered order of succession to be what was really intended by the sages or compilers or propounders of the Smritis or Hindu Codes, by elaborate arguments founded on different principles, of which the capacity to confer spiritual benefit by the performance of the Párvana Sráddha is most prominent and conspicuous.

For a proper and correct understanding of a commentary like the Dáyaghága it is absolutely necessary to take into consideration the law as it was understood by the previous as well as by the subsequent commentators of both the schools.

Theoretically, Hindu law is contained in the Smritis or the Codes of Manu and other sages ; the commentators profess merely to explain the same. The earlier commentators composed systematic treatises on all branches of law, compiling and reconciling the texts of the various Codes which do not appear to lay down the same law in all matters. But it must not be supposed that all the commentators endeavoured to set forth the rules of law that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from a comparison of the texts of the different Smritis or Codes on the same subject, by the application of the authoritative rules of interpretation and construction ; for, what the successive commentators who founded the different schools, really did, was, that they altered the law as laid down by their predecessors under the pretext of interpreting the Smritis ; and what the followers of the founders of the schools did, was, to explain the law laid

down by their masters, more fully when left dubious or obscure by them, and also supplied their deficiencies, and sometimes refuted adverse arguments advanced by writers of other schools who were opponents of their doctrines, and they did also, though rarely, express with respect their dissent from the view of their masters, where the same appeared to them to be open to just and legitimate criticism.

Hence one must know what had been the law before, and how has the law been understood after, a particular commentary was written, in order to understand fully, properly and correctly the law intended to be enunciated by its author. Every commentator appears to address his work to those that were familiar with the law explained in the then existing commentaries ; and with regard to the innovations and alterations introduced by him, the prevalent doctrines opposed to his views are noticed, controverted and refuted by him with elaborate ratiocination, while those assented to by him are accepted without discussion as forming the common basis of argument, and some again are tacitly accepted though left altogether unnoticed, as matters well-understood and so thought unnecessary to be repeated.

Accordingly, the law of the Bengal school founded by Jímútaváhana whose views are enunciated in his *Dáyabhága* cannot be fully, clearly and correctly appreciated and understood unless one reads that work together with the *Mitákshará* the universally respected anterior commentary on all the branches of law, on the one hand, and the posterior works of both the schools, on the other, namely, the glosses on the *Dáyabhága*,

this *Dáyatattwa*, and the *Dáyakrama-Sangraha*, works of the Bengal school, supplementing and explaining the doctrines and the law laid down in that treatise of paramount authority in Bengal, as well as the later works of the *Mitákshará* school, criticising the peculiar doctrines of the Bengal school, such as the *Víramitrodaya* of *Mitra-Misra*.

This historical method of study should be adopted, inasmuch as that alone can enable us to understand not only the gradual growth and development of Hindu law, but also the law of the Bengal school the distinctive features of which are laid down in the *Dáyabhága* a work which is admitted on all hands to be not exhaustive as regards inheritance and succession the only branch of law it deals with. It has already been remarked that all the schools profess to admit the *Smritis* to be the fountain-source of law, and all that the commentators profess to do, is to explain the law propounded in these Codes. The successive commentators do, as has already been said, either supplement and elucidate the law as left by their predecessors, or introduce some changes and innovations in the law, under the pretext and disguise of putting correct interpretation on the texts of the *Smritis*. The successive commentaries are therefore inter-dependent on each other, to a certain extent, so that for the purpose of the correct understanding of any one of them, the others should be taken into consideration. The *Dáyabhága* bears the distant analogy of being as it were an amending Statute of the *Mitákshará* so far as Bengal is concerned. This comparison expresses the relation which the two works bear to each other.

Although the *Dáyabhága* is the fountain-source of the peculiar doctrines constituting the Bengal school, and as such is regarded as the work of paramount authority in Bengal, still, having regard to the nature and character of the treatise, it must not be deemed and read like a modern statute intended to codify any branch of law. The *Mitákshará* and the *Dáyabhága* purport to be mere commentaries on the *Smritis*, and bear no resemblance to Codes of law.

The *Dáyabhága* is undoubtedly later than the *Mitákshará* as regards both time and development : and the knowledge of the previous state of the law enunciated in the *Mitákshará* is, as has already been remarked, absolutely necessary for understanding the peculiar doctrines of the Bengal school, which are in opposition to those of the *Mitákshará*, as well as for appreciating the arguments advanced in the *Dáyabhága* to support and maintain its positions, and to controvert and refute the opposite views inculcated in the *Mitákshará*. It follows therefore that as regards matters on which the *Dáyabhága* is silent and deficient, the law of the *Mitákshará* was intended by the founder of the Bengal school to be accepted and followed. And this is precisely the view which the Privy Council have taken, and if I may presume to say so, rightly taken, while giving a lucid exposition of the manner in which the different schools have come into existence. Their Lordships observe,—“Thus the *Mitákshará*, which is universally accepted by all the schools except that of Bengal, as of the highest authority, and which in Bengal is received also as of high authority, yielding only to the *Dáyabhága* in those

points where they differ, was a commentary on the Institutes of Yājñavalkya": *Collector of Madura vs. Mootoo Ramalinga*, 12 moore's I. A., 397, 435. Their Lordships further observe in the well-known Unchastity case of *Moniram Kalita vs. Keri Kalitani* 7 I. A., 115— I. L. R., 5 Cal., 776, that the Vīramitrodaya a commentary of the Mitāksharā school and a work of later date than the Dáyabhāga "may also like the Mitāksharā, be referred to in Bengal in cases where the Dáyabhāga is silent".

Another important matter to be specially noticed with respect to an argumentative and controversial work like the Dáyabhāga which is respected as authoritative, is, that the positions and conclusions maintained and deduced by the author from the passages of the Codes, cited by him are to be accepted as law, although the arguments whereby the same are supported may be deemed faulty, unconvincing, inconsistent or erroneous. It is worthy of special observation that it is only the positions and conclusions maintained and drawn by the author that are to be respected ; we shall not be justified in deducing fresh inferences from those texts and arguments, not drawn by the author himself. The argument whereby a particular position is established may be proved to be inaccurate and untenable ; but that will not affect the position itself which must be accepted and acted upon. The question to be considered by the Court is, what is maintained by the author, and not, how the same is maintained. The reasons may be good, bad or indifferent, but they are not to be regarded at all ; for, if the conclusion which appears to be drawn from them is clearly

expressed, then, although the process of reasoning whereby the same is deduced may be quite unsound, it must nevertheless be followed. It should be borne in mind that the *Dáyabhága* is followed by the people of Bengal, not because the arguments in support of its doctrines are strong, reasonable, convincing, persuasive and unanswerable ; but because the rules of law therein propounded are suitable to their feelings and sentiments. It should also be remembered that the real object of the commentators was, as has already been said, not to discuss the law such as is propounded in the *Smritis*, but to establish what they thought should be the law ; and this was no doubt the same in many respects, as enunciated in the *Smritis* which however, in so far as regarded the innovations and changes introduced for the first time by a commentator, were modified and virtually repealed as it were, but under the garb and disguise of their interpretation—a fiction which must be resorted to wherever there is a rigid body of law unalterable in theory, but partly unsuitable to an altered state of society which is not and cannot remain stationary, but is always subject to changes in the course of time, though the same are slow among Hindus, one of the most conservative nations in the world.

This view that the courts are not justified in drawing fresh inferences from texts cited and arguments advanced, by the author in the *Dáyabhága*, that is, inferences not deduced by the author himself,—is maintained, and if I may presume to say so, rightly maintained by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the *Unchastity case*, who observe—“But even if the

words were more open to such a construction than they appear to be, their Lordships are of opinion that what they have to consider is not so much what inference can be drawn from the words of Catyayana's text by itself, as what are the conclusions which the author of the *Dáyabhága* has himself drawn from them. It is to that treatise that we must look for the authoritative exposition of the law which governs lower Bengal, whilst on the other hand nothing is more certain than that in dealing with same ancient texts, the Hindu commentators have often drawn opposite conclusions." *Moniram v. Keri Kalitani*, I. L. R. 5 Cal. 776, 785.

It is extremely to be regretted that in some cases dealing with the law of succession according to the *Dáyabhága* the foregoing considerations were entirely lost sight of. In the eleventh chapter of the *Dáyabhága* the order of succession to a man's property is explained. In order to introduce certain near and dear cognates in the order of succession, in preference to comparatively more distant agnates, the author relies, as one of the arguments supporting his views, on the doctrine of spiritual benefit which the author maintains is enunciated in two slokas of Manu, and a passage of Baudháyana. From the references to this doctrine in the arguments to support the positions of the different relations in the order of succession, no consistent principle can be deduced. In fact the author's object was to lay down an order of succession different in some respects from that in the *Mitákshará*, and in support of this order the author refers to the capacity for conferring spiritual benefit, as one of the reasons in his argument for the justification of the

changes introduced by him in the order. It is erroneous to say that the author's object was to establish a principle of spiritual benefit, which doctrine itself he gives up in the concluding portion of the chapter, where he maintains that the *order* maintained by him ought to be accepted by the learned, although his exposition of spiritual benefit might be rejected. Besides, there is no data from which a consistent principle could be deduced, such as is fancied to have been in the mind of the author, who no doubt asserts that, of two relations he who confers greater amount of spiritual benefit in a particular manner is to be preferred to the other ; but there is nothing in his work from which a case of contest between two relations for preference, which the author himself has not considered, can be settled, by means of the theory of spiritual benefit ; since it is absolutely impossible to calculate their relative capacity for conferring the same, where the author himself has not done so. I am unable to understand how, in the face of what the author himself expressly says in the eleventh chapter of the *Dāyabhāga*, can it reasonably be maintained that the object of the author was to lay down therein the principle of spiritual benefit, and not an order of succession. The so-called principle deduced from the various references to the capacity for performing the *Pārvana Srāddha*, in the *Dāyabhāga*, has been so explained by the Court as to make it inconsistent with the order of succession, which cannot but be admitted to be laid down by the acute logical author in the *Dāyabhāga*, to a certain extent, though not exhaustively. It may also be remarked here that the *Pārvana Srāddha*, the capacity to perform which

it suited the purpose of the author to refer to, for maintaining the changes in the order of succession, has become obsolete among the Hindus and is not generally celebrated at all at the present day.

It should be observed that the courts have explained the law more correctly in later decisions, as regards the meaning of the term *Bandhu* used in Yajnavalkya's text on the order of succession; in fact, the exposition of the term in the Full Bench case of *Umaid Bahadur* (I.L.R., 6 Cal., 119) is founded on a principle which is contrary to that on which the Full Bench decision in *Amrita Kumari's* case (2 B. L. R., F. B., 28 = 10 W. R.), rests, which is no other than the so-called principle of spiritual benefit, but which is not only not recognised in the *Mitāksharā*, but is expressly pronounced by its author to be unacceptable. The conclusions are right in both the cases, but the whole of the argument advanced by the court in the earlier case is virtually condemned and rejected as erroneous in the later decisions.

In the Full Bench case of *Guru Govinda Shaha Mandal* (5 B. L. R., 15 = 13 W. R., F.B., 47) both the Judges and the Lawyers erred in the view of the law, “अन्धेनेव नीयमाना यद्यान्वाः,” i. e., “like the blind led by the blind.”

But what is most regrettable is that the error then committed should be perpetuated, and an erroneous admission by the pleader though very eminent who was subsequently elevated to the Bench and became a pre-eminent judge, and who argued the case before the Full Bench on behalf of the unjustly losing party,—should be

accepted as law, when the same leads to most absurd and unnatural results. And it is strange that a point should be deemed to be decided by a Full Bench that expressly omitted to decide it, because of the admission which was made at a time when the text enumerating *Bandhus* was altogether misunderstood. If the correct meaning of that term were known when the said case was decided by the Full Bench, and the order of succession explained in this work were known to the pleader or were accessible to the learned judges, or their Lordships' attention were otherwise drawn to the light it throws on the question for their consideration, then undoubtedly the learned pleader instead of making the admission he did, would have contended on the authority of this *Dáyatattwa*, that the position of his client's opponent who was the Uncle's Daughter's son, in the order of succession, is the same as in the *Mitákshará*, and that therefore he could not be preferred to his client who was an agnate, though a *Sakulya*, and the Court would have arrived at the right decision. I have said that the result is absurd, because if a particular order of succession is repugnant to the feelings of all Hindus without exception, it cannot but be pronounced absurd. Ask any Hindu of Bengal whether the fraternal nephew's son's son or his daughter's son is entitled to preference, and he will unhesitatingly answer the question in a manner contrary to that given by the Full Bench in the case of *Digambari vs. Motilal* I. L. R., 9 Cal., 563. Any one impelled by curiosity may make the experiment by putting the question in Bengali whether ভাইপোর পৌত্র বা ভাইপোর দৌহিত্র is entitled to succeed, to

a Hindu whether he knows English or not, and he will find that one uniform answer will unhesitatingly be given by one and all without a single exception, in favour of the agnate descendant.

It is remarkable that those who imagine the principle of spiritual benefit to be the key to the Hindu law of inheritance lose sight of the fundamental doctrine involved in the very definition of the term *Dáya* or heritage, which means property left by a deceased person devolving on a living person by reason of the *relationship* of the latter to the former. It is *relationship* not spiritual benefit, that forms the foundation of inheritance in Hindu law, as in every other system of Jurisprudence : nor is it the principle of spiritual benefit, but the capacity to perform a particular obsequial ceremony, that is referred to in the *Dáyabhága* as one of the arguments in support of the order of succession of a few relations only. To the question,—who are heirs ? The answer is—“Relations are heirs.” To the question—“In what order are the relations to take ? The answer given in the *Mitákshará*, is—“In the order of the proximity of their relationship ;” while the *Dáyabhága* adds that the capacity to confer spiritual benefit by the performance of the *Párvana Sráddha* must also be taken into consideration to determine the order in which certain relations are to inherit. It should be noticed that the capacity to confer spiritual benefit by the performance of the *Adya* and the like *Sráddhas*, other than the *Párvana Sráddha*, which are *actually* performed, is not to be taken into consideration at all, although the same are of far greater benefit to the soul

of the deceased than the latter, which are seldom if ever performed in these days, by even the high castes, while among the lower classes or the Majority of the Hindus the same have become obsolete or things of the past.

The author of the *Dáyabhága* has dealt with the order of succession of different relations in the successive Sections of the Eleventh Chapter. In Section one, the Widow's Succession is discussed at considerable length; in Section two, that of the daughter and daughter's son; in the third, that of the father; in the fourth, that of the mother; in the fifth, that of the brothers, of half and whole blood, as well of those that are joint or separated, or re-united after separation; and in the sixth, of other relations. In the case of every one of the relations, there is some peculiarity and qualification as regards his or her capacity to confer spiritual benefit; and in some, other grounds are mentioned justifying preference. It is impossible to discover a consistent principle of spiritual benefit, which may be said to be the foundation of the order of succession. The attempt to deduce a general principle as being one that logically follows from the various cases in which reference is made to the capacity to confer spiritual benefit, as well as to some other matter, dealt with in the said Sections,—is analogous to what the Lord Chancellor remarks, ought not to be done, as regards deduction of any principle from the generality of expressions in judgments in particular cases,—in the following passage,—

“Now before discussing the case of *Allen v. Flood*, and what was decided therein, there are two observations

of a general character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all".—*Quinn v. Latham*, L. R., Appeal Cases 1901, p. 495, 506.

These remarks made by the Earl of Halsbury apply *mutatis mutandis* to the *ratio decidendi* in *Gurugobinda Shaha Mundals* case. The discussions in the *Dáyabhága* regarding the inheritance of particular relations or groups of relations are like so many judgments applicable to those relations only, and all the arguments on the basis of the doctrine of spiritual benefit, found in any part of the chapter XI, are put forward to support the succession of those relations only. "The generality of expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law". For we find that in almost every instance some other consideration is introduced to qualify the particular capacity for spiritual benefit which again is absolutely wanting in the female heirs,—a fact negating

the theory of the said capacity being the criterion of inheritance. The endeavour to arrive at a logical generalisation from the references to the spiritual benefit cannot but be regarded as most unreasonable and illogical, when it is inconsistent with the order of succession maintained by the author, who invokes the aid of the spiritual benefit as an argument in support of the said *order*. It proves the Lord Chancellor's remark that there is no logic in law. The argument—that the exposition of the principle of spiritual benefit and the effect given to it by the Full Bench would lead to the above result,—is met thus,—“But this circumstance (that is, the interference of that principle with the order of succession specified in the earlier part of Ch. XI), even if true, cannot be accepted as a sufficient reason to justify the total exclusion of one single individual who is really competent to satisfy all the requirements of that principle. If in any case which may arise hereafter, it should become necessary for us to determine the precise position which the son of a paternal uncle's daughter is entitled to hold in the order of succession, the question would fairly arise, namely, whether the details of a work like the *Dayābhāga* ought to be permitted to over-ride the principle upon which it is admittedly based”.—13, W. R. 49, 63.

The whole argument on both sides,—namely, that the paternal uncle's daughter's son is not an heir at all, because he is not mentioned to be so, on the one side, and that he is an heir because he is capable of conferring spiritual benefit, on the other side,—was equally fallacious. The paternal uncle's daughter's son is an

heir, not because he satisfies all the requirements of the so-called spiritual principle, but because he bears a particular blood relationship to his maternal grand-father's brother's son. For, all heirs do not confer spiritual benefit, nor do all who confer spiritual benefit are entitled to become heirs ; and the doctrine is used by the author, not for the purpose of finding out who are heirs, but for the purpose of supporting the *order* in which certain heirs are to inherit. It has already been said that to the question who are heirs the answer is, Relations are heirs, in fact, the very definition of the term *Dāya* = *heritage*, proves this. After some explanatory comments on the text of Nārada, defining Partition of Heritage the author concludes as to the import of Heritage by saying,—“Therefore, the word *Dāya* = heritage is, by usage, employed to signify, property in which ownership *caused by relationship* to the previous owner arises on the extinction of his ownership (by death natural or civil.)”—See *Dāyabhāga* ch. I., para 5.

A careful perusal of the whole chapter XI will convince the reader that the author laid down a particular *order* of succession, and directed the entire argument to maintain the said *order* which however was intended, not to be exhaustive, but to extend down to the “*maternal uncle and the like*” and so illustrating the order in so far as it was different from that of the *Mitāksharā* ; but he intended to leave the rest with respect to which there was no controversy, in the same state as in the said universally respected treatise, only supplementing it with a few observations in the course of explaining the Smṛiti-texts on succession, cited by

him, and thus seeming to superficial readers to deal with the law of succession exhaustively. He relied no doubt, on his own peculiar view of spiritual benefit, with which, he knew, the learned could not be satisfied ; but he maintained that even if the same be abandoned, still the *order* of succession specified by him should be accepted as the one intended by the sages.

As regards the doctrine of spiritual benefit, upon which arguments are founded by Jímútaváhana for supporting the order of succession, introduced by him, it should be noticed that it owes its origin to the novel interpretation of the text of Baudháyana cited by him in Chapter XI, Section I, paragraph 37, and explained in the next paragraph 38. It appears to have been unknown to any commentator who wrote before him.

It is no doubt true, that the Hindu Shástras extol the importance of male issue in a spiritual point of view. There are many texts in the Smritis bearing on this subject ; for instance,

Manu (9, 138) and Vishnu (15, 43) declare,—

पुत्रान्नो नरकाद् यस्मात् पितरं त्रायते सुतः ।

तस्मात् पुत्र इति प्रोक्तः स्वयमेव स्वयम्भुवा ॥ मनविष्णु ।

“Since a son delivers (tráyate) the father from the hell called *Put* ; therefore he is named *Put-tra* or *Put-deliverer*, by the self-existent himself.”

Similarly, Háríta says,—

पुत्रामा निरयः प्रोक्तश्-क्षितन्तुश्च नैरयः ।

तत्र वै त्रायते यस्मात् तस्मात् पुत्र इति स्मृतः ॥ हारीतः ।

“A (certain) hell is called by the name of *Put* ; and one destitute of issue goes to (that) hell : a son is

therefore known as *Put-tra*, because he delivers (his father) from the same."

So Sankha and Likhita declare,—

पितृणाम् अनृणो जीवन् दृष्ट्वा पुत्रमुखं पिता ।

स्वर्गी स तेन जातेन तस्मिन् संन्यस्य तदृणं ।

अग्निहोत्रं त्रयो वेदा यन्नाश्च शतदक्षिणाः ।

ष्येष्टपुत्रप्रसूतस्य कलां नार्हन्ति षोडशीं ॥

"A father becomes while alive exonerated from the debt to his ancestors, upon seeing the face of a son (after birth) : by means of that son born (to him), he becomes entitled to heaven, devolving on the son that debt (to ancestors) : The maintenance of the holy fire, the three Vedas, and sacrifices with payment of large fees to the officiating priests, are not entitled to have even the sixteenth part of the efficacy of the birth of an eldest son."

Likewise Manu (9, 137), Sankha, Likhita, Vishnu (15, 45), Vasishtha (13, 5), and Háríta ordain,—

पुत्रेण लोकान् जयति पौत्रेणानन्त्यम् अमृते ।

अथ पुत्रस्य पौत्रेण ब्रह्मस्याप्नोति पिष्टपं ॥

"By a son, (a man) conquers worlds (*i. e.* secures heavenly regions) ; by a son's son, (he) obtains immortality (literally, endlessness) ; and by a son's son's son (he) reaches the sun's region."

So also Yájnavalkya (1, 78) declares,

लोकानन्त्यं दिवः प्राप्तिः पुत्र-पौत्र-प्रपौत्रकैः ।

यस्मात्, तस्मात् स्त्रियः सेव्या, कर्त्तव्याश्च सुरक्षिताः ॥

“Since, immortality in this world (by means of the continuation of lineage), and attainment of heaven, are secured) by son, son’s son and son’s son’s son, therefore wives should be approached, and should be guarded well.”

जायमानो ह वै ब्राह्मणस्त्रिभिर्ऋषैर्ऋणवान् जायते ।
ब्रह्मचर्येण ऋषिभ्यः, यज्ञेन देवेभ्यः, प्रजया पितृभ्यः,—एष वा
अनृत्यो-यः पुत्री यज्वा ब्रह्मचारी च ॥ श्रुतिः ।

“A Bráhmāna on being born becomes a debtor in three obligations: to the Rishis (who are the propounders of the sacred books), for studentship (to peruse the same); to the Gods, for sacrifices; to the ancestors, for progeny: he becomes free from the debts, who has son, who has performed sacrifices, and who has studied the Vedas.”

The object which the Hindu sages had in view in propounding the above doctrine, was to place marriage on a spiritual basis, or in other words, to thrust into prominence the spiritual aspect of the fundamental institution, upon which the continuance of the human race rests. The whole Sanskrit literature is imbued with this religious spirit that was imparted by the sages to the holy relation upon which the propagation of the human race depends. The connection of the sexes is not to be deemed primarily a source of sensual pleasure, of which the birth of children is an undesirable though inseparable accident; whereas the perpetuation of lineage should be regarded as its primary object, although the Providence has in its infinite wisdom combined with

it an imperious craving, the fulfilment of which is attended with pleasurable sensibility, while securing the attainment of the primary object. The Hindu sages endeavoured to place the responsibilities of marriage and care of children on a spiritual basis, so that persons might not be averse to the same, while engaged in the pursuit of the pleasures attending the commerce of sexes.

It should be remarked that the spiritual benefit derived from male issue, as set forth in the above texts, has nothing whatever to do with the offerings of oblations of food or of libations of water, in any *Srāddha* and the like ceremony, that may be performed by them, after the death of the father or other ancestor, inasmuch as the benefit arises on the very birth of male issue, and does not depend on anything to be done by them. There are, however, passages in the *Sāstras*, that the souls of deceased ancestors are anxious that their lineage should continue to exist in this world, and are pleased when they celebrate the ancestor-worship, or even offer libations of water to them.

There is, however, no authority in the *Sāstras* to support *Jīmútavāhaná's* theory of spiritual benefit derived by a person from the offering of *Pinda* or oblation made to any of the three paternal ancestors of a deceased person, by a *collateral* relation while performing the *Párvana Srāddha* ceremony, except his arbitrary interpretation of a text of *Baudháyana*, which cannot convey the meaning he puts upon it, and which will presently be considered. And as regards the benefit derived by a deceased person from the offering of *Pindas*, made to his maternal ancestors, by the maternal

uncle and the like, not only there is no authority in support of it, to be found in the Sástras, but it seems to be opposed to a well-known principle laid down by them.

The text of Baudháyana upon which the doctrine of spiritual benefit is founded is as follows,—

प्रपितामहः पितामहः पिता स्वयं सोदर्या भ्रातरः, सवर्णायाः
पुत्र-पौत्र-प्रपौत्राः । एतान् अविभक्त-दायादान् सपिण्डान् आचक्षते ।
विभक्त दायादान् सकुल्यान् आचक्षते । सत्स्वङ्गेषु तन्नामी ह्यर्थो
भवति । (तदभावे सपिण्डः) । सपिण्डाभावे सकुल्यः । तदभावे
चाचार्योऽन्तेवासी ऋत्विग् वा हरेत् । तदभावे राजा ॥

Dáyabhága Chapter XI, Section I para 37.

The plain meaning of the text is shown by the following translation,—

“The paternal great-grandfather, the paternal grandfather, the father, the man himself, his uterine brothers, his son, son’s son, and son’s son’s son by women of the same caste : all these enjoying the undivided *heritage* (Dáya) are pronounced *Sapindas* (or those living in the same mess) ; those who enjoy divided *heritage* are called *Sakulyas* (or those having the same land for cultivation, or belonging to the same family.) Male issue of the body being left, the property must go to them ; on failure of *Sapindas*, the *Sakulyas* ; on failure of them, the preceptor or the pupil or the priest shall take (the property) ; in their default the king.”

In this translation the word *Dáya* is taken in the sense of *heritage* which is its plain, ordinary and natural meaning, and which alone is compatible with the context, and which every Sanskritist would put on the word, if he has not read the interpretation put on

the above text by the author of the *Dáyabhága*. For, *Jínútaváhana* puts a novel construction of his own, upon that part of the above passage, which has been rendered above into—"all these enjoying the undivided *heritage* are pronounced *Sapindas* ; those who enjoy the divided *heritage* are called *Sakulyas*"—by taking the word *Dáya* meaning heritage in the new sense of *Pinda* or oblation, entirely evolved out of his inner consciousness ; since in no other work in the Sanskrit language, is that word used in that sense. There is no Lexicon, Thesaurus, Vocabulary or Dictionary of the Sanskrit language in which the word *Dáya* is found to bear the meaning of *Pinda*. The passage according to him would mean,—“all these enjoying the *undivided oblation* are pronounced *Sapindas* ; those who enjoy the *divided oblation* are called *Sakulyas*.”

And thereupon he builds a novel theory of the effect of the *Sapindi-karana* ceremony which, as understood by all other Sanskrit writers on the subject, has the only effect of entitling the soul of the deceased, for whom the ceremony is performed, to pass from the *Preta-loka*—or the region of the next world to which the soul of a person goes just after his death—to the *Pitri-loka* or the higher region of the *Pitris* or paternal ancestors, where the spirits of the deceased persons dwell, for whom the sixteen *Sraddhas* ending with and including the *Sapindi-karana*, have regularly been performed by their surviving descendants or other relations in this world. But it was left to the author of the *Dáyabhága* to discover a novel effect of the last ceremony, which had been entirely unknown to all the previous

commentators, namely, that since the performance of of the *Sapindi-karana* ceremony, the soul of a person participates with the souls of his three paternal ancestors in the oblations that may be presented to them by any of their descendants whether agnate or cognate. The doctrine is very peculiar ; none of the ancestors takes any share of any *Pinda* offered to a descendant. He who when alive offered a *Pinda* to a paternal ancestor, does after death partake of a *Pinda* offered to that paternal ancestor by any other of his descendants either in the male or in the female line. And although a person while alive may offer *Pindas* to his maternal ancestors, he does not after death share in their oblations, because there is no *Sapindana* or mixing up of his *Pinda* with those of the maternal ancestors, such mixing up being confined with those of the paternal ancestors only. If the *Sapindana* or the mixing of the four *Pindas*—one being intended for the soul of the deceased for whom the *Sapindi-karana* ceremony is celebrated, and the three others for his three paternal ancestors one for each,—had the effect of entitling it to enjoy the oblations offered to the paternal ancestors, why should not the latter *vice versa* enjoy the oblations offered to the former and also to each other. There is neither reason nor rhyme in the arbitrary and dogmatic view which has emanated from the imagination of Jímútaváhana.

The foregoing texts show that the Shástras impose a religious duty on every man to have a son. There is also authority recommending the possession of more sons than one, whom a person should leave behind him

at his death to perpetuate the lineage and to perform his obituary rites and to conduct the periodical worship of his *paternal* ancestors. It is worthy of special remark that a man's son cannot confer any spiritual benefit on that man's *maternal* ancestors. For, the Ancestor-worship is a ceremony entirely in honour of the *paternal* ancestors, in which originally the maternal ancestors had no place ; though later on, a man was enjoined to worship his own three maternal ancestors also, after the paternal ancestors.

For instance, Manu ordains.—

त्रयाणाम् उदकं कार्यं त्रिषु पिण्डः प्रवर्त्तते ।

चतुर्थः सम्प्रदातैषां पञ्चमो नोपपद्यते ॥ ८, १८६ ।

“To three, should the libation of water be offered ; for three, is the funeral oblation of food ordained : the fourth is the giver of them, the fifth has no concern in them.”—9, 186.

This text can apply to the three *paternal* ancestors only, the latter sentence shows that it cannot refer to the three maternal ancestors ; because, the words “fourth” and “fifth” are used in the text, relatively to the remotest of the three ancestors to whom the offerings are to be made ; but the remotest of the three maternal ancestors being the maternal great-great-grand-father, the person who is to make the offerings would be the “fifth” relatively to him, according to the Hindu mode of calculating degrees, which is the same as that of the canonists, and according to which those two words have been employed in the text. Hence, it is clear that this text of Manu cannot reasonably be construed

to relate to maternal ancestors who could not be the objects of Ancestor-worship ordained by Manu in this text. The cognates were excluded as well from this ceremony as from inheritance, according to Manu's code.

Later on, men were enjoined to include the maternal ancestors in the Ancestor-worship, thus,—

पितरो यत्र पूज्यन्ते तत्र मातामहा ध्रुवं ।

“Where the paternal ancestors are worshipped, there the maternal grandfathers should certainly be worshipped.”

The son whom a man is bound to leave behind him, for discharging his debt to his paternal ancestors, can render no spiritual service to his maternal ancestors, because the son is required to worship his own, and not his father's, maternal ancestors, when celebrating the ancestor-worship. Therefore a man is not required, nor competent, to provide for the performance of any religious ceremony for the benefit of his maternal ancestors ; his duty in that respect dies with him. His religious obligation is not the same as regards the two sides of the ancestors. In fact, a man's *debt to ancestors* which is discharged by the birth of a son, does not at all refer to the maternal ancestors who cannot derive any spiritual benefit from that son.

How then can a man be said to be under a religious obligation to his maternal ancestors to provide for the offering of *pindas* to them after his death, and also to derive spiritual benefit from the offering of obsequial oblations, made to the maternal ancestors, by the maternal uncle and the like, who in doing so, merely discharge their own obligation to the same ancestors as their

male issue. The maternal uncle and the rest whose religious duty it is, to perform the worship of their paternal ancestors, can by no means be supposed to perform the ceremony vicariously for their sister's son and the like. Besides, there is a well-known maxim of Hindu religion, namely,—*युचि-तत्कालजीवी स्यात्*, which means, "Religious duty attaches to a person who is alive at the time (of its performance) and is unpolluted". This maxim negatives the idea of the subsistence of a person's religious duty towards his maternal ancestors, *after* his death. There is absolutely no authority or reason, therefore, to support the position that a man is spiritually benefited by the celebration of Ancestor-worship by the maternal uncle and the like maternal relations.

What again is the meaning of the words "*divided*" and "*undivided*" qualifying the term "*oblation*" the novel sense in which Jīmútaváhana wants to take the word *dāya* in Baudháyana's text. It is also impossible to understand any reasonable sense of the expression "participating in, or partaking of, *undivided* or *divided oblations*." The oblations that are presented to the three paternal and the three maternal ancestors in the Párvana Sráddha ceremony or the periodic Ancestor-worship in every lunar month,—are always *divided*, in the sense that a separate oblation is presented to each of the three ancestors on either side. It is this Sráddha ceremony on which Jīmútaváhana's doctrine of spiritual benefit is founded. Before this ceremony can be performed for benefiting, in the way maintained by the author, a deceased person, the *Sapindikarana Sráddha* rite must be celebrated for the deceased, on the first

lunar anniversary of his death. The performance of this rite is necessary for enabling the soul of the departed to leave the *Preta-loka* (or Hindu Purgatory) where it goes just after death, and enter the *Pitri-loka* or the region of the *Pitris* or celestial spirits, and thenceforward to become an object of the periodic Ancestor-worship. In this ceremony also, four separate oblations are made at first, and then an union of them is effected, symbolical of the association of the soul of the departed with the *manes* of his paternal ancestors, the oblations being the symbols of their celestial bodies. In this *Sapindi-karana* ceremony alone, the oblations can be said to be *undivided* by reason of the mixing of the four *pindas*. But the same cannot be predicated of the oblations in the *Párvana Sráddha* the foundation of the theory of spiritual benefit propounded in the *Dáyabhága*.

As regards the "*partaking of the oblations*," the author of the *Dáyabhága* says that the uses of a man's wealth are twofold, namely, *first*, personal enjoyment by himself, and *second*, donation or charity or enjoyment by others according to his pleasure. This proposition in its ordinary sense is unexceptionable. But then he goes on to say that after death also, a person may be said to enjoy his wealth if the same be applied to the performance of the *Párvana-Sráddha*, the oblations offered in which may be enjoyed by him, in the fanciful manner depicted by him ; and if that also is not possible by reason of the default of relations that could and would offer such oblations, then similar enjoyment by his three maternal ancestors, of oblations offered by their male issue at the expense of his wealth inherited

by them would resemble *charity* meritorious in a spiritual point of view, and beneficial to his soul.

Thus the author asserts a low selfish principle of inheritance, which is not only unsupported by the Shástras, but is contrary to the fundamental doctrines of Hindu religion. How do the ancestors enjoy the oblation? Certainly not in the physical sense, for the *pinda* does not show its enjoyment by any one, it is not affected in any way, either in size, quantity or quality. What does the ceremonial itself prove: it shows that the Ancestor-worship does not differ in the least from the worship of Gods by the Hindus. As in the worship of Gods, so in that of the ancestors, dishes of choicest food are placed where they are supposed to come on invocation, the preparation of which is intended to afford evidence of their reverence and earnest desire to please them; and it is also prayed that the Gods and the ancestors may be pleased to accept and partake of the same, and be satisfied. But they are believed to be pleased by the mere sight of the things, and not to partake of them, which are ultimately distributed among Bráhmanas. That the ceremony is performed for the purpose of receiving benefits from the ancestors, and not for the purpose of conferring benefits on them, is proved by the prayers that are in the course of the ritual addressed to them when they are dismissed at the conclusion of the ceremony. The prayers are—

“ॐ एत नः पितरः सौम्यासो—गन्धारीभिः पथिभिः
पूर्व्विणेभिः । दत्तात्मभ्यं द्रविणे ह भद्रं रयिञ्च नः सर्व्ववीरं
नियञ्चत ॥”

“Om ! come O our auspicious fathers, by the deep ancient paths, and give us blessings about (our) property and grant us wealth and many heroic sons.

See ritual of Sráddha among followers of the Sama-Veda.

and

दातारो नोऽभिवर्द्धन्तां, वेदः सन्ततिरेव च ।

अद्वा च नो मा व्यगमत्, बहु देयश्च नोऽस्त्विति ।

अन्नश्च नो बहु भवेद्, अतिथींश्च लभेमहि ।

याचितारश्च नः सन्तु, मा च याचिष्य कश्चन ।

अन्नं प्रवर्द्धतां नित्यं, दाता शतश्च जीवतु ॥

तेषामस्त्वन्नया दृष्टि-र्येभ्यः सङ्कल्पिता हिजाः ।

एताः सत्याशिषः सन्तु ॥”

“वाजी वाजोऽवत वाजिनो नो धनेषु विप्रा अमृता ऋतज्ञाः ।

अस्य मध्वः पिवत मादयध्वं दृष्ट्वा यात पथिभिर्देवयानैः ॥”

“May our donors prosper ; may the sacred learning, male issue, and faith in the teachings of the Shástras be never wanting in us ; may our things for making gifts be numerous ; may our food be abundant ; may we get guests (seeking our place for entertainment) ; may many persons beg of us ; may we never (be under the need to) beg ; may our stock of food increase every day ; may the donor live a hundred years ; may those (our forefathers) represented by the Bráhmanas (appointed in that behalf) have unceasing gratification : may these blessings be realized.”

“In every battle do (ye) protect us fighting for property (oh !) wise and immortal (fathers), aware of

the reward of pious rites ; drink (ye) this honey and be delighted, and being satisfied depart by paths used by Gods."—Raghunandana's *Srāddha-Tattwa*.

The fundamental doctrines of Hindu religion are :—the eternity of the soul ; its confinement in a body ethereal or mundane such as that of a God or of a man or of any lower animal, until *Moksha* or liberation ; its metempsychosis or transmigration from one body to another ; and its subjection to its *Karma* or acts and omissions in its past states of existence while living as a human being, which produce the *Adrishta* or Invisible Dual Force of virtues and vices, determining its condition of happiness and misery, and its assumption of different forms of body. According to the theory of *Adrishta*, which is universally known to all Hindus from the highest to the lowest, every man is the builder of his own condition and fortune. The millions of Hindus meeting with untimely death after suffering indescribable miseries at a famine, curse only their own selves as the greatest sinners in previous states of existence, and therefore suffering untold woes. They do not blame either the Government or the landlords or any other person for their terrible misfortune, which they ascribe to their own past misdeeds awarding the same as condign punishment for expiating them ; and they die like philosophers, without even thinking of resorting to violence for procuring good for themselves and their dear ones, from their lucky neighbours possessing the same in abundance.

The doctrine of spiritual benefit derived from funeral oblations offered in the *Pārvana Srāddha* that

may be, performed by relations, at their option, is utterly inconsistent with the fundamental doctrine of *Karma* and *Adrishta* set forth above. According to the ritual prescribed in comparatively recent treatises, the sixteen *Srāddhas* ending with the *Sapindi-Karana* celebrated on the first lunar anniversary of a deceased person, which are performed for a deceased individual alone, appear to stand on a different footing ; and the Hindu law also makes the performance of them obligatory on the heir out of the estate left by the deceased. The soul of a deceased person, for whom these obituary ceremonies have been performed, is popularly believed to pass from the *Preta-loka* or region for the departed or the world of ghosts or Purgatory, to the *Pitri-loka* or region for the manes of ancestors, or heaven. Had the effect of the *Parvána Srāddha* been such as is explained in the aforesaid passage of the *Dáyabhága*, the regular performance of the same should have been made legally obligatory on the heir. But the author of that work was perfectly aware of the weakness of his argument in support of the so called principle of spiritual benefit ; and accordingly, he says that if the learned be unsatisfied with the doctrine, that the capacity for conferring spiritual benefit is the principle or criterion of the order of succession, yet the order of succession set forth by him should be accepted as the one deducible from the texts cited by him : Ch. xi, Sect. vi, para 33.

Hence the *order of succession* laid down in the *Dáyabhága* should be considered without any reference to the so-called principle of spiritual benefit, as in fact

there is no such consistent principle. The order is very clearly laid down ; and what was intended by the seemingly vague expression "the maternal uncle *and the rest*," is explained by Raghunandana in this treatise, and by Srikrishna in his commentary on the *Dáyabhāga* as well as in his *Dāya-krama-sangraha* leaving aside the spurious passages or interpolations that were not parts of the original text of this work, and therefore not found in all manuscript copies as is stated by Colebrooke. Looking to the author's argument introducing in the order of succession, "the maternal uncle and the like," just after the paternal great-grand-father's daughter's son, that term must be taken to mean the meternal uncle, his son, and his son's son ; because they that confer the spiritual benefit on the *three* maternal ancestors to whom the deceased proprietor had to offer oblations during his life, are to become his heir's by reason of their performing, as it were, his duties vicariously. As the three male issue of a person confer the highest amount of spiritual benefit and as the maternal grandfather is the ancestor principally considered, those three are the only maternal relations that may come under the principle. But if the maternal-grandfather is alive, then because his male issue are not entitled to perform the *Srāddha* ceremonies during his life, and because secular benefit is perhaps as much important as the spiritual one, also because he is nearer in relationship, therefore he ought to succeed in preference to his descendants. Accordingly he is so placed in the order of succession, both by Raghunandana and Srikrishna. In fact these four maternal relations only were intended to

be introduced reciprocally to the four grandsons by daughter, of the proprietor himself and of his three paternal ancestors, as heirs in preference to the comparatively more distant agnates. And this appears to be the view, taken by Raghunandana, of the *Dáyabhága* law, of which the substance is given by him in this work, and this is the traditional interpretation of the *Dáyabhága* law as has all along been understood by the Panditas of the Bengal school. This view is also taken by Śrīkrishna the well-known commentator of the *Dáyabhága*, as appears from his Synopsis of the order of succession appended to his commentary on Ch. XI of the *Dáyabhága*, and also from his *Dáya-Krama-Sangraha* omitting however the interpolated passages which, Colebrooke says, were not found in all manuscript copies of the same.

Difficulty, however, arose in consequence of the omission in the *Dáyabhága* of other cognates ; and that gave rise to the Full Bench decision already referred to.

The object with which the translation of this work was published was to remove that difficulty, as well as the doubt created by the Full Bench as regards the whole order of succession. The object has been attained but partially : the order of succession down to the paternal great-grand-father's daughter's son, which is very clearly expressed in this treatise has been permitted to stand notwithstanding the revolutionary opinion expressed by that Full Bench. It is respectfully submitted that it would be highly desirable and satisfactory if the mistake into which the Full Bench was betrayed, be entirely corrected by the High Court.

It may be interesting to trace the cause of the origin of a new school of law in Bengal, different from that of the rest of India. The reason why this change of law was introduced and accepted in Bengal is to be sought in the social history of the two highest castes of the Bengali Hindus. A'disúra one of the Hindu kings of Bengal became sorry to find no Bráhmaṇa within his territory, so well versed in the sacred literature and the ceremonial of sacrifices, as to be able to enlighten him on the subject of the *Puttreshti* sacrifice, i. e., the sacrifice by the performance of which the birth of son may be secured, or to be able to perform the same in the prescribed mode. Buddhism had prevailed in Bengal for many centuries before the time of A'disúra, and appears to have been adopted by all classes excepting the Bráhmaṇas who were the greatest opponents of it, which though as a system of religion is really a branch of Hinduism, yet abolished the usage of hereditary caste or Bráhmaṇism, and preached equality by birth, and personal distinction based on possession of virtues, and thus laid the axe at the root of the Bráhmaṇical claim for inherited superiority, and necessarily turned them into its bitterest enemies. But the spread of Buddhism among other classes affected the Bráhmaṇas also, who could not be expected to learn the Shástras relating to the sacrifices, or to acquire the practical training for performing the same, while the people did not want to have them performed by their aid. The king of Bengal therefore had to request the king of Kányakubja or Kanauj to send him five learned Bráhmaṇas familiar with the sacred literature, and capable of performing as officiating priests all the Vedic

sacrifices. Accordingly five learned Bráhmaṇas came from Kanaúj to Bengal, and with them came also five learned Káyasthas sent probably because they were virtuous members of the same caste with the king of Bengal, who had sent for them also. The Bráhmaṇas were highly respected by the king who was impressed with the evidence of their learning and occult power. The King was also pleased with the Káyasthas on account of their virtues and high attainments. To the former, the king made grants of many villages ; and on the latter, he conferred high appointments in his state ; and thus they were induced to settle in his territory where they became the leading members of their respective castes.

These five Bráhmaṇas and five Káyasthas were respectively the ancestors of the present high-caste Bráhmaṇas and high-caste Káyasthas of Bengal. There was intermarriage between these new comers and the old Bráhmaṇas and Káyasthas, respectively. The new comers and their descendants held a higher social position than their respective caste people that had been settled here from before. Poligamy prevailed amongst the male descendants of the new comers, to whom members of the original castes eagerly gave their daughters in marriage, for raising the social status of their families. Many of these daughters used to continue to reside in their father's house, where their husbands either resided with them or approached them from time to time. Thus their sons were born and bred-up in their maternal grand-father's house, and were provided for by him. And in this way arose a closer tie of

connection with cognate relations, among the leading members of the two highest castes.

This furnishes us with the reason, why in Bengal the Law of succession was changed in favour of the dear and near cognates.

But though a person may be born and bred up in his mother's father's house, still it is with the maternal grandfather and his male issue only that the person's connection becomes closer, and not with their collateral relations, who have good reasons to be displeased with him and with his mother. A daughter residing in her father's family enjoys liberties that are denied to females coming into the family as daughters-in-law, to whom her conduct is often over-bearing and annoying, which is silently endured at first so long as they are young. But when these daughters-in-law grow up and assume the position which is naturally theirs in their husband's house, disagreements spring up fomented by this daughter, causing disruption of the family and separation of her father's brothers from him. And although she continues to live joint with her brothers for some longer time, still as she is her brother's wife's ननन्दृ *na-nandri* = relation *impossible to please*, they cannot live together in harmony, and so she is ultimately provided with a different house to live there with her children separately from her brother's family. Nor can her sons though living near her relations, be socially intimate with them; for they bear a different family name, and have not to observe any mourning for their maternal grandfather's collateral relations on death, and they observe mourning for three days only even on the death of their

mother's father. On these and other occasions, the fact that he is a stranger to the family, becomes remarkably conspicuous. But though thus living at a different place separate from their agnate relations, they have to observe the full period of mourning on the death of an agnate relation within seven degrees counted in the Hindu mode of computation. The tie of agnatic connection is very strong among the Hindus, and is not much weakened even under the foregoing adverse circumstances, but completely re-asserts itself among the descendants of the persons born and bred-up in the family of their mothers' father, who become the root of joint families on the agnatic basis, of their male descendants.

We are now in a position to understand why Jímúta introduced the change of law in the way set forth above : it was for the benefit of the members of Jímúta's own class, who were the leaders of Hindu Society ; and the same being acceptable to the leading members of the two foremost castes, became the law of Bengal without difficulty. For, "वद-वद-वाचरति श्रेष्ठस्तु तद एवेतरे जनाः"—ordinary people follow the usages of the leading persons.

Jímútaváhana was the 7th descendant of Bhattanáráyana one of the said five Bráhmanas ; he was the minister and administrator of Justice during the reign of Vishwaksema, and flourished in the last quarter of the 11th and the beginning of the 12th century of the Christian era. For this account, my thanks are due to Pandita Pramathanáth Tarkabhúshana the very learned professor of Smriti in the Calcutta Sanskrit College, who has found out the age of Jímúta from certain passages in his work called Kála-Viveka, and kindly

informed me of the same, and also to Pandita Lālmohan Vidyānidhi the author of the well-known work called *Sambandha-Nirnaya* who furnished me with the following passage of the *Kula-Kārikā* of Eru Misra, or the *Social History of the Bengali Brāhmanas* by Eru Misra, which gives a succinct account of Jīmútavāhana :—

ब्राह्मिण्यनीचजः श्रेष्ठो भट्टनारायणः कविः । तस्यात्मजो बटुर्नाम पारियामी बटुमुतः ॥
 बटुकस्य त्रयः पुत्राः मणिभद्रस्तु श्रेष्ठकः । मणिभद्र-सुतस्य पारिवर्त्तसमुज्ज्वलः ॥
 पारियामी बटुर्नाम मणिभद्रो जगद्गुरुः । भद्रमुनेः सुतो जातः धनज्ञयो महाकविः ॥
 तस्यान्वये विप्रजातः कवीनाम् शिरोमणिः । तस्य पुत्रो हलो नाम बङ्गराज्ये प्रतिष्ठितः ॥
 पारिकुल-मुनियेष्ठः सर्वत्र बुधपूजितः । तस्य पुत्रः सुधीः श्रीमान् चतुर्भुजः सदा युधिः ॥
 विष्णुमङ्गल-जीमूतो चतुर्भुजसुताबुमी । तस्मिन् काले बङ्गदेशे जीमूतचतुरक्षणीः ॥
 जीमूत-चतुर्भुज-पामात्यः ब्राह्मविवाह इतीरितः । तदुत्तिर्वेदवेदाङ्गे सूत्रा सूत्रतमाऽभवत् ॥
 जीमूराज्ये तदा राजा विश्वक्षेत्री महाव्रतः । प्रजाणां समुदाचारे तथा संव्रयमावने ।
 निबन्धो दायमानः स जीमूतेन कृतस्तदा ॥

एकुनिमस कुलकारिका ॥

"Bhatta-narāyana (one of the five Brāhmanas) was descended from the *Sāṇḍilya Gotra* and was a distinguished poet. His son was Batu by name who was very learned and was settled in the village Pāri. Batuka had three sons, of whom Manibhadra was the last; his son Manibhadra was the glory of the Pāri family; Manibhadra among the sons of Batu in the village Pāri, became the preceptor of the world. The great poet Dhananjaya was born as son to the sage Bhadra, in his lineage was born Bidhu the chief of poets. His son by name Hala was distinguished in the kingdom of Bengal, the best of the sages of the Pāri family, and respected everywhere by the learned. His son Chaturbhuja was learned, prosperous and always pure. Chaturbhuja had two sons Bilwa-mangala and Jīmu'ta. At that time in Bengal Jīmu'ta who was endowed with the highest intellectual capacity mastering all subjects became the minister of the king of the Gaura country and was celebrated as administrator of justice. His keen intellect became

keenest in the Vedas and the Vedāngas; at that time in the kingdom of Gaura, Viśvaksena was the king celebrated for austerities. It was at that time that the well-known commentary Dáyabhāga was composed by Jímu'ta for (the purpose of introducing) good usage among people and for removal of doubts."

Kula-Káriká of Eru Misra.

Jímútaváhana was an inhabitant of the village Pári-grāma situated on the southern bank of the river Ajay, at a distance of about five miles in the north-easterly direction from the Gooskara station in the Loop Line. It is included within the district of Burdwan.

In Pandita Bharat-chandra Síromani's Edition of the original Dáyabhāga with six commentaries there is the following sloka in the Peroration at the end of the work,—

पारिभद्रकुलोद्भूतः श्रीमान् जीमूतवाहनः ।

दायभागं चकारि मं विदुषां संशयच्छिदे ॥

meaning "The fortunate Jímútaváhana sprung from the Pári-Bhadra family, composed this Dáyabhāga for removing doubts of the learned."—Colebrooke's translation, however, does not contain this verse.

If this text be genuine, then the author appears to have thought that by describing himself as a member of the Pári-Bhadra family, sufficient account is given, namely, that he was a descendant of the celebrated professor Bhadra of Parí-gram, whose descendants were well-known to the learned Bráhmanas of Bengal.

As regards Jímu'ta's time allowing 25 years for a generation it would be the last quarter of the 2nd century after the migration of the five Bráhmana's into Bengal. And the time of Eru Misra who was the 18th descendant

of Vedagarbha another of the said five Bráhmaṇas, would be the 2nd quarter of the 5th century from the said time or two hundred and fifty years later than Jímúta's. The time of the migration as found in the Social Histories is 999th year of the Sambat era which corresponds with the 931st year of Christ.

Jímúta was highly respected, and Raghunandana who differs from him in a few particulars, does most respectfully express his dissent in this work which is but an epitome of Jímúta's work.

The translation has been revised, and a few alterations have been made, but they are not material. In this edition the original text is added and placed before the Translation: its presence is of great advantage for testing the accuracy of the rendering. For the convenience of reference it is, like the Translation, divided into Chapters, and so each Chapter is sub-divided into paragraphs, numbered consecutively. This edition is a fac-simile of the first, so that the same passages are to be found in the same pages of both editions.

In conclusion I have to thank Dr. Sarat-chandra Bandyopádhyáya, M. A., D. L., for carefully revising the Index.

20, SANKHARITOLA EAST,
Calcutta, 23rd October, 1904. }

G. S.

दायतत्त्वम् ।

महामहोपाध्याय-श्रीरघुनन्दनभट्टाचार्य-विरचित-स्मृतितत्त्वापर-
नामाष्टाविंशतितत्त्वान्तर्गतम् ।

श्रीगोलापचन्द्रशास्त्रिणा-संशोधितम् ।

अध्यायक्रमेण दायतस्वस्य विषयसूची ।

				पञ्चाङ्कः ।
प्रथमेऽध्याये ।	दायभागार्थनिरूपणं
द्वितीयेऽध्याये ।	पितृकृतविभागः
तृतीयेऽध्याये ।	पितर्युपरते चातृणां विभागः
चतुर्थेऽध्याये ।	विभागानधिकारिणः
पञ्चमेऽध्याये ।	विभात्वाविभाग्ये
षष्ठेऽध्याये ।	वृत्तविभागसन्देहे विनिर्णयः
सप्तमेऽध्याये ।	चिरप्रोषितानतस्य वंशस्य विभागः
अष्टमेऽध्याये ।	विभागकाक्षे निष्ठुतस्य पञ्चादवगतस्य विभागः
नवमेऽध्याये ।	स्त्रीधननिर्णयः
दशमेऽध्याये ।	स्त्रीधनाधिकारिणः
एकादशाध्याये ।	अपुत्रपुरुषधनाधिकारिणः

दायतत्त्वं ।

CHAPTER I.

(1) ओम् ! नमो गणेशाय । प्रबन्ध सच्चिदानन्दं वासुदेवं जगत्-पतिं । दायभागस्मृतेस्तत्त्वं वक्ति श्रीरघुनन्दनः । (2) निरूप्यन्तेऽत्र सच्चिदाद् दायभागविनिर्णयः । पिढस्तविभागश्च भ्रातृभागक्रियास्तथा । अनधिकारिभोगेभ्यविभाज्यविभाज्यता । विभक्तसंशयच्छेदोविभागो-निष्ठतस्व च । स्त्रोधनं तद्विभागार्होऽपुत्रधनाधिकारिणः ॥

(3) अथ दायभागः । (4) तत्र नारदः । 'विभागोऽर्धस्व पित्रयस्व पुत्रैर्यत्र प्रकल्प्यते । दायभाग इति प्रेक्तं तद्विवादपदं बुधैः' । अर्धो धनं । पित्रः पिढस्तसम्बन्धाज्जन्तः । यत्र विवादपदे । (5) दीयते इतिष्पुत्पत्त्या दायशब्दः । तत्र ददातिप्रयोगोक्तौषः । स्मृतप्रव्रजितादि-स्वत्व-निवृत्ति-पूर्वक-परस्वत्वोत्पत्ति-फल-साम्यात् । ननु स्मृतादीनां स्वत्वध्वंसफलको न ममेदमिति संकल्पान्नकस्यागस्तथास्ति । (6) एवं तद्वत्त्वे दायपदप्रयोगात् पूर्वस्वामिनः स्वत्वापगमोऽवसीयते । तत्रान्येषाञ्च पूर्वस्वामिसम्बन्धरधीनं स्वत्वं जायते । 'सत्स्वङ्गेषु तन्नास्मीत्यर्थो भवति' इति बोधायन-वचनात् । पिढस्तस्त्वोपरस्मि पुत्रेषु विद्यमानेषु पुत्रगतं तत्स्वत्वात्पदं धनं भवतीत्यर्थः । (7) यस्तु मिताचरायां 'उत्पत्तौ वार्धं स्वामित्वाज्जमेत इत्याचरार्थः' इति मोतम-वचनं । तदपि पिढस्तस्त्वोपरस्मिङ्गजत्वहेतुत्वेनोत्पत्तिमात्र-सम्बन्धेनान्यसम्बन्धाधिक्येन जनकधने पुत्ररायां स्वामित्वाजनं पुत्रो-क्तमेत नान्यसम्बन्धीत्याचार्या मन्वन्ते । (8) नच पिढस्तत्वे विष्-

मानेऽपि जन्मना तद्धने पुत्रस्त्वमिति वाच्यं । देवलवचनविरोधात् । तद्वयथा । 'पितर्युपरते पुत्राः विभजेयुर्धनं पितुः । अस्वाम्यं हि भवेदेषां निर्दोषे पितरि स्थिते' ॥ निर्दोषेऽपतिते । (9) अतएव विभागं प्रकृत्य नारदः । 'विनष्टे वाप्यशरणे पितर्युपरतस्मृहे' । विनष्टे पतिते । अशरणे गृहस्थाग्रमरहिते ॥ (10) तेन मरणपातित्य-गार्हस्थ्येतराग्रमगमनैः स्वत्वध्वंसे उपरतस्मृहे सत्यपि स्वत्वे स्वगत-धनेच्छारहिते च पुत्राणां विभागाधिकारः । (11) अत्र पतितानामपि स्वधन साध्यप्रायश्चित्तश्रुतेः पातित्येन स्वत्वनाशः प्रायश्चित्तवैमुख्ये बोध्यः । (12) स्वत्वसमानकालीनेच्छाप्रागभावासमानकालीनेच्छाध्वं-सत्वमुपरतस्मृहत्वं । (13) अत्रोपेक्षया स्वत्वे नाशिते पुनरिच्छया न स्वत्वमिति बोध्यं । (14) तस्मात् देवलवचने पितरि विद्यमाने तद्धने पुत्राणाम् अस्वाम्यश्रुतेः 'उत्पत्तौ वार्थं स्वामित्वात्तमेत इत्याचार्याः' इति गौतमवचनं पितृस्वत्वोपरमानन्तरमेव जन्मना पुत्रस्त्वसम्पादनात् स्वामित्वेन तद्धने पुत्रोत्तमेत्येतत्परं । नतु पितृस्त्वकाले जन्मानन्तरं । (15) नारदप्रथमवचने पितृपुत्रेति सम्बन्धिसाक्षोप-लक्षणं । दायभागमुपक्रम्य 'पत्नी दुहितरश्चैव पितरौ भ्रातरस्तथा । तत्सुतो गोत्रजो बन्धुः शिष्यः सन्नृणाचारिणः । एषामभावे पूर्वस्व-धनभागुत्तरोत्तरः । स्वर्थातस्य ह्यपुत्रस्य सर्व्ववर्णेष्वयं विधिः' ॥ इति याज्ञवल्क्योक्तेः । उत्तरोत्तर इति बोधायनश्रुतेः पूर्व्वस्वेत्यत्रापि तथा । (16) तेन यत्र द्रव्ये यत्-स्वामिनः पुत्रत्वादिसम्बन्धाधीनं तत्स्वत्वोपरमे तत्सम्बन्धिनः स्वत्वं तत्र तं प्रति निरुद्धोदायशब्दः । (17) पुत्रत्वादि-सम्बन्धाधीनं नतु कयाद्यधीनं, स्वत्वोपरमे नतु पतिस्त्वसमकालीन-पत्नोस्त्वयुक्तेः । (18) तत्र विभागस्तु सम्बन्धन्तरसङ्गावेन भूहिरण्यादा-वुत्पन्नस्य एकदेशगतस्त्वस्य विनिगमनाभावात् विशेषव्यवहारानर्हस्य गुटिकापातादिना अमुकस्थेदमिति विशेषेण भजनं स्वत्वज्ञापनमिति

वदन्ति । (19) तत्रं समोचोनं । यत्रास्व स्वत्वं तत्रैव गुटिकापातइति कथं वचनाभावाच्चिद्येत्यः । (20) यत्र वा पितुर्निधनानन्तरं तदोयाश्चयोरेक-तरमादाय भ्रात्रा यदर्जितं तत्रार्जकस्य द्वावंशावपरस्वैकः सर्वसम्पत्तः तत्र यदि प्राचीनधनविभागे गुटिकापातादर्जकेन स एवाश्वः पश्चात्तन्वः तदा प्रादेशिकस्वत्ववादिमते प्रागर्जकस्यैव सोऽश्वइति तेनार्जितधने कथं भ्रात्रन्तरस्व भागः । यदि-चार्जकेतरेण सोऽश्वोसन्वः तदा तेनार्जितधनस्य समभागोयुक्तः । एकस्य स्वायासेन अपरस्य अश्वयासेन अर्जितत्वात् । (21) वस्तुतस्तु पूर्वस्वामिस्वत्वोपरमे सम्बन्धाविशेषात् सम्बन्धिनां सर्वधनप्रसूतस्वत्वस्य गुटिकापातादिना प्रादेशिकस्वत्वव्यवस्थापनं विभागः । (22) एवं कृत्स्नधनगतस्वत्वोत्पादविनाशावपि कस्येति संसृष्टतायां प्रादेशिकस्वत्वनाशकृत्स्नधनगतस्वत्वोत्पादाविव । (23) एतच्च 'विभक्तोयः पुनः पित्रा भ्रात्रा चैकत्र संस्थितः । पित्र-व्येणाथवा प्रौत्या सतु संसृष्टउच्यते' ॥ इति वृहस्पतिवचने येषामिव हि पित्रभ्रात्रपित्रव्यादीनां पित्रपितामहोपार्जितद्रव्येण अविभक्तत्वमुत्पत्तितः सम्भवति तएव विभक्ताः सन्तः परस्परप्रौत्या पूर्वकृतविभागध्वंसेन यत् तव धनं तन्मम धनं यन्मम धनं तत्तवापि इत्येकस्मिन् कार्ये एकगृहिरूपतया स्थिताः संसृष्टाः । नत्वनेवं रूपाणां धनसंसर्गमात्रेण सम्भूयकारिणां वणिजामपि संसर्गित्वं, नापि विभक्तानां धनसंसर्गमात्रेण प्रौतिपूर्वकाभिसन्धानं विना, इत्यभिदधता दायभाक्कतापि स्वइक्षितं । (24) साधारणस्वत्वादेव हि 'बन्धूनामविभक्तानां भोगं नैव प्रदापयेत्' । इति कात्यायनवचनं यथान्युतं सङ्गच्छते, द्रव्यमात्रे स्वत्वस्यापि सम्भवात्, अतएवात्र चौर्यं न भवतीति वक्ष्यते । (25) एवञ्च 'साक्षित्वं प्रातिभाव्यञ्च दानंग्रहणमेव च । विभक्ताभ्रातरः कुर्यर्नविभक्ताः परस्परं' ॥ इति नारदवचनेनाविभक्तपरस्परदानादिनिषेधोऽपि न्यायादेव संगच्छते । दानात् पूर्वमपि तदने

प्रतिषेद्धीहस्त्वसम्भवात् दानग्रहणयोरसम्भवः । एवं साक्षित्व-
 प्रातिभाष्योर्ज्ञेयं । (26) स्वत्वाविशेषादेवाविभक्तद्रव्येण यत् कृतं
 तत्र दृष्टादृष्टे कर्माणि सर्वेषां फलमागित्वं । तथाच नारदः,—
 'भ्रातृणामविभक्तानामेकोधर्मः प्रवर्त्तते । विभागे सति धर्मीषि
 भवेत्तेषां दृष्टक् दृष्टक्' ॥ (27) व्यासः,—'स्यावरस्य समस्तस्य
 गोचसाधारणस्य च । नैकः कुर्यात् कथं दानं परस्परमतं विना' ॥
 अत्र समस्तस्येति विशेषणेन छत्वाधनविषयकमेव प्रत्येकस्वत्वं प्रती-
 यते । (28) तस्मात् तुल्यसम्बन्धनतरसत्वं सम्बन्धिसकाशात् संक्रान्ताधनं
 तस्यापि ममापीति सम्बन्धिना प्रतीयते । तद्धिमती स्वार्थं दानादिकं
 प्रतिषिद्धं । (29) अतो न त्वेकदेशगतस्वत्वमिति सिद्धं । (30) भस्मं विभो-
 जयति ब्रह्मसतिः । 'पितरिक्ष्वहराः पुत्राः सर्वेण समाश्रितः -
 विद्याधर्मयुतस्त्वेषामधिकं लभ्युमर्हति । विद्याविज्ञानग्रीष्मार्धज्ञान-
 दानक्रयेषु च । यस्वेह प्रथिता कीर्तिः पितरस्तेन पुत्रिणः' ॥
 (31) कालभेदेनापि विभागमाह ब्रह्मसतिः । 'एकां स्त्रीं कारयेत्
 कर्म यथांगेन गृहे गृहे' । (32) अत्र एकस्यापि एकस्यां व्यक्तौ साम-
 यिकनानांशस्त्वविनाशकल्पनं स्फुटमिति । सर्वेषां सामयिकनाना-
 स्वत्वसङ्गोचोवा । (33) देशादिभेदेनापि विभागमाह कल्पतरुका-
 करयोः कात्यायनः । 'देशस्य जातेः संघस्य धर्मीयामस्य योऽश्वगुः ।
 उदितः स्यात् स तेनेव दायभागं प्रकल्पयेत्' ॥ भृगुरादिति शेषः ।

CHAPTER II.

(1) अथ पितृकृतविभागः । हारोतः,—‘जीवन्नेव वा प्रविभज्य वनम् आश्रयेत् वृक्षान्नमम् वा गच्छेत्, स्वल्पेन वा संविभज्य भूयिष्ठम् आदाय वसेत्, यद्युपदश्येत् पुनस्तेभ्योऽगृहीयात्’ इति ॥ वृक्षान्नमः प्रव्रज्या । (2) अनेन स्वल्पस्य विभागो भूयिष्ठद्रव्यग्रहणश्च पितुरभिहितं । (3) विष्णुः,—‘पिता चेत् पुत्रान् विभजेत् तस्य स्नेष्ट्या स्वयमुपातेऽर्धे, पैतामहे तु पितापुत्रयोरुत्थं स्वामित्वं’ इति ॥ (4) स्वार्जितेऽपि स्नेष्ट्या न्यूनाधिकविभागो भक्तत्वबहुपोषत्वाच्च-मत्वादिस्त्वासत्त्वकारणात्, यथा कात्यायनः,—‘जीवद्भिर्भागे तु पिता नैकं पुत्रं विशेषयेत् । निर्भाजयेन्नचैवैकम् अकस्मात् कारणं विना’ ॥ (5) उक्तकारणशून्ये तु नारदः,—‘व्याधितः कुपितश्चैव विषयासक्त-चेतनः । अयथाशास्त्रकारी च न विभागे पिता प्रभुः’ ॥ विषयासक्तत्वं सुभगापुत्रत्वादिना । (6) यत्र तु भ्रातरएव विभागमर्हयन्ते तत्र विषम-भागाभावम् आह मनुः,—‘भ्रातृणाम् अविभक्तानां यद्युत्थानं भवेत् सह । न तत्र भागं विषमं पिता दद्यात् कथञ्चन’ ॥ (7) पैतामहम् अन्यैर्दृतं पित्रोर्दृतं तदकामतो न विभजनीयं । यथा मनुविष्णू,—‘पैत-कन्तु पिता द्रव्यम् अनवाप्तं यद् आप्रुयात् । न तत् पुत्रैर्भजेत् सार्द्धम् अकामः स्वयम् अर्जितं’ ॥ तत् स्वयम् अर्जितमिति कृत्वा न विभजेदित्थं न्वयः । (8) अन्योदारे तु वक्ष्यमाणशङ्कवचनादगवस्था, सामान्यविशेष-न्यायात् । (9) एतत्तु स्थावरविषयं । (10) मत्स्यादावनुवृत्ते तु पितुरेव स्वाम्यं (स्वाच्छ्रम्यं) । यथा याज्ञवल्करः,—‘मणिसुक्ताप्रवासानां सर्व-स्वैव पिता प्रभुः । स्थावरस्य तु सर्वस्व न पिता न पितामहः’ ॥ पिता-महश्च्युतेस्तत्रान्विषयमिदं । (11) एवञ्च ‘पूर्व्वनष्टाश्च योभूमिम् एकशे-दुदरेच्छमात् । यथाभागं भजन्त्यन्ये दत्त्वांश्च तु रोयकं’ ॥ इति शङ्क-

वचनं भ्रात्राद्युद्धृतविषयं । (12) अत्र स्वयं तुरीयांशं गृहीत्वा भ्रात्रा-
दिभिः सहोदरार्ता गृहीयात्, अन्यथा विषमसृष्टं स्यात् । (13) पितु-
भागकरणे त्वपुत्रपत्न्यै पुत्रतुल्यांशदानम् आह व्यासः,—‘अपुत्राश्च
पितुः पत्न्याः समानांशाः प्रकीर्त्तिताः । पितामहश्च सर्वांस्ता मातृ-
तुल्याः प्रकीर्त्तिताः’ । (14) एतच्चादत्ते स्त्रीधने । यथा याज्ञवल्करः,—
‘यदि कुर्व्यात् समानांशान् पत्न्यः कार्य्याः समांशिकाः । न दत्तं
स्त्रीधनं यासां भर्त्ता वा श्वशुरेण वा’ ॥ (15) एतद्वचनैकवाक्यतया
व्यासवचने पितुः पत्न्य इति नान्वयः । (16) नच वैपरीत्यं स्पष्टस्य तु
विधेर्नान्यैरुपसंहारद्वयत इति न्यायात् । (17) तेन पुत्रकृतविभागे
विमातुर्नांशिता । (18) स्त्रीधने दत्तेत्वर्थं पुत्रांशस्य पत्न्या देयं । ‘अधि-
विबल्लिये देयम् आधिवेदनिकं समं । न दत्तं स्त्रीधनं यस्यै दत्ते-त्वर्थं
प्रकीर्त्तितं’ ॥ इति विवाहे याज्ञवल्करदर्शनेन, ‘बहूनाम् एकधर्मा-
न्नाम् एकस्त्रापि यदुच्यते । सर्वेषामिव तत् कुर्व्यात् एकरूपा हि ते
स्मृताः’ ॥—इति वीधायनोक्तेन तथा प्रतीतेः । (19) पितामहधनस्य
पौत्रैर्विभागे पितामहे मातृवद्भागोदेय इति । (20) ‘पैतामहे तु पिता-
पुत्रयोस्तुल्यं स्वामित्वं’ । इति विष्णूक्तं । ‘भूर्या पितामहोपात्ता
निबन्धोद्भवमेव वा । तत्र स्यात् सदृशं स्वाम्यं पितुः पुत्रस्य
चोभयोः’ ॥ इति याज्ञवल्करोक्तञ्च । निबन्ध आकरादौ राजादिदत्तं
नियतलभ्यमिति कल्पतरुक्तं द्रष्टव्यं । द्रव्यं द्विपदरूपं भूसाह-
चर्यात् । तथाच ‘स्वावरं द्विपदश्चैव यद्यपि स्वयमर्जितं । असम्भूय
सुतान् सर्वान् न दानं न च विक्रयः’ ॥ (21) इत्येतेषु निबन्धभूमिद्विपदेषु
पितामहोपात्तेषु पितुर्यथा पार्ष्वपिण्डदातृत्वेन तत्पितृधने स्वत्वं
तथा तन्मरणादिना तत्स्वत्वोपरमे तत्पुत्राणां पितृयोग्यांशे सत्यपि
पितृव्येऽशिता । (22) अतएव व्यक्तमाह रत्नाकरधृतकाल्यायनः ।
‘अविभक्ते स्मृते पुत्रे तत्सुतं रिक्त्वभागिनं । कुर्वीत जीवनं येन

सत्त्वं नैव पितामहात् । सभेतांशं स पित्राश्च पित्रव्यात् तस्य वा सुतात्' ॥ (23) सति तु पितरि पार्ष्णानधिकारात् पुत्राणां नांशिता । (24) एवं धनिनः पौत्रस्त्वोपरमे तदंशमात्रे प्रपौत्राणाम् अंशिता । सति पौत्रे तु नांशिता इति । (25) यद्वा पुत्रेभ्यः स्वधनविभागदाने स्वाच्छ्रव्यात् यथा न्यूनाधिकदानं तथा अत्र नास्तीत्येतत्परं । (26) नतु पितापुत्रयोस्तुल्यांशित्वं । 'द्वावंशौ प्रतिपद्येत विभजन्नात्मनः पिता । समांशहारिणी माता पुत्राणां स्थान्मृते पतौ' ॥ इति नारदवचने पितुर्द्वांशित्वात् । (27) नचैतत् स्वार्जितपितृद्रव्यपरं । 'तस्य स्वेच्छा स्वयमुपात्तेऽर्थे' इति विष्णुस्तस्वेच्छाया उद्धाररूपद्वांशनिर्णयानर्हत्वात्, भूयिष्ठमादाय वसेदित्यनेन विरोधात् (28) किन्तु नारदवचनं द्वावंशाविति पितामहादिधनपरं । (29) 'पितुः प्रसादाङ्गुल्यन्ते वस्त्राण्यभरणानि च । स्यावरन्तु न भुज्येत प्रसादे सति पैतृके' ॥ इति मिताक्षरादृतवचनमपि पितामहधनपरं । पित्रा च स्वीपार्जितं स्यावरं दत्तं भुज्येतएवेति, अन्यथा मूलभूतश्रुत्यन्तरकल्पनापत्तेः । (30) निवृत्तरजस्कायामेव मातरि पितामहधनविभागमाह बृहस्पतिः । 'पित्रोरभावे भ्रातृणां विभागः सन्प्रदर्शितः । मातुर्निवृत्ते रजसि जीवतोरपि शस्यते' ॥ अत्र मातृपदं विमातृपरमपि पुत्रान्तरोत्पत्तिसम्भावनातीत्यात् । (31) मातुर्निवृत्ते रजसीति श्रुतेरेतद्वचनं पितामहधनपरं नतु पितृधनपरं तत्र विभक्तजस्य भागदर्शनात् । यथाह बृहस्पतिः । 'पित्रा सह विभक्ता ये सापन्ना वा सहोदराः । जघन्धजाश्च ये तेषां पितृभागहारास्तु ते । अनोशः पूर्वजः पित्रे भ्रातृभागे विभक्तजः । यथा धने तथर्षेऽपि दानाधानक्रयेषु च । परस्परमनीशास्ते मुक्ता शौचोदकक्रियाः' ॥ विभक्तजोविभागानन्तरं गर्भाधानेन जातः । (32) याज्ञवल्क्यः । 'विभागश्चेत् पिता कुर्वादिच्छया विभजेत् सुतान् । ज्येष्ठं वा त्रेष्ठभागेन सर्व्वं वा सुतः

समांशिनः' ॥ अत्रेच्छयेति स्वीपाप्तविषयं, श्रेष्ठभागेन विंशोद्धारयुक्त-
भागेन, श्रेष्ठसमभागौ पैतामहधनविषयी प्रागुक्तवचनसामञ्जसात् ।
(33) एवं 'चोर्द्धं पितुः पुत्रा रिक्खं विभजेयुर्निवृत्ते रजसि मातु-
र्जीवति चेच्छति' इति गौतमवचनस्य मातरजसोनिवृत्त्युक्तेः, पैतामह-
धनगोचरत्वं । (34) ततश्चोर्द्धं पितुरिति पितुर्मरणाप्रतीतिर्जीवति
चेच्छतीत्यत्रापि पितुरेवेच्छा प्रतीयते । तेन पितामहधने पितुरिच्छया
विभागो न पुत्रस्वेति सिद्धं । (35) एवञ्च 'अस्वाम्यं हि भवेद्देवां
निर्दोषे पितरि स्थिते',—इति देवलवचनं, पितुरनुमत्या विभागः,—
इति वीधायनवचनञ्च पित्रधनवत् पैतामहधनपरमप्यविशेषात् ।
(36) यदि तु अनिवृत्तरजस्वायां मातर्यपि देवात् पितामह-
धनं विभक्तं । तत्र विष्णुः,—'पित्रविभक्ता विभागानन्तरोत्पन्नस्य
विभागं दधुः' इति । नेदं पित्रधनचरं । प्रागुक्तदृष्टतत्त्ववचन-
विरोधात् । (37) द्वादशविधान् पुत्रान् उद्दिश्य देवलः,—'सर्वं ज्ञानौ-
रसस्वीते पुत्रा दायहराः स्मृताः । शौरवे पुनरुत्पन्ने तेषु ज्येष्ठं च
विध्यते । तेषां सवर्णां वै पुत्रास्ते तृतीयांशभाजिनः । हीनास्त-
मुपजीवेयुर्मासाच्छादनसंहताः' ॥ दायहराः पूर्वांशहराः । तेषां
शौरसम्पत्तिरिक्तानां मध्ये वै पितुः सवर्णास्ते सव्यौरवे तृतीयांश-
हराः । (38) अत्रापि विशेषमाह मनुः,—'शौरसन्धेचजौ पुत्रौ पित्र-
रिक्खस्य भागिनौ । दद्यापरे च क्रमशो नोत्ररिक्खांशभागिनः' ॥
सन्ततिक्कारकत्वेन धनिदेयपिण्डदातृत्वेन च प्रथमं पुत्रिकापुत्रस्य,
तदनन्तरं दत्तकस्य गोचरिक्खयोर्भागित्वं । क्रमशः पूर्वपूर्वाभावे
परः परः इत्थं क्रमेण गोचधनयोर्भागिनः । (39) शूद्रस्य दासोपुत्र-
विभागमाह याज्ञवल्करः । 'जातोऽपि दासां शूद्रेण कामतोऽंशहरो-
भवेत् । सते पितरि कुर्युस्तं भ्रातरस्त्वर्धभागिनं । अभ्रातृकोहरत्
सर्व्यं दुहितृणां सुतादृते' ॥ कामतः पितुरिच्छातः । अंशहरः

पुत्रान्तरतुल्यांशहरः । (40) सति तु दौहित्रे तस्यैव स्त्रीय-
सन्तानत्वात् दासीपुत्रस्य अपरिणीताजातत्वात् तयोस्तुल्यांशित्वं
युक्तमिति । (41) अनियोगोत्पन्नस्यैव जस्य औरसेन सह विभागम्
आह मनुः,—‘यद्येकरिक्थिनौ स्वाताम् औरसस्यैव जौ सुतौ । यद्यस्य
पैतृकं रिक्थं स तद् गृह्णीत नेतरः’ ॥ एकऋक्थिनौ एकस्यां जातौ
ऋक्थिनौ । यस्य वीजात् यो जातः, स तस्य ऋक्थं गृह्णीयात् ।
इतरोऽन्यवीजजो न गृह्णीयादित्यर्थः । (42) स्त्रोधने, यत्-पितृदत्तं
यदनं स्त्रीये, तद्वीजजस्तदनं गृह्णीयात्, नान्यः, इत्याह नारदः,—‘हौ
सुतौ विवदेयातां द्वाभ्यां जातौ स्त्रिया धने । तयोर्यत् यस्य पितृ-
स्वात् स तद् गृह्णीत नेतरः’ ॥

CHAPTER III.

(1) अत्रोपरते पितरि भ्रातृणां विभागः । तत्र देवलः,—
‘पितर्युपरते पुत्रा विभज्युधनं पितुः’ । पितुः सकाशात् आगतधन-
मित्यर्थः । नारदः,—‘यच्छिष्टं पितृदायेभ्योदत्तत्वेन पैतृकं ततः ।
भ्रातृभिस्तद्विभक्तव्यम् ऋषौ च स्वाद् यथा पिता’ ॥ पितृदायेभ्यः
पित्रा दत्तप्रतिश्रुतेभ्यः । ऋषौ न स्वादित्यनेन अशक्तौ शोधनीय-
मित्युक्तमर्थस्थाने स्वीकर्तव्यं । (2) अत्र मातरि जीवन्त्यां सोदराणां
विभागे न धर्मः । यथा शङ्खलिखितौ,—‘ऋक्थमूलं हि कुटुम्बम्
अस्वतन्त्राः पितृमन्तो-मातुरप्येवमवस्थितायाः’ इति ॥ अतएव व्यासः,—
‘भ्रातृणां जीवतोः पित्रोः सहवासोविधीयते । तदभावे विभक्तानां
धर्मस्तेषां विवर्धते’ ॥ विभक्तानां स्वमात्रधनेन वैदिककर्मकरणात्
तन्मात्रधर्मत्वेन तद्वृद्धिरित्यर्थः । (3) यदि तु विभज्यते, तदा मातृभागम्

आह कात्यायनः,—‘मातापि पितरि प्रेते पुत्रतुल्यांश्चकारिणी’ ॥
 (4) समांशता तु मातुरप्राप्तस्त्रीधनायाः । प्राप्तस्त्रीधनायास्तु भागार्धं
 प्राशुक्तवचनात् । (5) सोद्वारानुद्वाराभ्यां द्विप्रकार-विभागमाह
 बृहस्पतिः,—‘द्विप्रकारोविभागस्तु दायादानां प्रकीर्तितः । वयोज्येष्ठ-
 क्रमेणैकः समाऽपरांशकल्पना’ ॥ वयोज्येष्ठक्रमेणेत्युद्वाराभिप्रायेण ।
 (6) शूद्रे तद्वाराभावोवक्ष्यते । (7) समभागस्य शास्त्रीयत्वेऽप्युद्वार-
 पक्षो-भक्त्यतिशयाद् अविरुद्धः । विभागाविभागविकल्पवत् । (8) यथा
 मनुः,—‘ज्येष्ठएव तु गृह्णीयात् पितरं धनम् अशेषतः । शेषास्तम्
 उपजौवेयु-र्यथैव पितरं तथा’ ॥ नारदः,—‘विभ्रयाद्देवैः सखीन्
 ज्येष्ठोभ्राता यथा पिता । भ्राता शक्तः कनिष्ठोवा शक्त्यपेक्षा कुले
 स्थितिः’ ॥ मध्यमोऽत्र दण्डापूपन्यायात् सिद्धः । (9) सच न्यायो यथा,—
 भूषिकस्य दण्डभक्षणं दुष्करं, तन्निष्पत्तौ तत्सहचरितापूपभक्षणम्
 अतिसुकरत्वात् यथा सम्भाव्यते, तथा अत्रापि सहचरितैकसिद्धाव-
 परसिद्धेरौचित्यात् तत् सम्भाव्यते । (10) अतएवाविशेषात् नारदः,—
 ‘कुटुम्बार्थेषु चोद्युक्तस्तत् कार्यं कुर्वते तु यः । स भ्रातृभिर्वृद्धणीयो
 आसाञ्छादनवाहनैः’ ॥ (11) एवम्भूतं प्रशंसति व्यासः,—‘जौविते यस्य
 जौवन्ति विप्रा-मित्राणि वान्धवाः । सफलं जौवितं तस्य आत्माधै
 को न जौवति’ ॥ (12) हरिवंशे वैपरोत्याद्-दोषम् आह इन्द्रं प्रति
 नारदः,—‘अन्योन्यभेदो-भ्रातृणां सुहृदां वा वलान्तक । भवत्यानन्द-
 छदेव द्विषतां नात्र संशयः’ ॥ (13) अत्र सर्व्वेच्छया नारदेन सह-
 वास-उक्तः । (14) विभागस्तु न तथा । यथा विभागं प्रक्रम्य
 कात्यायनः,—‘अप्राप्त व्यवहाराणां धनं व्ययविवर्जितं । न्यसे-
 युर्बन्धुभिन्नेषु प्रोषितानां तथैव च’ ॥ अप्राप्तव्यवहाराणां बालानां ।
 (15) यस्तु स्वयोग्यतया पित्रादिधने निष्पृहः स तण्डुलप्रस्थादि
 दत्त्वा तत्पुत्रादेर्दुर्गन्ततानिरासाय विभजनीयः । यथा मनुः,—

‘भ्रातृणां यस्तु नेहेत धनं शक्तः स्वकर्म्मणा । स निर्भाष्यः
 स्वकादंशात् किञ्चिद् दत्त्वोपजीवनं’ ॥ (16) कात्यायनः,—‘दृश्यमानं
 विभज्येत गृहक्षेत्रचतुष्पदं । गूढद्रव्यादिशङ्कायां प्रत्ययस्तत्र
 कौर्त्तितः’ ॥ प्रत्ययोदिव्यं । (17) एतदेव स्पष्टयति,—‘गृहोपस्कार-
 वाङ्मासु दोष्ठाभरणकर्म्मिणः । दृश्यमाना विभज्यन्ते कोषं
 गूढेऽत्रवोद्गुः’ ॥ गृहोपस्कारः उदूखलादि, कर्म्मिणो दासादयः,
 कोषो दिव्यविशेषः । स तु दिव्यतत्त्वेऽनुसन्धेयः । प्रसिद्धम् अन्यत् ।
 (18) नारदः,—‘येषाम् न कृताः पित्रा संस्कारविधयः क्रमात् ।
 कर्त्तव्या भ्रातृभिस्तेषां पैतृकादेव तद्वनात् । अविद्यमाने पित्र्ये
 स्वांशाद् उच्यते वा पुनः । अवश्य-कार्याः संस्काराः भ्रातृभिः
 पूर्वसंस्कृतैः ॥ (19) कन्याभ्यस्तु विवाहोचितद्रव्यदानमाह देवलः,—
 ‘कन्याभ्यश्च पितृद्रव्याद्-देयं वैवाहिकं वसु । अपुत्रकस्य कन्या
 स्वा धर्मजा पुत्रवद्-धरेत्’ ॥ विष्णुः,—‘अनूढानाम् कन्यानां
 स्ववित्तानुसारेण संस्कारं कुर्यात्’ ॥ (20) एवं तुरीयांशदानप्रतिपादकमपि
 विवाहोचित-द्रव्यदानपरं । (21) पितृ-व्यतिरिक्तानामपि संस्कर्त्तृत्वमाह
 हैतनिर्णयामृततृप्तमृतिः,—‘अष्टौ संस्कारकर्म्माणि गर्भाधानमिव
 स्वयं । पितुः कुर्यात् तदन्योवा तस्याभावे तु तत्क्रमात् ॥

CHAPTER IV.

- (1) अथ विभागानधिकारिणः । आपस्तम्बः,—‘सर्वे हि धर्म-
 युक्ता भागिनोद्रव्यमर्हन्ति । यस्त्वधर्मेण द्रव्याणि प्रतिपादयति
 ज्येष्ठोऽपि तम् अभागं कुर्वीत’ इति ॥ ज्येष्ठोऽपि पुत्र इति शेषः ।
 (2) तथाच ब्रह्मसूत्रिः,—‘सवर्णाजोप्यऽगुणवान् नार्हः स्यात् पैतृके

धने । तत्पिण्डदाः श्रोत्रिया ये तेषाम्-तद्-अभिधीयते ॥ तत्पिण्डदाः धनिपिण्डदाः, अतएव श्रोत्रिया इत्युक्तं, अगुणवान् गुणविरुद्ध-दोषवान्, अगुणवद्भासाच्छादनदातार इति रत्नाकरः, एतस्मिन्पि सुतरां धनिपिण्डदात्वं प्रतीयते । (3) 'यथा जलं कुपुत्रेण तरन् मज्जति मानव । तथा पिता कुपुत्रेण तमस्वन्धे निमज्जति' ॥ (4) कात्यायनः,—'यद्वायं द्रव्यम् उत्पन्नं तस्मात् द्रव्यं नियोजयेत् । स्थानेषु द्रव्ययोगेषु न स्त्रीमूर्च्छविधर्मिषु' ॥ (5) स्त्री इति पत्न्यादिविशेषविहितेतरसपिण्डस्त्रीपरं । (6) तथा,—'शास्त्रशौर्यादिरहितस्तपोदानविवर्जितः । आचारहीनः पुत्रस्तु मूर्खोच्चारसमस्तु सः' ॥ (7) शङ्खः,—'अकृत्वा प्रेतकार्याणि प्रेतस्य धनहारकः । वर्णानां यद्वधे प्रोक्तं तद्व्रतं नियतश्चरेत्' ॥ (8) देवस्तः,—'मृते पितरि न क्षौव-कुटुम्बस्तज्जडान्धकाः । पतितः पतितापत्वं लिङ्गो दायांशभागिनः । तेषां पतितवर्जंभ्यो भक्तवत्सलं प्रदीयते । तत्सुताः पित्रदायांशं लभेरन् दोषवर्जिताः' ॥ जडो धर्मकृत्ये निरुत्साहः, अन्धो जन्मान्धः, 'जन्मान्धवधिरौ तथा' इति मनुवचनात्, लिङ्गो कपटव्रतधारौ । (9) नारदः,—'पितृद्विष्ट पतितः पण्डो यश्च स्याद् औपपातिकः । औरसा अपि नैतेऽर्थं लभेरन् क्षेत्रजाः कुतः' ॥ पितृद्विष्ट पितरि जोवति तत्साङ्गनादिकृत्, मृते तु तत्प्राज्ञादिविमुखः । औपपातिकः उपपातकैः रूच्यः, कल्पतरुकृता तु औपपातिक इत्यत्र अपपात्रितः इति पठित्वा राजवधादि-दोषेण बान्धवैर्यस्य घटापवर्जनं कृतम् इति विवृतं । प्रकाशकारिण उपपातकौ इति पठित्वा उपपातकैर्युक्तः इति विवृतं ।

CHAPTER V.

(1) अथ विभाज्याविभाज्ये । तत्र व्यासः,—‘अनाश्रित्य पितृ-
द्रव्यं स्वशक्त्याप्नोति यद् धनं । दायादेभ्यो न तद् दद्यात् विद्यालभ्यं
यद् भवेत्’ ॥ (2) विद्याधनम् आह कात्यायनः,—‘उपन्यस्ते तु यज्ञस्य
विद्यया पक्षपूर्वकं । विद्याधनस्तु तद् विद्यात् विभागे न नियोजयेत् ।
शिष्याद्-आर्त्विज्यतः प्रभ्रात् सन्दिग्धप्रभ्रनिर्जयात् । स्वप्नान-
रंसनात् वादात् लब्धं प्राप्नोयमास्तु यत् । विद्याधनस्तु तत् प्राहुर्विभागे
न नियोजयेत् । शिष्येष्वपि हि धर्मोऽयं मूल्याद्-यज्ञाधिकं भवेत् ।
परं निरस्य यज्ञस्य विद्यया दूतपूर्वकं । विद्याधनस्तु तद्विद्यात् न
विभाज्यं ब्रह्मसतिः’ ॥ (3) यदि भवान् भद्रम् उपन्यस्यति तदा भवति
मया एतत् देयमिति पश्चितं, तत्रोपन्यासं निस्तोष्यं यत्-लभते तत्र
विभाज्यं । शिष्यात् अध्यापितात्, आर्त्विज्यतः याजितात् यजमानात्
दक्षिण्या लब्धधनं, दक्षिणाधनञ्च न प्रतिग्रहलब्धं वेतनरूपत्वात् तस्य ।
तथा यत्किञ्चित् विद्याप्रभ्रे निस्तीर्णेऽपश्चितं यदि कश्चित् परितोषात्
ददाति । तथा योहि अस्मिन् शास्त्रार्थे अस्माकं संशयम् अपनयति तस्मै
धनमिदं ददानि इति उपस्थितस्य संशयम् अपनोय यज्ञस्य, वादिनोर्वा
सन्देहे न्यायकरणार्थम् आगतयोः सम्यक् निरूपणेन यज्ञस्य षष्ठांश-
दिकं । तथा शास्त्रादिषु प्रकृष्टज्ञानं सन्भाव्य यत् प्रतिग्रहादिना लब्धं ।
तथा शास्त्रज्ञानविवादे, अन्यत्रापि यत्र कुचचित् अन्योन्य-ज्ञान-
विवादे, निर्जित्य यज्ञस्य । तथा एकस्मिन् देये बहूनामुपपन्ने, येन
प्रकृष्टमधोत्य यज्ञस्य । तथा शिष्यादिविद्यया चित्रकरसुवर्णकारा-
दिभिर्यज्ञस्य । तथा दूतेनापि परं निर्जित्य यज्ञस्य । तत् सर्वम्
अविभाज्यम् इतरैः । तस्मात् यथा कयाचित् विद्यया लब्धम्, अर्जकस्यैव
तत्, न इतरेषाम्, इति प्रदर्शनार्थं कात्यायनेन विस्तारितम्, इति

दायभागः । (4) नारदः,—‘कुटुम्बं विभ्रयाद्-भ्रातुर्योविद्यामधि-
गच्छतः । भागं विद्याधनात् तस्मात् स लभेताश्रुतोऽपि सन्’ ॥
विभ्रयाद् इत्येकवचननिर्देशात्, यदि विद्याम् अभ्यस्यतो भ्रातुः
कुटुम्बम्-अपरोभ्राता स्वधनश्रयशरोरायासाभ्यां सम्बर्हयति, तदा
तद्विद्यार्जितधने तस्याधिकारः । अश्रुतोमूर्खः । (5) कल्पतरु-
मिताक्षरादीपकलिकासु कात्यायनः,—‘परभक्तोपयोगिन विद्या
प्राप्ताऽन्वतसु या । तया लब्धं धनं यत्तु विद्यालब्धं तदुच्यते’ ॥
अन्वतः पिढमादकुलव्यतिरिक्तात् । (6) अत्र विशेषयति सएव,—
‘नाविद्यानान्तु वैद्येन देयं विद्याधनात् कश्चित् । समविद्याधिका-
नान्तु देयं वैद्येन तद्धनं’ ॥ तन्मोक्षरितविद्यापदम् उभाभ्यां सम्बध्यते,
तेन समविद्याधिकविद्यानां भागः, नतु न्यूनविद्याऽविद्ययोः ॥ वैद्येन
विदुषा । (7) पुनर्विशेषयति,—‘कुले विनीतविद्यानां भ्रातृणां पिढ-
तोऽपि वा । शौर्यप्राप्तान्तु यद्वित्तं विभाज्यं तत् वृहस्पतिः’ ॥ कुले
स्वकुले पितामहपिढव्यादिभ्यः पिढतएव वा शिषितविद्यानां भ्रातृणां
यत् विद्याशौर्व्यप्राप्तं धनं तत् विभजनीयमिति कल्पतरुद्वाराकरी । (8)
पुनः कात्यायनः,—‘इंग्रहरोऽर्हहरोवा पुत्रवित्तार्जनात् पिता’ ।
पुत्रवित्तार्जनात्--ऊदभिहितभावो द्रव्यवत् प्रकाशते इति न्यायात्
—पुत्रार्जितवित्तात् । (9) पितुर्इंग्रित्वं पिढधनानुपघातविषयं भ्रातृ-
धनोपघातविषयश्च । अर्जकस्य तु इंग्रित्वं । भ्रातृधनोपघाते तु
तेषामप्येकैकांगित्वं वक्ष्यमाचक्ष्यासवचनात् । पितुर्इंग्रह्रत्वन्तु पिढ-
द्रव्योपघातात् गुणवत्त्वाद्वा इति दायभागः । अनुपघाते पिता इंग्र-
ह्रः, अर्जकत्वात् स्वयमपि इंग्रह्रः, इतरेषाम् अनंग्रित्वं । भ्रातृ-
द्रव्योपघाते तु तस्याप्येकांगः । इति इंग्रार्हांगयोर्भेदकथनं । (10)
पुनः कात्यायनः,—‘गोप्रचारश्च रथ्या च वस्त्रं यश्चाङ्गयोजितं ।
प्रायोज्यं न विभज्येत शिल्पार्थं वृहस्पतिः’ ॥ प्रायोज्यं यत् यस्य प्रयो-

जनार्हं पुस्तकादि, न तत् मूर्खादिभिः सह पण्डितादिभिर्विभज्योयं, एवमेव दायभागमदनपारिजातादयः। (11) याज्ञवल्करः,—‘पितृभ्याञ्चैव यद्-दत्तं तत् तस्यैव धनं भवेत्’ ॥ पुत्रदुहित्रोर्यदलङ्कारादि दत्तं, तत् तस्यैवेति शूलपाणिमहामहोपाध्यायाः । (12) नारदः,—‘शौर्य्य-भार्य्या-धने चोभे यच्च विद्याधनम् भवेत् । त्रौष्येतान्यविभाग्यानि प्रसादोयच्च पैटकः’ ॥ प्राप्तञ्च सह भार्य्ययेति भरद्वाजवचनात् भार्य्याप्राप्तिकाशे लब्धं धनं भार्य्याधनम् औदाहिकमित्यर्थः । चोभे इत्थत्र हित्वेति पाठे एतन्निकं हित्वा अन्यद्विभजेदित्यनुवर्त्तते, अत-एतान्यविभाग्यानीति । (13) प्रसाददत्तस्य पौर्वापर्य्ये पूर्व्वसंप्रदानस्यैव तद्द्रव्यं,—‘सर्व्वेष्वेव विवादेषु बलवत्पुत्ररा क्रिया । आधौ प्रतिग्रहे क्रीते पूर्व्वी तु बलवत्तरा’ ॥ इति याज्ञवल्करवचनात् । अथ या बलवती सैव सिध्यतीत्यर्थः । (14) तत्राप्याधिक्रिया स्वामिनो यद्येष्टविनियोग-विरोधिका, नतु स्वत्वध्वंसजनिका, इति सा पूर्व्वी परा वा, प्रतिग्रह-क्रयक्रियाभ्यां पूर्व्वस्वामिस्वत्वध्वंसोत्तरजाताभ्यां बलवतीभ्यां बाध्यते । (15) अतएव रत्नाकरादिदृष्टश्रुतिः,—‘न्यासं कृत्वा परत्राधिं कृत्वा वाधिं करोति यः । विक्रयव्या क्रिया तत्र पश्चिमा बलवत्तरा’ ॥ न्यासं कृत्वा आधिं करोति, आधिं कृत्वा वा विक्रयं करोति, विक्रयपदं स्वत्वध्वंसकत्वात् दानं लक्षयति, तत्र परा क्रिया सिद्धेत्यर्थः ॥ (16) एवञ्च विक्रोददात्रोर्मरणादिना बाध्यनुद्धारि विक्रयदानाभ्यां तत्कर्त्तृत्वस्वत्वजननात् तत्क्रोदप्रतिग्रहीदभ्यामाधुद्धारः कार्य्यइति । तत्रैवागमविवादे ताभ्यान्तयोर्भोगएव व्यवस्थापनीयो नागमादिरिति । (17) शङ्खलिखितौ,—‘न वासुविभागो-नोदकपात्रालङ्कारोपयुक्तस्त्रीवाससाम् अपांप्रचाररथ्यानां विभागश्च-इति प्रजापतिरिति’ ॥ यस्मिन् वासुनि येन गृहोद्यानादिकं कृतम्, अपरेषापि स्थानान्तरे तथाकृतञ्चेत्, तदा येन यत् कृतं, तत्

तस्यैव । अन्यत्राप्येवं । (18) साधारणधनार्जितेऽपि विशेषमाह व्यासः,—
 ‘साधारणं समाश्रित्य यत् किञ्चित् वाहनायुधं । शौर्यादिनाप्नोति
 धनं भ्रातरस्तत्र भागिनः । तस्य भागद्वयं देयं शेषास्तु सम-
 भागिनः’ ॥ अत्र भ्रातर इत्युपलक्षणं पिढ्यादयोपि बोद्धव्याः ।
 तस्य अर्जकस्य, साधारणोपघाते यस्य यावतोऽशस्य अल्पस्य महतो-
 वा उपघातः, तस्य तदनुसारेण भागकल्पना कार्येति दायभागः ।
 (19) नच,—स्वावरस्य समस्तस्य गोत्रसाधारणस्य च । नैकः कुर्यात्
 ज्ञयं दानं परस्परमतं विना । विभक्ता अविभक्ता वा सपिण्डाः
 स्वावरे समाः । एकोऽप्यगौशः सर्व्यं च दानाधमनविक्रये’ ॥ इति
 व्यासवचनाभ्यामेकस्य दानवन्धकविक्रयानधिकारइति वाच्यं । (20)
 वषट्ठविनियोगार्हत्वरूपस्य स्वत्वस्य द्रव्यान्तरइव अनाप्यविशेषात् ।
 (21) व्यास वचनञ्च स्वामित्वेन दूर्वृतपुरुषगोचरविक्रयादिना कुटुम्ब-
 विरोधात् अधर्मापन्नार्थनिषेधरूपं, नतु विक्रयाद्यनिष्यत्त्वधर्म, इति
 दायभागः । (22) विभक्तानामपि यथांशविच्छेदो न जातस्तन्मध्यगत-
 द्वावतिष्ठते, तेन तत्र साधारणत्वमेव, तत्रेकोऽगौशः, घृथगभूतेषु
 स्वतन्त्रकृतस्य सिद्धिरिव, इति विवादचित्तामणिः । वसुतस्तु विभक्ते-
 ष्वनुप्रापद्वयं विभक्ताविभक्तसीमादिसंशयव्युदासाय ग्रामसामन्ताद्यनु-
 मतिप्रवृत्तवत् । (23) अतो विभक्तानुमतिं विना व्यवहारः सिध्यत्येव ।
 (24) तदुक्तं मिताचारायां,—‘स्वग्रामज्जातिसामन्तदायादानुमतेन च ।
 हिरण्योदकदानेन वहुर्भिर्गच्छति मेदिनी’ ॥ इति दायदा-
 दीहिरादयः ज्ञातेः घृथगुपादानात् । (25) हिरण्योदकदानेनेति ।
 ‘स्वावरे विक्रयोनास्ति कुर्यादाधिमनुजया’ । इति देवसवचनेन
 स्वावरस्य केवलविक्रयप्रतिषेधात्, एवं—‘भूमिं यः प्रतिष्ठज्जाति यश्च
 भूमिं प्रयच्छति । तावुभौ पुण्यकर्माभौ नियतं स्वर्गगामिनौ’ ॥ इति
 दानप्रशंसादर्शनाच्च, विक्रयेऽपि कर्त्तव्ये, सहिरण्यमुदकं दत्त्वा, दान-

क्रेतेन स्थावर विक्रयः, इति विज्ञानेश्वरः । (26) वस्तुतस्तु स्थावरविक्रय-
निषेधः अविभक्तस्थावरविषयः । तथापि यदि विक्रयं विना अवस्थितिर्न
भवति, तदा विक्रये कर्त्तव्ये दायादानां दुरन्ततानिहृत्यर्थं क्रेतुरिच्छया
दानमप्युक्तं । (27) अतएव हारोतेन,—‘यश्चोपकारिणे ददाति,’ इति
यत् दानोपसर्गत्वमुक्तं, तत् व्यसनोपकारिणं । तदितरोपकारिणे दाने
फलमाह दक्षः,—‘मातापित्रोर्गुरौ मित्रे विनीते चोपकारिणे ।
दीनानाद्यविशिष्टेभ्यो दत्तन्तु सफलं भवेत् ॥’ (28) अतएव नारदः,—
‘स्वभागान् यदि ते दद्युर्विक्रौण्णोयुरथापि वा । कुर्युर्येषेष्टं तत्
सर्वम् इशास्ते स्वधनस्व वै ॥’ (29) अतएव याज्ञवल्क्यः,—‘क्रमा-
दभ्यागतं द्रव्यं हतम् अभ्युदरेत्तु यः । दायादेभ्यो न तद्दद्यात् विद्यया
लब्धमेव च ॥’ पित्रपितामहागतं बलादग्यैर्दृतं योऽंशस्तराणाम्
अनुज्ञया उदरति, तत् अंशस्तरैभ्यो न दद्यात् । (30) भूमौ तु
विशेषयति शङ्खः,—‘पूर्वमष्टाक्ष योभूमिम् एक एवोदरेच्छमात् ।
यथाभागं भजन्त्येव दत्त्वांशन्तु तुरीयकं ॥’ एतद्वचनं अति-
महार्णवकामधेनुपारिजातप्रभृतिवृत्तिस्त्रिणात् अयुक्तमेवेति रत्नाकरः ।
तत्र, दायभागमिताक्षराप्रभृतिवृत्तत्वात् । (31) पूर्वपुरुषार्जितमष्टोदरं
विशेषयति मिताक्षरायां,—‘स्थावरं द्विपदञ्चैव यद्यपि स्वयमर्जितं ।
असम्भूय सुतान् सर्वान् न दानं नच विक्रयः । ये जाता येऽप्यजाता
वा ये च गर्भे व्यवस्थिताः । वृत्तिन्तेऽपि हि काङ्क्षन्ति वृत्तिलोपो
विमर्हितः ॥’ (32) अस्त्रापवादमाह,—‘एकोपि स्थावरे कुर्याद्
दानाधमनविक्रयं । आपत्काले कुटुम्बार्थं धर्मार्थं च विशेषतः ॥
आधमनं बन्धकत्वेन स्थातं । (33) कुटुम्बार्थं दासकृतस्यापि सिद्धिमाह
मनुः,—‘कुटुम्बार्थेऽभ्यधीनोऽपि व्यवहारं यम् आचरेत् । स्वदेशे वा
विदेशे वा तं ज्ञायान् न विचासयेत् ॥’ तद्देशस्य देशान्तरस्य वा
स्वामिनि कुटुम्बव्यवहारनिमित्तकं दासोऽपि यत् ऋणादिकं कुर्यात्

तत् स्वाम्यनुमन्येतेति कुक्षुकभट्टः । (34) व्यक्तमाह वृहस्पतिः,—
 ‘पितृव्यभाटपुत्रसौदासशिष्यानुजीविभिः । यद्-गृहीतं कुटुम्बार्थं
 तद्-गृही दातुमर्हति’ ॥ (35) मनुः,—‘ग्रहीता यदि नष्टः स्यात्
 कुटुम्बार्थं कृतव्ययः । दातव्यं बान्धवैस्तत् स्यात् प्रविभक्तैरपि
 स्वतः’ ॥ स्वतः स्वधनात् । (36) कात्यायनः,—‘कुटुम्बार्थमशक्ते तु
 गृहीतं व्याधितेऽथवा । उपपन्ननिमित्तान्तु विद्याद् आपत्कृतान्तु तत् ।
 कन्यावैवाहिकश्चैव प्रेतकार्यं च यत् कृतं । एतत् सर्वं प्रदातव्यं
 कुटुम्बेन कृतं प्रभोः’ ॥ कुटुम्बम् अवश्यं भरणीयं । प्रभोरिति कर्त्तरि
 षष्ठौ, तेन प्रभुना दातव्यमिति रत्नाकरः । (37) दायभागी हारीतः,—
 ‘जीवति पितरि पुत्राणाम् अर्थादानविसर्गाद्येपि न स्वातन्त्र्यं,
 कामं दौर्णे प्रोषिते आर्त्तिं गते वा ज्येष्ठोऽर्धाश्चिन्तयेत्’ ॥ सुव्यक्त-
 माह तुः शङ्खसिंहितौ,—‘पितर्यशक्ते कुटुम्बव्यवहारान् ज्येष्ठः
 प्रतिकुर्यात्, अन्तरावा कार्यान्नास्तदनुमतः, नत्वकामे पितरि ऋक्ष-
 विभागः, वृद्धे विपरीतचेतसि दीर्घरोगिणि वा ज्येष्ठएव पितृवदर्थान्
 पालयेत् इतरेषाम्, ऋक्षमूलं हि कुटुम्बम्, अस्वतन्त्राः पितृमन्तो-
 मातुरप्येवमवस्थितायाः’ ॥ एतद्वचनद्वयं कार्यान्नामे दीर्घरोगिणि च
 पितरि विभागं निषिध्येव ज्येष्ठो गृहं चिन्तयेत् तदनुजोवा कार्यान्ना-
 इत्याह । (38) अनुमतिस्त्वप्रतिषेधादपि भवति । ‘स्वं द्रव्यं
 दौयमानश्च यः स्वामो न निवारयेत् । ऋक्षभिर्वा परैर्वापि दत्तं
 तेनैव तदुद्धृतुः’ ॥ इति प्रायश्चित्तविवेककृतकात्यायनवचनात् । (39)
 अतएव, परमतम् अप्रतिसिद्धम् अनुमतं भवति इति व्यायदिदः ।
 (40) एवं दत्तानिवारणात् सिद्धिरिति ।

CHAPTER VI.

(1) अथ वृत्तविभागसन्देहनिर्णयः । गङ्गाः,—‘गोत्रभागविभागार्थे सन्देहे ससुपस्थिते । गोत्रजैसापरिज्ञाते कुलं साक्षित्वमहेति’ ॥ गोत्रभागविभागार्थे सन्देहे इति गोत्रलब्ध-विभजनोय-विभजन-विषयके वृत्तविभागवैपरोत्यसन्देहे विभागकरणसन्देहे च कुलं बन्धुः, एवामभावएव अन्यः, साक्षी । (2) तल्लेख्यमाह वृहस्पतिः,—‘भ्रातरः संविभक्ता ये स्वव्या तु परस्परं । विभागपत्रं कुर्वन्ति भागलेख्यं तदुच्यते’ ॥ (3) व्यवहारमाह कात्यायनः,—‘यद्येक-शासने ग्रामक्षेत्रारामाश्च लेखिताः । एकदेशोपभोगेऽपि सर्वे भुक्ता भवन्ति ते’ ॥ शासनं पत्रादि । (4) एकदेशस्याप्यनुपभोगे तु सर्वस्व-क्रीतादेर्हानिरित्याह सएव,—‘संविभागक्रयप्राप्तं पित्रं लब्धञ्च राजतः । स्थावरं सिद्धिम् प्राप्नोति भुक्त्या, हानिम् उपेक्षया । प्राप्तमात्रं येन भुक्तं स्वीकृत्यापरिपन्थितं । तस्य तत् सिद्धिमाप्नोति हानिक्षीपेक्षया तथा’ ॥ संविभागक्रयादिलब्धस्यैव सति भोगे सिद्धिः तन्नोपेक्षया हानिरिति । (5) नारदः,—‘दानग्रहण-पञ्चवृत्तक्षेत्रपरिग्रहाः । विभक्तानां पृथक् ज्ञेयाः पाकधर्मा-वमश्रयाः । साक्षित्वं प्रातिभाश्यञ्च दानं ग्रहणमेव च । विभक्ता-भ्रातरः कुर्युर्नाविभक्ताः परस्परं । येषामेताः क्रिया-लोके प्रवर्तन्ते स्वरिक्तयतः । विभक्तान् अवगच्छेयुर्लेख्यमप्यन्तरेण तान्’ ॥ (6) अतएव याज्ञवल्करः,—‘भ्रातृणामथ दम्पत्योः पितुः पुत्रस्य चैव हि । प्रातिभाव्यम् नृपं साक्ष्यम् अविभक्ते न तत् स्मृतं ॥ परस्पर-मिति शेषः । (7) यद्यपि,—‘जायापत्योर्विभागो न विद्यते, तथा पुण्या-पुण्यफलेषु च’ । इत्यापस्तम्बोक्तो-विभागाभावः, पत्न्यधिकारे पत्रा-अपि जीवत्पतिधनमात्रे स्तत्त्वम् उक्तञ्च । ‘दम्पत्योर्विभागं धनम्,’

इति आहविवेकः । मध्यगम् उभयस्वामिकमित्यर्थः । तथापि,—‘यदि कुर्यात् समानांशान् पत्न्याः कार्य्याः समांशिकाः’ । इति याज्ञवल्क्येन पुत्रविभागकरणे प्रहस्रस्याऽपुत्रपत्न्या अपि विभागावगतेस्तदभिप्राये च दम्पत्योरित्युक्तं । (8) यत्तु,—‘भार्या पुत्रश्च दासश्च त्रयएवाधनाः स्मृताः’ । इत्यत्राधनत्वमुतेरापस्तम्बीयाविभागाभिधानं वैदिककर्त्तृ-माने सहकारित्वेनाधिकारार्थमिति । (9) तच्च, तद्वचनोत्तरार्धे,—‘यत्ते समधिगच्छन्ति यस्यैते तस्य तदनं’ । इत्यनेन स्वार्जितस्यैव पत्न्यादीनां पत्याद्यनुमतिमन्तरेण स्वातन्त्र्यप्रतिपादनात् । आपस्तम्ब-वचने ‘तथा पुण्यापुण्यफलेषु च’ इति दृष्टगुपादानाच्च । (10) तस्मात्, विभागो न विद्यत इति निषेधस्य प्रहस्रिपूर्वकत्वात्, एकस्मिन् धने उभयोः स्वं प्राप्यते । (11) अन्यथा उभयोः स्वत्वाभावेन विभाग-प्रसक्त्यनुपपत्तेर्निषेधविधिर्न स्यात् । (12) ‘एकत्वं सा गता यस्माच्चर-मन्वाहुतिव्रतैः’ । इति लघुहारीतोक्तैकत्वसैतदपि फलं ।

CHAPTER VII.

(1) अथ चिरप्रोषितागतस्य वंशस्य विभागः । तत्र ब्रह्मसूत्रिः,—‘गोत्रसाधारणं त्यक्त्वा योऽन्यदेशं समाश्रितः । तद्वंश-स्यागतस्यांशः प्रदातव्यो न संशयः । तृतीयः पञ्चमश्चैव सप्तमो-वापि यो भवेत् । जन्मनामपरिज्ञाने लभेतांशं क्रमागतं । यं परम्परया मौलाः सामन्ताः स्वामिनं विदुः । तदन्वयस्यागतस्य दातव्या गोत्रजैर्महो । भुक्तिश्चैषुरुषो सिध्येदपरेषां न संशयः । अनिवृत्ते सपिण्डत्वे सकुल्यानां न सिध्यति । अस्वामिना तु यदुक्तं’

गृहचेनापवादिकं । सुहृद्वन्धुसङ्कुत्सानां न तद्भोगेन ह्यीयते ।
 विवाहश्चोत्रियैर्भुक्तं रात्रामात्यैस्तथैव च । सुदीर्घेषापि कालेन
 तेषां सिध्यति तत्तु न ॥ गोचसाधारणं द्रव्यमिति शेषः । अपरेषां
 गोत्रजादितरेषां । आपन्नः पञ्चवीधिका । विवाहोऽजामाता इति
 व्यवहारचिन्तामणिः । (2) नारदः,—‘अनागमस्तु यद्भुक्तं पित्रा
 पूर्वतरैस्त्रिभिः । न तच्छेषम् अपाकर्तुं क्रमात् त्रिपुरुषागतं ॥
 पित्रा पूर्वतरैरित्यत्र पित्रा सह पितरमादाय त्रिभिः, ‘चतुर्थः सम-
 वाप्रुयात्’ इति वचनात् । (3) भोगं विशिनष्टि व्यासः,—‘पिता
 पितामहोयस्य जीवेच्च प्रपितामहः । त्रयाणां जीवतां भोगो-
 विज्ञेयस्त्वेकपूरुषः’ ॥ युगपद्भोगे षष्टिवर्षेऽपि न त्रैपुरुषिकः, प्रपिता-
 महस्य तत्र स्वात्म्यात् तस्यैव भोगः, तदा कोनामासावित्याह
 ‘विज्ञेयस्त्वेकपूरुषः’, इति । (4) त्रिपुरुषं विशेषयति व्यासः,—
 ‘प्रपितामहेन यद्भुक्तं तत्-पुत्रेण विना च तं । तौ विना यस्य पित्रा
 च तस्य भोगस्त्रिपौरुषः’ ॥ (5) कियन्तं कालम् एकैकस्य भोग-
 इत्यपेक्षायां व्यासः,—‘वर्षाणि विंशतिं भुक्त्वा स्वामिनाऽव्याहता
 सती । भुक्तिः सा पौरुषो भूमेर्द्दिगुणा च द्विपौरुषो । त्रिपौरुषो
 च त्रिगुणा न तत्राऽन्वेष्ट्यागमः’ ॥ अत्राव्याहतेति प्रतिवादिसमर्थं
 लक्ष्यते, षष्टिवर्षभोगस्याप्यनेनैकवाक्यत्वं । अतः परम् उपेक्षया स्वत्व-
 नाशः । (6) बृहस्पतिरपि,—‘आहर्त्ता शोधयेत् भुक्तिम् आगमश्चापि
 संसदि । तत्सुतो-भुक्तिमेवैकां पौत्रादिषु न किञ्चन’ ॥ (7)
 याज्ञवल्क्यः,—‘आगमस्तु कृतो येन सोऽभियुक्तस्तमुद्धरेत् । न तत्-
 सुतस्तत्सुतोवा भुक्तिस्तत्र गरीयसौ’ ॥ (8) भुक्तिशोधनमाह
 कात्यायनः,—‘आगमोदीर्घकालश्च निम्बिद्रोऽन्यरवोऽभितः । प्रत्यर्थि-
 सन्निधानञ्च पञ्चाङ्गी-भोग इत्यते’ ॥

CHAPTER VIII,

(1) अथ विभागकाले निष्कृतस्य पद्यादवगतस्य विभागः । तत्र कात्यायनः,—‘प्रच्छादितन्तु यत् येन पुनरागतस्य तत् समं । भजेरन् भ्रातृभिः सार्धम् अभावे तु पितुः सुताः । अन्योन्यापहृतं ह्ययं दुर्विभक्तश्च यद्वेत् । पश्चात् प्राप्तं विभज्येत समभागेन तद्गुः’ ॥ पश्चात्प्राप्तमित्युपादानात् विभक्ते सति लौकिकप्रमाणेन यस्य कस्यचिन्निष्कृतस्य प्रदर्शनं विनापि न पुनर्विभागः, न वा तत्र दिव्यं, अन्यथा शङ्कापिशाचा दिव्यं विना कचिदप्यनिश्चितद्वयत्वेन सम्यग्विभागो न स्यात् । दुर्विभक्तमिति असम्यग्विभागस्य पुनर्विभागं दर्शयति । (2) ‘सक्तदंशो निपतति सक्तत् कन्या प्रदीयते । सक्तदाह ददानोति त्रौष्येतानि सतां सक्तत्’ ॥ इति मनु-नारद-कात्यायन-वृहस्पति-वचनं सम्यग्विभागविषयं । (3) ‘येनांशोयादृशो-भुक्तस्तस्य तत्र विचासयेत् । स्वेच्छाकृतविभागो यः पुनरेव विसम्बदेत् । स रात्रांशे स्वके स्थाप्यः शासनोयोऽनुबन्धकत्’ ॥ इति वल्गाकरधृतवृहस्पतिवचनमपि स्वेच्छाकृतपदोपादानं स्वारसिकन्यूनाधिकपरं, नतु भ्रातृषादिकृतदुर्विभागपरं । (4) पश्चात् प्राप्तमित्यनेन तन्मात्रस्त्वेव विभागः, न पूर्वविभक्तं विभजनोयमित्यवगम्यते । (5) समभागेनेति अपहर्तुरपहर्तृतया भागो न देयः, अप्योवा देयः, इति निरासार्थं । (6) भृशुराहेति शेषः वाक्यार्थकर्मता च । (7) अविभक्तत्वादेव विभागे प्राप्ते वचनारम्भसौख्यदोषाभावं ज्ञापयतीति विश्वरूपहलायुधप्रभृतयः । (8) स्तेयधात्वर्थाणिपत्तिरित्यभिप्रायः । तच्चाह,—‘यत् परद्रव्यहरणं स्तेयं तत् परिकीर्तितं’ । इति कात्यायनवचने परशब्दादात्मोयत्वव्यवच्छेदेनैव परकोयत्वस्यावगमात् । यथा मुद्रापचारे प्रतिनिधित्वेन माषप्राप्ती, ‘अयञ्चिया वै माषाः,’ इति माषा-

निषिद्धाः । तत्र माघमाचारश्चकमिश्रितानां निषेधः, नतु माघ-
 शुक्लोभयारश्चकमिश्रितानां, तथा अत्रापि परमात्रद्रव्यस्यापहारएव
 स्तेयं, नतु स्वपरसाधारणस्याविभक्तदायस्य भोगादिनेति साधारणा-
 साधारणयोश्चासाधारणस्यैव शौचप्रतीतेरिति । (9) अतएव
 परकोयत्वेन विशेषतो जानतस्तदपहारे स्तेयं, नतु स्वद्रव्यभ्रमिष
 परद्रव्यव्यवहर्तुरपोति जिनेन्द्रदायभागप्रायश्चित्तविवेककृत्तम् । (10)
 तत्र स्वीयवृद्धा परकोयापहारे यत् अस्तेयत्वमुक्तं, तत्र समीचीनं,
 भागवतोयनृगोपास्थानविरोधात् । तथाहि,—‘कस्यचिद्विजमुख्यस्य
 अष्टा गौमेम गोधने । संपृक्ताऽविदुषा सा च मया दत्ता
 द्विजातये । तां नोयमानं तत्स्वामौ हृद्गोवाच ममेति च ।
 ममेयं प्रतिगृह्णाह नृगो मे दत्तवानिति । विप्रौ विददमानौ माम्
 जचतुः सार्यसाधकौ । भगवान् दातापहर्त्ता च तच्छ्रुत्वा मेऽभवद्भ्रमः ।
 तत्पापात् ककलाशत्वप्राप्तिश्च मे यथाऽभवत् । तावदद्राक्ष-
 मात्मानं ककलाशतनुं प्रभो’ इति ॥ (11) यत्तु अनेकेषामङ्कुरीयक-
 समुदये सदृशतया आम्बोयाङ्कुरीयकभ्रमिष परकीयाङ्कुरीयकविक्रये न
 स्तेयत्वं, तद्विशेषचिह्नितद्रव्याणां कपर्षकादीनां नानास्वामिका-
 नाम् एकत्र स्थापनदशायामिव परस्परद्रव्यविनिमयादेव परस्परविनि-
 योगे दोषाभाव इत्यवगत्य एकत्र स्थापनात्, अन्यथा दोषशङ्कया
 न तथा कुर्व्यादिति, यत्र कूटत्वादिना साभार्थं स्थापितं तत्र
 स्तेयत्वं । (12) एतद्विषये मत्स्यपुराणं,—‘अन्नानाद-यः पुमान्
 कुर्व्यात् परद्रव्यस्य विक्रयं । स निदीपो ज्ञानपूर्वं चौरवह्ण-
 मर्हति’ ॥ इति एतदज्ञानकृतदण्डाभावपरमिति । (13) तेन पर-
 मात्रस्वत्वावच्छिन्नद्रव्ये परानुमतिमन्तरेण ममेदं यथेष्टविनियोज्य-
 मिति कृत्वा व्यवहारः स्तेयं । (14) स च क्वचिन्मानसः सङ्कल्प-
 रूपः, क्वचित् कायिकोदानविक्रयादिलक्षणः । (15) तस्य चाविभक्त-

भ्रातादिधनेषु असम्भवः । इदं परकीयमेव इदं ममैवेति विशेषा-
 निश्चयात् । (16) अतएव कात्यायनः,—‘बन्धुनापहृतं द्रव्यं
 बलात्तेव प्रदापयेत् । बन्धूनामविभक्तानां भोगं नैव प्रदापयेत् ॥
 अत्रापहृतपदं भाक्तं, सामादिना प्रदापयितव्यः, नतु बलात्. अवि-
 भक्तेन यद्यधिकं भुक्तं तदसौ न दाप्यः । (17) एवञ्च निधेर्लामिऽपि
 न दोषः, नष्टस्वामिकत्वात् । तत्राच मनुः,—‘राजा लब्ध्वा निधिं
 दद्याद्विजेभ्योऽर्धं हिजः पुनः । विद्वान् अशेषमादद्यात् स सर्वस्व
 प्रभुर्यतः । इतरेषु निधौ लब्धे राजा षष्ठांशमाहरेत् । अनिवे-
 दितविज्ञाता दाप्यस्तं दक्षमेव च’ ॥ (18) सम्भूयवाणिजिकानाम्
 नेतादृशं वचनाभावात्, प्रत्युत,—‘जिह्वां त्वज्युर्निर्लाभं’,—इति
 याज्ञवल्क्येन वक्ष्यकस्य लाभशून्यं कृत्वा त्यागउक्तः, दायद्रव्यइव
 वाणिजिकानामेकधनेऽन्येषां स्वत्वाभावाच्च किन्तु मिलनात्तद-
 निश्चयमात्रमिति ।

CHAPTER IX.

(1) अथ स्त्रीधनं । तत्र कात्यायनः,—‘प्राप्तं शिष्येण यद्विस्तं
 प्रोत्वा चैव यद् अन्धतः । भर्तुः स्वास्यं भवेत्तत्र शेषन्तु स्त्रीधनं
 कृतं’ ॥ अन्धतः पित्रमात्रभर्तृकुलव्यतिरिक्तात्, यज्ञव्यं शिष्येण वा
 यद्वर्जितं, तत्र भर्तुः स्वातन्त्र्यं, तेन स्त्रिया अपि धनं न स्त्रीधनं
 अस्वातन्त्र्यात्, एतद्व्यतिरिक्तधने स्वत्वं स्त्रियाएव दानाद्यधि-
 कारस्तु । (2) मनुविष्णू । ‘पत्नी जीवति यः कश्चिदलङ्कारो-
 द्भूतोभवेत् । न तं भर्तुरन् द्रायादाः, भजमानाः पतन्ति ते’ ॥ पत्न्यु-

दत्तेऽपि तदनुज्ञया परिहितोऽलङ्कारस्तावतैव भार्यायाः स्त्रियो-
भवतीति मेधातिथिः । (3) कात्यायनः,—‘जड़या कन्यया वापि
पत्न्युः पितृगृहेऽथवा । भर्तुः सकाशात् पित्रोर्वा लब्धं सौदायिकं
स्मृतं । सौदायिकं धनं प्राप्य स्त्रीणां स्वातन्त्र्यमिष्यते । यस्मात्
तदाऽनृशंस्यार्थं तैर्दत्तं तत् प्रजीवनं । सौदायिके सदा स्त्रीणां
स्वातन्त्र्यं परिकीर्तितं । विक्रये चैव दाने च यथेष्टं स्यावरेष्वपि’ ॥
सुदायेभ्यः पितृमातृभर्तृकुलसम्बन्धिभ्योलब्धं सौदायिकं, आनृशंस्यम्
अनैष्ठ्यम् । (4) नारदः,—‘भर्ता प्रीतेन यद्वत्तं स्त्रिये तस्मिन् स्मृतेऽपि
तत् । सा यथाकामम् अग्नोयाद्द्याद्वा स्यावरादृते’ ॥ भर्तृदत्त-
विशेषणात् भर्तृदत्तस्यावरादृते अन्यस्यावरं देयमेव । (5) अन्यथा,
‘यथेष्टं स्यावरेष्वपि’ इति कात्यायनोक्तं विरुध्येत । (6) कल्पतरु-
करयोः कात्यायनः,—‘अपकारक्रियायुक्ता निर्लज्जा चार्थनाशिनो ।
अभिचाररता या च स्त्रीधनं न च सार्हति’ ॥ (7) याज्ञवल्क्यः,—
‘दुर्भिक्षे धर्मकार्ये वा व्याधौ संप्रतिरोधके । गृहोतं स्त्रीधनं भर्ता
नाकामोदातुमर्हति’ ॥ संप्रतिरोधके भोजनाद्यवरोधकारिण्युमर्षा-
दिके । (8) अन्यत्र तु कात्यायनः,—‘न भर्ता नैव च सुतो न
पिता भ्रातरौ न च । आदाने वा विसर्गे वा स्त्रीधने प्रभविष्यवः’ ॥

CHAPTER X.

(1) अथ स्त्रीधनाधिकारिणः । देवलः,—‘सामान्यं पुत्रकन्यानां
सुतायां स्त्रीधनं स्त्रियां । अप्रजायां हरेर्भर्ता माता भ्राता पितापि
वा’ ॥ (2) अत्र हन्त-निर्हन्तात् पुत्रकन्ययोस्तुत्याधिकारः । (3)

अन्यतराभावे अन्यतरस्य तद्धनं । (4) एतयोरभावे, जड़ाया-
दुहितुः, पुत्रवत्याः सन्भावितपुत्रायाश्च, तुल्याधिकारः, स्वपुत्रवारेण
पार्ष्वणे,—‘सपिण्डोक्तरीत्यादूहं’ यत् पितृभ्यः इदोयते । सर्वेष्वंश-
हरा माता इति धर्मेषु निश्चयः ॥ इति शातातपोक्ततद्गोम्य-
पतिपिण्डदानमश्ववात् । (5) तद्याच नारदः,—‘पुत्राभावे तु
दुहिता तुल्यसन्तानदर्शनात्’ । (6) अतएव एतादृशदुहित्वभावे
पौत्राधिकारः । (7) तदभावे दौहित्राधिकारः,—‘दौहित्रोपि
ह्यनुचनेन सन्तारयति पौत्रवत्’ । इति मनुवचने दौहित्रे पौत्र-
धर्मातिदेयात्, पुत्रेण परिचीतदुहितुर्वाधात्, बाधकपुत्रेण बाध्यदुहित्व-
पुत्रबाधस्य ग्राह्यत्वात् । (8) तदभावे प्रपौत्रः, तद्गोम्यपिण्डदाहत्वात् ।
(9) तदभावे बन्ध्याविधवयोर्मातृधनाधिकारः, तयोरपि तत्प्रज्ञा-
त्वात् । (10) तदभावे तु भर्ता । (11) एतच्च न पितृमातृदत्तधन-
विषयं, तन्न भ्रातुरधिकारात् । तद्याच बृहकात्यायनः,—‘पितृभ्या-
श्चैव यद्वत्तं दुहितुः स्वावरन्धनं । अप्रजायामतोतायां भ्रातृगामि तु
सर्व्वदा’ ॥ (12) मातुः परिचयनकालखल्वनु पुत्रसत्वेऽपि क्रमेण
अनूकोढदुहित्वोरेवाधिकारः,—‘मातुः पारिचायं स्त्रियो विभजेरव’
इति वशिष्ठोक्तेः । (13) ‘स्त्रोधनं दुहितृणाम् अप्रप्तानाम्
अप्रतिष्ठितानाञ्च’ । इति गोतमवचनेन प्रथमम् अप्रप्तानाम्
अवाग्दत्तानां, तदभावे त्वप्रतिष्ठितानां वाग्दत्तानां, ईषदर्थे
नञ्, तदभावे चकारसमुच्चितानाम् जड़ानां, ‘स्त्रोधनं दुहितृणाम्,’
इति सामान्यतः प्रागुक्तत्वात्, ‘अप्रप्तानाम्’ इत्यादेशु क्रमार्थत्वेनोप-
संहारार्थत्वात् । (14) व्यक्तमाह मनुः,—‘मातुश्च यौतुकं यत्
स्वात् कुमारी-भागएव सः’ इति । यौतुकपदं बुमित्रश्चे इत्यस्यात्
सिद्धं, मित्रता च स्त्री-पुंसयोर्विवाहात् भवति,—‘यदेतत् हृदयं तव
तदसु हृदयं मम, यदिदं हृदयं मम तदसु हृदयं तव’,—इति

मन्त्रलिङ्गात् । 'यौतुकं यौतकश्च तत् इति वाचस्पति-मित्रराय-
मुकुटधृतात् यौतकमपि साधु । (15) परिषयनकालः परिषयन-
पूर्वपरीभूतकालः, सच वृद्धिश्चाक्षरम्-पत्यभिवादनान्तो विवाहसत्त्वे
विवृतः । (16) यत्तु मनुवचनं,—'स्त्रियास्तु यज्ञवेदिसं पित्रा दत्तं
कथञ्चन । ब्राह्मणो तद्धरेत् कन्या तदपत्यस्य वा भवेत्' इति ॥ तत्
'पित्रा दत्तम्' इति विशेषणात् विवाहसमयादन्यदपि पितृदत्तं
कन्याया एवेत्येतदर्थं, ब्राह्मणोपदन्तु कन्यामात्रपरं । यद्वा क्षत्रियादि-
स्त्रीचामनपत्यानां पितृदत्तं धनं सपत्नीदुहिता ब्राह्मणोपकन्या हरेत् न
पुनः 'अप्रजस्त्रीधनं भर्तुः' इति वचनावकाशः, इति वचनार्थः । (17)
तदभावे पुत्राधिकारः,—'दुहितृणामभावे तु रिक्थं पुत्रेषु तद्वदेत्' ।
इति मनुवचनात् । (18) एवं पुत्राधिकारात् प्राक् दुहितृधिकार-
विधायकवचनान्तराण्यपि एतद्विषयकाणि । (19) पुत्राभ्याभावे तु
ब्राह्मणादिपञ्चकविवाहकालीनं स्त्रीधनं भर्तुः, आसुरादित्रयविवाह
कालीनस्तु मातुः, तदभावे पितुः । (20) यथा मनुः,—'ब्राह्मण-
दैवार्षगान्धर्वप्राजापत्येषु यज्ञनं । अतीतायाम् अप्रजायां भर्तुरेव
तदिष्यते । यत् तस्याः स्वादनं दत्तं विवाहेष्वसुरादिषु । अतीतायाम्
अप्रजायां मातापित्रोस्तदिष्यते' ॥ (21) कन्याधनाधिकारे क्रमम्
आह बौधायनः,—'रिक्थं मृतायाः कन्याया गृह्णीयुः सोदराः स्वयं ।
तदभावे भवेन्मातुस्तदभावे भवेत् पितुः' ॥ (22) अत्र क्रमदर्शनात्
पूर्ववचने 'मातापित्रोः' इत्यत्र पाठक्रमेणाधिकारः, नतु हन्वनिर्देशात्
समुच्चितेन । (23) वृहस्पतिः,—'मातुः स्वसा मातुलानी पितृव्यस्त्री
पितृस्वसा । श्वश्रूः पूर्वजपत्नी च मातृतुल्याः प्रकीर्तिताः । यदाऽसाम्
औरस्येन स्यात् सुतोदौहितृण्येव वा । तत्सुतो वा धनन्तासां
स्वस्रोयाव्याः समाप्नुयुः' ॥ (24) औरसपदं कन्यापुत्रोभयपरं, सुत-
इति सपत्नीपुत्रपरं,—'सर्वासामेकपत्नीनाम् एकाचेत् पुत्रिणी भवेत् ।

सर्वास्तास्तेन पुत्रेण प्राह पुत्रवतीर्मनुः' ॥ इति मनुस्मृतेः । एक-
पत्नीनामिति एकः पतिर्यासां ताः । नतु सुतपदम् औरसविशेषं
वैयर्थ्यात्, सपत्नीपुत्रसङ्गावे स्वस्त्रोयाद्यधिकारापत्तेश्च । तत्सुतइति
पौत्रसपत्नीपौत्रपरं, नतु दौहित्रपुत्रपरं तस्य स्वभोग्यभर्तृपिण्डदानान-
धिकारात् । (25) अत्र प्रागुक्तानुसारात् दौहित्रपर्यन्तानन्तरमेव
सपत्नीपुत्र-तत्पुत्रयोरधिकारः, नतु प्रागुक्तभर्तादिपिण्डपर्यन्ताभावे-
ऽप्येति वाच्यं, भर्तादीनां धनिभोग्यपार्ष्णपिण्डदानानधिकारात् ।
(26) तस्मादेतेषां सपत्नीपौत्रान्तानां 'तत्सुतोवा' इति वा-शब्दसमु-
च्चितानां,—'सामान्यं पुत्रकन्यानां मृतायां स्त्रीधनं विदुः ।
अप्रजायां हरेर्हर्ता माता भ्राता पितापि वा' ॥ इति देवलोक्तानां
भर्तादिपिण्डपर्यन्तानाञ्च अभावएव सत्स्वपि श्वशुरभ्रातृश्वशुरादिषु
'स्वस्त्रोयाद्याः' इत्यनेन भगिनोसुत-भर्तृगृहेष्ठकनिष्ठोभयरूपभ्रातृपुत्र-
जामातृ-देवराणां मातृस्वस्त्रादिधनेऽधिकारः अनन्यगतेर्वचनात् ।
(27) अत्र,—'त्रयाणाम् उदकं कार्यं त्रिषु पिण्डः प्रवर्त्तते । चतुर्थः
संप्रदातेषां पञ्चमोनोपपद्यते' ॥ इति दायभागप्रकरणेयमनुस्मृतेः,
'पिण्डदोऽंशहरः' इति याज्ञवल्क्योयात्, 'मातृतुल्याः प्रकीर्त्तिताः'
इत्यनेन स्वस्त्रोयादीनां पुत्रत्वप्रापनेन । (28) पिण्डदत्वसूचनस्य
दायभागप्रकरणे उपकारतारतम्येन धनाधिकारक्रम-प्रापनैक-
प्रयोजनकत्वात् । (29) 'मातुलोभागिनेयस्य स्वस्त्रोयोमातुलस्य च ।
श्वशुरस्य गुरोश्चैव सख्युर्मातामहस्य च । एतेषाञ्चैव भार्याभ्यः
स्वसुर्मातुः पितुस्तथा । पिण्डदानन्तु कर्त्तव्यम्, इति वेदविदां
स्थितिः' ॥ इति शातातपवचनात् । (30) पिण्डदान-विशेषेणैव वक्ष्य-
मेवाम् अधिकारक्रमः प्रतिपत्तव्यः, पाठक्रमात् अर्थक्रमस्य बलवत्त्वात्,
अन्यथा सर्वशेषे देवराधिकारे महाजनविरोधः स्यात् । (31) तत्र
प्रथमं देवः, तत्पिण्ड-तद्वर्त्तृपिण्ड-तद्वर्त्तृदेयपुरुषत्रयपिण्ड-दत्त्वात्

सपिण्डत्वाच्च भ्रातृ-स्रोधने अधिकारो । (32) तदभावे भ्रातृश्वशुर-
देवर्योः सुतो, तत्पिण्ड-तद्भर्तृपिण्ड-तद्भर्तृदेयपुरुषद्वयपिण्ड-दत्त्वात्
सपिण्डत्वाच्च । (33) तयोरभावे त्वसपिण्डोऽपि भगिनीपुत्रः, तत्पिण्ड-
तत्पुत्रदेयतत्पित्रादिपिण्डत्रयदत्त्वात् । (34) तदभावे भर्तृभागि-
नेयः, पुत्राद् भर्तृर्दुर्व्यलत्वेन तत्स्थानपातिनोरपि भगिनीपुत्र-
भर्तृभागिनेययोस्तथैव बलाबलस्य न्याय्यत्वेन तद्भर्तृदेयपुरुषद्वयपिण्ड-
दत्त्वात् तत्पिण्डदत्त्वात् तद्भर्तृपिण्डदत्त्वाच्च मातृस्रानौधनेऽधिकारो ।
(35) तदभावे भ्रातृपुत्रः, तत्पिण्ड-तत्पुत्रदेयतत्पित्रादिपिण्डद्वय-
दत्त्वात् पित्रस्वसुर्धने अधिकारो । (36) तदभावे श्वशुरयोः पिण्ड-
दानात् जामाता श्वश्रूधनेऽधिकारो । (37) इति क्रमः, 'स्वस्रौयाद्याः'
इति त्वधिकारिमात्रपरं न पाठिकक्रमपरं । (38) एषां वक्तां
प्रातिखिकोक्तानामभावे सपिण्डानन्तर्ये च श्वशुरादिरधिकारो । (39)
न च सपिण्डाभावे 'मातुः स्वसा' इति वचनं वार्थं, अस्मिन्
अधिकारिगच्छने देवरतत्सुतभ्रातृश्वशुरसुतानाम् अधिकारप्रापनात्
आसन्नतर-श्वशुरभ्रातृश्वशुरादेः परित्वागादिति ।

CHAPTER XI.

(1) अथापुत्रधनाधिकारिणः । (2) याज्ञवल्क्यः,—'पत्नी
दुहितरश्चैव पितरौ भ्रातरस्तथा । तत्सुतो गोत्रजो बन्धुः शिष्यः
स ब्रह्मचारिणः । एषामभावे पूर्वस्य धनभाग उत्तरोत्तरः । स्वर्ग-
तस्य ह्यपुत्रस्य सर्व्ववर्णेष्वयं विधिः' ॥ (3) तथा विष्णुः,—'अपुत्रस्य
धनं पत्न्याभिगामि, तदभावे दुहितृगामि, तदभावे पित्रगामि, तदभावे

मातृगामि, तदभावे भ्रातृगामि, तदभावे भ्रातृपुत्रगामि, तदभावे
 सकुल्यगामि, तदभावे बन्धुगामि, तदभावे शिष्यगामि, तदभावे
 सहाध्यायिगामि, तदभावे ब्राह्मणधनवर्ष्यं राजगामि' इति ॥ (4) अत्र
 अपुत्रपदं पुत्रपौत्रप्रपौत्राभावपरं तेषां पार्ष्वणपिण्डदातृत्वाविशेषात् ।
 (5) अतएव बौधायनवचने पुत्रपौत्रप्रपौत्रान् उपक्रम्य,—‘सत्स्वङ्गजेषु
 तन्नामो ह्यर्थो भवति' इत्युक्तं । (6) तद्यथा,—‘प्रपितामहः पितामहः
 पिता स्वयं सोदर्याभ्रातरः सवर्णायाः पुत्रः पौत्रः प्रपौत्रः, एतान्
 अविभक्तदायादान् सपिण्डान् आचक्षते, विभक्तदायादान् सकुल्यान्
 आचक्षते, सत्स्वङ्गजेषु तन्नामो ह्यर्थो भवति' इति ॥ (7) अस्यार्थः,
 पित्रादिपिण्डत्रयेषु सपिण्डनेन भोक्तृत्वात्, पुत्रादिभिस्त्रिभिस्तत्-
 पिण्डस्यैव दानात्, यश्च जीवन् यत्पिण्डदाता, स मृतः सन्
 सपिण्डनेन तत्पिण्डभोक्ता, एवं मध्यस्थितः पुरुषः, पूर्वेषां जीवन्
 पिण्डदाता, मृतश्च तत्पिण्डभोक्ता, परेषां जीवतां पिण्डसम्प्रदान-
 भूतभासीत्, मृतैश्च तेः सह दौहित्रादिदेयपिण्डभोक्ता, अतोयेषामयं
 पिण्डदाता, ये च तत्पिण्डदातारः, ते अविभक्तं पिण्डरूपं
 दायमश्रन्तीति अविभक्तदायादाः, सपिण्डाः, पञ्चमस्य पूर्वस्य
 मध्यमः पञ्चमोन पिण्डदाता न च तत्पिण्डभोक्ता, एवम् अधस्तनोऽपि
 पञ्चमोन मध्यमस्य पिण्डदाता नापि तत्पिण्डभोक्ता, तेन
 वृद्धप्रपितामहात् प्रभृति त्रयः पूर्वपुरुषाः, प्रतिनमृतः प्रभृत्यध-
 स्तनास्त्रयः पुरुषाः, एकपिण्डभोक्तृत्वाभावात् विभक्तदायादाः
 सकुल्या इत्याचक्षते । (8) इदं सपिण्डत्वं सकुल्यत्वञ्च दायग्रहणार्थम्
 इत्युक्तं, अगोचरविवाहार्थञ्च पिण्डलेपभुजामपि इति विवृतं रुद्धि-
 तत्त्वे । (9) पुत्रादिविमानक्रमं व्यक्तमाह रत्नाकरधृतकात्यायनः,—
 ‘अविभक्ते मृते पुत्रे तत् सुतं रिक्त्यभागिनं । कुर्वीत जीवनं येन
 लभ्यं नैव पितामहात् । लभेताग्रं स पित्रान्तु पितृव्यात् तस्य वा

सुतात् । स एवांशस्तु सञ्ज्ञेयां भ्रातृणां न्यायतो भवेत् । लभेत तत्-
 सुतोवापि निहन्तिः परतो भवेत् ॥ (10) जीवनं जीवनीयतद्द्रव्यं ।
 यदा भ्रातृणां कश्चिदेकोन विद्यते, तदा तत्सुतस्य पित्रंशो दातव्यः ।
 यदा विपक्षस्त्रायनेकपुत्राः, तदा एकः पित्रंशस्तोषां विभज्य दातव्यः ।
 एवं तत्सुतोऽप्यंशं लभेत । तत्सुतस्य भागो निवर्त्तत इत्यर्थः । (11)
 एतच्च सहवासविषयं । यथा देवसः,—‘अविभक्तविभक्तानां कुल्यानां
 वसतां सह । भूयोदायविभागः स्यादाचतुर्थादिति स्थितिः’ ॥ अवि-
 भक्तानामिव विभक्तानां सहवसतां संसृष्टानां वा पुनर्बिभागः, भ्रातृ-
 तत्सुत-तत्सुत-पर्यन्तमेव, तत्सुताच्चतुर्थादिवर्त्तते इति । (12) प्रागुक्त-
 क्षमपथ्यन्तं विभागदानस्तु भिन्नदेशादागतानाम्, इति न विरोधः ।
 (13) तेन प्रपौत्रपर्यन्तानाम् अभावे पत्नी धनाधिकारिणी । (14) यथा
 कात्यायनः,—‘भर्तृदायं मृते पत्नी विन्यसेत् स्त्री यथेष्टतः । विद्य-
 माने तु संरक्षेत् क्षपयेत् तत्कुलेऽन्वया । अपुत्रा श्रयणं भर्तुः पाल-
 यन्ती व्रते स्थिता । भुञ्जीतामरणात् क्षान्ता दायादा ऊर्ध्वमाप्नुयुः’ ॥
 ‘यथेष्टतः’ इति धर्मार्थः । (15) तथाच व्यासः,—‘लोकान्तरस्थं भर्ता-
 रम् आत्मानश्च वरानने । तारयत्युभयं नारी नित्यं धर्मपरायणा’ ॥
 (16) मदनपारिजातघृता स्मृतिः,—‘यद्ययद् द्रष्टव्यं लोके यद्ययत् पत्न्युः
 समीहितं । तत्तद्-गुणवते देयं पतिप्रोचन-काम्यया’ ॥ (17) ‘भर्तुः
 श्रयणं पालयन्तो’ नान्यगामिनौ । अतएव हरिवंशीय-पुस्तकव्रतोपा-
 स्थाने,—‘दानोपवासपुस्तानि सुकृतान्यप्यदन्धति । निष्कलान्दस-
 तोनां हि पुस्तकानि तथा शुभे’ ॥ (18) तथा वृहन्ननुः,—‘अपुत्रा-
 श्रयणं भर्तुः पालयन्तो व्रते स्थिता । पत्न्येव दद्यात् तत्पिण्डं
 क्षत्स्वमंशं लभेत च’ ॥ तत्पिण्डमित्यत्र तदित्यनुवच्यते, तच्छब्देन
 भर्तुः परामर्शात्, भर्तुः क्षत्स्वमंशं यावदंशं हरितुं नतु वर्त्तनजीवनो-
 चितमार्गः । (19) पत्नी सवर्षा ज्वेष्टा पत्नीत्वभिधानात् । (20)

ज्येष्ठत्वमाह मनुः । 'यदि स्वाद्य पराद्यैव विन्देरन् योषितोद्भिजाः । तासां वर्णक्रमेशेव ज्येष्ठं पूजा च वैश्व च' ॥ (21) तदन्वस्या-
भार्यायाः पोषणमात्रमाह नारदः,—'भ्रातृणां प्रजः प्रेयात् कश्चिच्छेत् प्रव्रजेच्च वा । विभजेरन् धनन्तस्य शेषास्ते स्त्रोधनं विना । भरणस्यास्य कुर्वीरन् स्त्रोणाम् आजोवनचयात् । रक्षन्ति शय्यां भर्तुं चेत् आच्छिन्दुरारितरासु च' ॥ प्रेयात् न्नियेत । (22) एवं पत्नीभार्याभेदात्,—'ततोदायमपुत्रस्य विभजेरन् सहोदराः । तुल्या दुहितरोवापि ध्रियमाणः पितापि वा । सवर्णा भ्रातरौ माता भार्या चैव यथाक्रमं । तेषामभावे गृह्णीयुः कुल्यानां सहवासिनः' ॥ इत्यादिवचनानि व्यवस्थेयानि-तुल्याः सवर्णाः, ध्रियमाणः जीवन् । (23) वसुतसु एतदुक्तक्रमः सर्वत्र न आहः, उपकारतारतम्य-मूलकवचनमात्रवचन-विरोधात् । अतएवात्र क्रमानुसारात्सूचकम् वापि अपिवा इत्युक्तं । (24) पत्नीभावे दुहितरः, अत्र बहुवचनात् कन्योद्गा-दौहित्राणां परिग्रहः । (25) तत्र कन्योद्गयोः,—'अपुत्रस्य सतस्य कुमारौ ऋक्त्वं गृह्णीयात्, तदभावे चोद्गा' इति पराग्रवचनात् क्रमः । (26) तदभावे दौहित्रः,—'पौत्रदौहित्रयोर्लोके विशेषो नास्ति धर्मतः । तयोर्हि मातापितरौ सम्भूतौ तस्य देहतः' ॥ इति मनुवचने पौत्रतुल्यत्वाभिधानेन यथा पुत्राभावे पौत्रः तथा दुहितृभावे दौहित्रः । (27) अतएव गोविन्दराजदृष्टोविष्णुः,—'अपुत्रपौत्रे संसारे दौहित्राधनमाप्नुयुः । पूर्वेषां हि स्वधाकारि पौत्रदौहित्रकाः समाः' ॥ (28) दौहित्रा-भावे पितरौ, तत्र प्रथमं पिता ततोमाता, पूर्वोक्त-विष्णुस्मृतेः । (29) तदभावे भ्रातरः, अत्रापि बहुवचनं सोदरासोदरसंख्यत्व-भेदेन अधि-कारिभेदार्थं । (30) अतएव एकपितृजातयोरपि सोदरविमाद-जयोर्मृतदेयषट्पुरुषपिण्डदाहत्वेन सोदरस्यैव घनाधिकारः, न तु

पित्रादित्रयमात्रपिण्डदातुर्विमादजस्य । (31) कश्चित् संसृष्टत्वेन विमादजस्यापि असंसृष्टसोदरेण सह तुल्याधिकारिता । सोदरस्य संसृष्टत्वेन स एव गृह्णीयात्, न संसृष्टपि विमादज इति । (32) तथाच याज्ञवल्क्यः,—‘संसृष्टिनस्तु संसृष्टौ सोदरस्य तु सोदरः । दद्याच्चापहरेदंशं जातस्य च मृतस्य च । अन्योदर्यस्तु संसृष्टौ नान्योदर्योर्धनं हरेत् । असंसृष्टपि चादद्यात् संसृष्टोनान्यमादजः’ । (33) संसृष्टिन्माह बृहस्पतिः,—‘विभक्तौ यः पुनः पित्रा भ्रात्रा चैकत्र संस्थितः । पितृव्येणाथवा प्रीत्या स तु संसृष्ट उच्यते’ ॥ (34) तेन विभागानन्तरं मैत्र्यात् पितापुत्रयोः, भ्रात्रोः, पितृव्यस्त्रातृपुत्रयो र्वा यथायथम् एकत्रावस्थानं संसर्गः, तदयुक्तः संसर्गः । (35) एवम्भूतस्य संसर्गिणो-मृतस्य धनं तज्जातस्यापत्यस्य अपरः संसर्गः दद्यात्, तदपत्याभावे संसर्गः स्वयं गृह्णीयात् । (36) एवं, ‘सोदरस्य तु सोदरः’ । (37) अत्र विशेषयति यमः,—‘अविभक्तं स्थावरं यत् सर्वेषामिव तद् भवेत् । विभक्तं स्थावरं ग्राह्यं नान्योदर्यैः कदाचन’ ॥ सर्वेषां सोदरासोदराणां, स्थावरातिरिक्तान्तु विभक्ताविभक्तं सोदराणामिव इति अर्थतः सिद्धं । (38) व्यक्तमाह मनुः,—‘येषां ज्येष्ठः कनिष्ठो वा ह्येतेतांशप्रदानतः । म्रियेतान्यतरोवापि तस्य भागो न लुप्यते’ ॥ अंशप्रदानतो विभागात् पूर्वं ह्येतेत प्रव्रज्यादिनेति शेषः । (39) केषाम् अंशविभागः, इत्यत्राह सएवः,—‘सोदर्याविभजेरंस्तं समेत्य सहिताः समं । भ्रातरो ये च संसृष्टाः भगिन्यश्च सनाभयः’ ॥ (40) बृहस्पतिः,—‘विभक्ता भ्रातरो ये च संप्रोत्यैकाच संस्थिताः । पुनर्विभागकरणे तेषां ज्यैष्ठं न विद्यते । यदि कश्चित् प्रमीयेत प्रव्रजेहा कथञ्चन । न लुप्यते तस्य भागः सोदरस्य विधीयते । या तस्य भगिनी सा तु ततोऽंशं लब्धुमर्हति । अनपत्यस्य धर्मोऽयम् अभात्यापितृकस्य च । संसृष्टानान्तु यः कश्चित् विद्याशौर्यादिना धनं प्राप्नोति

तस्य दातव्यो दंशः शेषाः समांशिनः' ॥ (41) अत्र संसृष्टानां ज्येष्ठांशभावोवर्णत्रयाणां बोध्यः । शूद्रस्य तु सर्व्वदा ज्येष्ठांशभावात् । (42) तथाच मनुः,—‘समवर्णासु ये जाताः सर्व्वे पुत्रा-द्विजज्जना । उद्धारं ज्ञायवे दत्त्वा भजेरन्नितरे समं । शूद्रस्य तु सर्व्वेष्वेव नाग्या भार्य्योपदिश्यते । तस्यां जाताः समांशाः स्वर्य्यदि पुत्रशतं भवेत्' ॥ (43) समांशाः समभागाएव भवेयुः, नोद्धारः कस्यचिद्देयः, इति कुञ्जकभट्टः । (44) युक्तश्चेतत् तथाहि,—‘ज्येष्ठस्य विंशउद्धारः सर्व्वे-द्रव्याश्च यद्दरं । ततोऽर्धं मध्यमस्य स्यात् तुरीयन्तु यवोयसः' ॥ इति मनुना सामान्यतो ज्येष्ठादीनामुद्धारविधानात् ‘द्विजज्जना’ इत्यस्य वर्णमात्रोपलक्षकत्वशङ्कानिरासाय उत्तरवचनोत्तरार्धं । (45) नच शुभामनरकत्वात्त्वाविशेषाच्च शूद्रस्याप्यधिकारइति वाच्यं, तद-निस्तारकमध्यमकनीयसोरर्धपादोद्धारदर्शनेन तस्याप्रयोजकत्वात् । (46) नचोद्धारंशयोर्भेदात् समांशितामिधानेन पूर्व्वोक्तासवर्णाजात-विषमांशभागएव शूद्रस्य निषिध्यते, नोद्धारः, इति वाच्यं, ‘शूद्रस्य तु सर्व्वेष्वेव’ इति पूर्व्वोर्ध्वेनैव तत्सिद्धमिति । (47) द्विजज्जनामप्युद्धार-निरासाय समांशता मनुना विहिता, समानं समवर्णास्त्रिति वचन-मभिधाय,—‘द्विप्रकारोविभागस्तु दायादानां प्रकीर्त्तितः । वयोज्येष्ठ-क्रमेणैकः परा समांशकल्पना’ इति ॥ प्रकीर्त्तित इत्यत्र प्रदर्शित इति वृहस्पतिः । (48) अत्र भगिन्यधिकारोविवाहोचितद्रव्यलाभाय, सुनिभिः संयद्गृह्णन्तिस्तथोक्तत्वात् । (49) अभास्यापिष्टकस्त्रेत्वात् पिष्ट-पदम्, एकशेषात् पिष्टमाहपरं, मातुरभावे भ्रात्रधिकारस्य विष्णा-दिभिर्गृह्यत्वात् । (50) ततश्च, ‘संसृष्टिनस्तु रंसृष्टी’ इत्येतद्वचनं तुल्य-रूपसस्त्वन्धिसमवाये संसर्गेकतविशेषप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं, तेन सोदराणां सापदानां भ्रातृपुत्राणां पिष्टव्यानां तुल्यानां सद्भावे संसर्गी गृह्णीयात् वाक्यादविशेषश्रुतेः, पूर्व्ववचने सर्व्वेषामेव प्रकृतत्वात् सर्व्वेषु चाक्षेपा-

सम्भवात्, अतो न भ्रातृमात्रविषयमिदं वचनम्, इति जीमूतवाहनः ।
 (51) सोदरे त्वसंसृष्टिनि संसृष्टिन्यसोदरे च सति कतरस्तावद्-
 गृह्णीयात्, एवं सोदरासोदरयोः संसृष्टयोः सङ्गावे कतरः । (52)
 इत्यत्र प्रथमत आह 'अन्योदर्यसु' इति, अन्योदर्यः पुनः संसृष्टौ सन्
 गृह्णीयात्, नान्योदर्यमात्रः, किन्तु असंसृष्ट्यपि पूर्ववचनस्यसोदर-
 पदानुषङ्गात् प्राप्तः सोदरश्च गृह्णीयात्, तेनैकत्र विषये पूर्ववचनोक्त-
 संसृष्टत्वसोदरत्वयोरैक्यः सम्बन्धेन तुल्यत्वात् उभयोर्विभज्य ग्रहणं ।
 (53) द्वितीये आह,—'संसृष्टोनान्यमादजः' इति सोदरे संसृष्टिनि
 सति अन्यमादजः संसृष्ट्यपि न गृह्णीयात्, अर्थात् तत्र संसृष्टौ सोदर-
 एव गृह्णीयात्, संसृष्टत्वाविशेषेऽपि सोदरत्वेन तस्मैव बलवत्त्वात् । (54)
 दायभागकारसु अन्योदर्यसु संसृष्टौ सन् सत्यपि सोदरेऽसंसृष्टिनि
 धनं हरेत्, नान्योदर्यः असंसृष्ट्यपि गृह्णीयात्, इति पूर्वार्थस्यार्थः । तत्र
 किं सोदरस्तदानीं न गृह्णीयादेव, इत्यपेक्षायाम् उत्तरार्धेनोक्तं,—
 'असंसृष्ट्यपि चादस्यात्' सोदर इत्यनुषज्यते, न संसृष्टोऽन्यमादजः
 केवलः, किन्तु उभाभ्यामेव विभज्य ग्रहीतव्यम् इत्याहुः । (55)
 मिताक्षरादयोऽप्येवं । (56) याज्ञवल्करदीपकलिकायां शूलपाणि-
 महामहोपाध्यायासु, 'अन्योदर्यसु संसृष्टौ नान्योदर्यधनं हरेत्' ।
 असंसृष्ट्यपि सोदरएव गृह्णीयात्, नतु संसृष्टः सापत्नो-भ्राता । संसृष्ट-
 इति गर्भसंसृष्टः सोदर इति केचित् । नान्योदर्योर्धनं हरेदिति पाठे
 अन्योदर्यः सन् धनं न गृह्णीयात् इति व्याख्या । असंसृष्टिसोदरस्याधि-
 कारार्थमिदं वचनम्, अतो न पुनरुक्तिरित्याहुः । (57) रत्नाकर-
 प्रभृतयसु,—यसु कल्पतरौ नान्योदर्यधनं हरेदिति पाठोदृश्यते, सः,
 मूलभूतयाज्ञवल्कर-मिताक्षरा-पारिजात-हलायुध-ग्रन्थेषु, नान्योदर्यो-
 धनं हरेदिति पाठदर्शनात्, तदनुसारव्याख्यादर्शनाच्च, लिपिकर-
 प्रसादः—इत्याहुः । (58) भ्रातृणामभावे तत्सुतः । तत्र प्रथमं सोदर-

पुत्रः,—‘स्वेन भर्ता सह आर्षं माता भुङ्क्ते स्वधामयं । पितामहो च स्वेनैव स्वेनैव प्रपितामहो’ ॥ इति वृहस्पतिवचनात्, सोदरभ्रातृ-पुत्रदत्तपितामहपिण्डे धनिमातुर्भोग्युतेस्तत्तदधनत्वेन तथोपकार-दर्शनात् । (59) तदभावे वैमात्रेयपुत्रः । (60) तदभावे गोत्रजः । (61) तत्र,—‘अयाणासुदकं कार्यं त्रिषु पिण्डः प्रवर्तते । चतुर्थः सम्प्रदातैषां पञ्चमोनोपपद्यते । अनन्तरः सपिण्डाद्-यस्तस्य तस्य धनं हरेत्’ ॥ इति मनूक्तात् ‘तस्य’ मृतस्य धनिनः, ‘सपिण्डात्’ सपिण्ड-मध्यात्, ‘यः अनन्तरः’ सन्निहिततरः ‘तस्य’ धनं भवेत् एवमेव कुलूकभट्टः । (62) ‘बहवो ज्ञातयोयत्र सकुल्या बान्धवास्तथा । योद्घासन्नतरस्तेषां सोऽनपत्यधनं हरेत्’ ॥ इति वृहस्पत्युक्तत्वाच्च । (63) पिण्डदानसम्बन्धतारतम्येन आसन्नजननतारतम्येन च धनेषु अधि-कारी । (64) तत्र यथा दौहित्रान्तस्त्रसन्तानाभावेऽन्योऽधिकारी एवं भ्रातृपुत्राभावे तद्दौहित्रान्तः पितुः सन्तानोऽधिकारी । (65) तदभावे पितामहः । (66) तदभावे पितामहो । ‘अनपत्यस्य पुत्रस्य माता दायमवाप्नुयात् । मातर्यपि च वृत्तायां पितुर्माता धनं हरेत्’ ॥ इति मनुवचनात् यथा पितृभावे माता तथा पितामहाभावे पितामहो । (67) तदभावे पितामहदौहित्रान्तसन्तानः पितरि तथा दर्शनात् । (68) एवं प्रपितामहः प्रपितामहो प्रपितामहदौहित्रान्तसन्ताना-अपि । (69) मृतभोग्यपिण्डदात्रभावे बन्धुरिति मातामहमातुलादिः । (70) तत्रापि पित्रादिवत् सति मातामहे स एव । (71) तदभावे यथाक्रमं मातुलादिः, मृतदेयमातामहादिपिण्डदत्त्वात् । (72) तदभावे सकुल्योविभक्तपिण्डः, प्रतिनमृतः प्रभृति पुरुषत्रयमधस्तनं वृहत्प्रपितामहादिमन्ततिश्च (73) अतएव दायकता,—ननु सहोदर-भ्रातृपुत्रवत् पित्रव्यस्यापि धनिदेयपूर्वपुरुषत्रयपिण्डदत्त्वात् धनि-पित्रव्यभ्रातृपुत्रयोस्तुल्योऽधिकारः स्यात्, उच्यते, पित्रव्योहि धनि-

पितामहप्रपितामहयोः पिण्डदः, भ्रातृपुत्रसु धनिपितरं प्रधानमादाय पुरुषद्वयपिण्डदः, इति सएव बलवान्, इति पितृव्यात् पूर्वमधिक्रियते—इत्युक्तं । (74) एवं यत्र मृतस्य पितृव्यमृतपितृव्यपुत्रयोः सत्त्वे धनिदेयपितामहप्रपितामहपिण्डदादत्वाविशेषेऽपि जननसन्निकर्षाधिक्येन पितृव्यस्यैवाधिकारः । (75) ‘अनेकपितृकानाम्पि पितृतो भागकल्पना’ । इत्यत्र जननसान्निध्यतारतम्येन भागदर्शनात् । (76) अतएव मिताक्षरायां पितामहपितृव्यतत्पुत्राः क्रमेणाधिकारिण-इत्युक्तं । (77) विवादचिन्तामणावपि अपुत्रधनाधिकारे भ्रातुरभावे तत्पुत्रः तदभावे आसन्नसपिण्ड-इत्युक्तं । (78) बृहस्पत्युक्तबान्धवा इत्यनेन यथाक्रमं आत्मपितृमातृबान्धवा धनाधिकारिणः, ते च,— ‘आत्मपितुः स्वसुः पुत्राः, आत्ममातुः स्वसुः सुताः । आत्ममातुलपुत्राश्च विज्ञेया आत्मबान्धवाः । पितुः पितुः स्वसुः पुत्राः पितुर्मातुः स्वसुः सुताः । पितुर्मातुलपुत्राश्च विज्ञेयाः पितृबान्धवाः । मातुर्मातुः स्वसुः पुत्राः, मातुः पितुः स्वसुः सुताः । मातुर्मातुलपुत्राश्च विज्ञेया मातृबान्धवाः’ ॥ (79) आपस्तम्बः,—‘अन्तेवासो वार्थास्तदर्थेषु धर्मकृत्येषु योजयेत्, दुहिता वा’ । इति । तदर्थेषु मासिकादिना तद्गोमार्थं धर्मकृत्येषु इति अदृष्टार्थमिति । (80) एवञ्च यस्य मृतस्य धनं देशान्तरस्थ-तद्वनाधिकारिसत्त्वे तद्वनविनाशसम्भावनायां तदीर्घदेहिककर्म्मार्थं तत्पुण्यार्थञ्च येन केनापि दातुं युक्तं । (81) ‘यदृच्छयापि यः कुर्यादात्विज्यं प्रीतिपूर्वकं’ । इति नारदवचने तस्यापि प्रतिनिधित्वात् । एतत् प्रपञ्चितं शुद्धितत्त्वे । (82) दायभागकृतापि,—सर्वत्रोक्तरीत्या मृतधनस्य मृतार्थत्वमनुसन्धेयम्—इति वदताप्येतत् स्वहस्तितम् । (83) इति महामहोपाध्यायश्रीहरिहरभट्टाचार्यात्मज-श्रीरघुनन्दनभट्टाचार्यविरचितं स्मृतितत्त्वे दायतत्त्वं समाप्तम् ।

पुत्रः,—‘स्वेन भर्ता सह आर्धं माता शुद्धं स्वं धामयं । पितामहो च स्वेनैव स्वेनैव प्रपितामहौ’ ॥ इति वृहस्पतिवचनात्, सोदरभ्रातृ-पुत्रदत्तपितामहपिण्डे धनिमातुर्भोग्युत्तेस्तादृतधनत्वेन तथोपकार-दर्शनात् । (59) तदभावे वैमात्रेयपुत्रः । (60) तदभावे गोत्रजः । (61) तत्र,—‘अयाणासुदकं कार्यं त्रिषु पिण्डः प्रवर्तते । चतुर्थः सम्प्रदातेषां पञ्चमीनोपपद्यते । अनन्तरः सपिण्डाद्-यस्तस्य तस्य धनं हरेत्’ ॥ इति मनूनात् ‘तस्य’ मृतस्य धनिः, ‘सपिण्डात्’ सपिण्ड-मध्यात्, ‘यः अनन्तरः’ सन्निहिततरः ‘तस्य’ धनं भवेत् एवमेव कुलूकभट्टः । (62) ‘बहवो ज्ञातयोयत्र सकुल्या बान्धवास्तथा । योज्ञासन्नतरस्त्रेष्वां सोऽनपत्यधनं हरेत्’ ॥ इति वृहस्पत्युक्तत्वाच्च । (63) पिण्डदानसम्बन्धतारतम्येन आसन्नजननतारतम्येन च धनेषु अधि-कारी । (64) तत्र यथा दौहित्रान्तस्वसन्तानाभावेऽन्योऽधिकारी एवं भ्रातृपुत्राभावे तद्वैहित्रान्तः पितुः सन्तानोऽधिकारी । (65) तदभावे पितामहः । (66) तदभावे पितामहो । ‘अनपत्यस्य पुत्रस्य माता दायमवाप्नुयात् । मातर्यपि च वृत्तायां पितुर्माता धनं हरेत्’ ॥ इति मनुवचनात् यथा पितृभावे माता तथा पितामहाभावे पितामहो । (67) तदभावे पितामहदौहित्रान्तसन्तानः पितरि तथा दर्शनात् । (68) एवं प्रपितामहः प्रपितामहो प्रपितामहदौहित्रान्तसन्ताना-अपि । (69) मृतभोग्यपिण्डदात्रभावे बन्धुरिति मातामहमातुलादिः । (70) तत्रापि पित्रादिवत् सति मातामहे स एव । (71) तदभावे यथाक्रमं मातुलादिः, मृतदेयमातामहादिपिण्डदत्तात् । (72) तदभावे सकुल्योविभक्तपिण्डः, प्रतिनमृतः प्रभृति पुरुषत्रयमधस्तनं वृद्धप्रपितामहादिमन्ततिश्च (73) अतएव दायकता,—ननु सहोदर-भ्रातृपुत्रवत् पित्रव्यस्यापि धनिदेयपूर्वपुरुषत्रयपिण्डदत्तात् धनि-पित्रव्यभ्रातृपुत्रयोस्तुल्योऽधिकारः स्यात्, उच्यते, पित्रव्योहि धनि-

पितामहप्रपितामहयोः पिण्डदः, भ्रातृपुत्रसु धनिपितरं प्रधानमादाय पुरुषद्वयपिण्डदः, इति सएव बलवान्, इति पितृव्यात् पूर्वमधिक्रियते—इत्युक्तं । (74) एवं यत्र मृतस्य पितृव्यमृतपितृव्यपुत्रयोः सत्त्वे धनिदेयपितामहप्रपितामहपिण्डदादृत्वाविशेषेऽपि जननसन्निकर्षाधिक्येन पितृव्यस्यैवाधिकारः । (75) ‘अनेकपितृकानाम् पितृतो भागकल्पना’ । इत्यत्र जननसन्निध्यतारतम्येन भागदर्शनात् । (76) अतएव मिताक्षरायां पितामहपितृव्यतत्पुत्राः क्रमेणाधिकारिण-इत्युक्तं । (77) विवादचिन्तामणावपि अपुत्रधनाधिकारे भ्रातुरभावे तत्पुत्रः तदभावे आसन्नसपिण्ड-इत्युक्तं । (78) बृहस्पत्युक्तबान्धवा इत्यनेन यथाक्रमं आत्मपितृमातृबान्धवा धनाधिकारिणः, ते च,— ‘आत्मपितुः स्वसुः पुत्राः, आत्ममातुः स्वसुः सुताः । आत्ममातुलपुत्राश्च विज्ञेया आत्मबान्धवाः । पितुः पितुः स्वसुः पुत्राः पितुर्मातुः स्वसुः सुताः । पितुर्मातुलपुत्राश्च विज्ञेयाः पितृबान्धवाः । मातुर्मातुः स्वसुः पुत्राः, मातुः पितुः स्वसुः सुताः । मातुर्मातुलपुत्राश्च विज्ञेया मातृबान्धवाः’ ॥ (79) आपस्तम्बः,—‘अन्तेवासो वार्थास्तदर्थेषु धर्मकृत्येषु योजयेत्, दुहिता वा’ । इति । तदर्थेषु मासिकादिना तद्गोमार्थं धर्मकृत्येषु इति अदृष्टार्थमिति । (80) एवञ्च यस्य मृतस्य धनं देशान्तरस्थ-तद्वनाधिकारिसत्त्वे तद्वनविनाशसम्भावनायां तदौर्द्धदेहिककर्म्मार्थं तत्पुण्यार्थञ्च येन केनापि दातुं युक्तं । (81) ‘यदृच्छयापि यः कुर्यादात्स्वार्थं प्रीतिपूर्वकं’ । इति नारदवचने तस्यापि प्रतिनिधित्वात् । एतत् प्रपञ्चितं शुद्धितत्त्वे । (82) दायभागकृतापि,—सर्वत्रोक्तरोत्या मृतधनस्य मृतार्थत्वमनुसन्धेयम्—इति वदताप्येतत् स्वहस्तितम् । (83) इति महामहोपाध्यायश्रीहरिहरभट्टाचार्यात्मज-श्रीरघुनन्दनभट्टाचार्यविरचितं स्मृतितत्त्वे दायतत्त्वं समाप्तम् ।

ERRATA.

Page	12	line	1	for	तेषान्	read	तेषाम्
"	"	"	7	"	द्रव्ययोगेषु	"	द्रव्ययोग्येषु
"	23	"	12	"	भगवान्	"	भवान्
"	24	"	1	"	भ्रातादिधनेषु	"	भ्रात्रादि
"	25	"	5	"	तदाऽनृशंस्यार्धं	"	तदानृशंस्यार्धं
"	"	"	15	"	## सुमर्षा-	"	सुत्तमर्षा-
"	"	"	27	"	स्त्रीधने	"	स्त्रीधने

TRANSLATION

OF THE

DAYATATTWA

OF

RAGHUNANDANA.

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SUCCESSION TO STRIDHAN PROPERTY.

1st to non-Yautuka or property other than nuptial gifts, heirs are,—

1. Son and maiden daughter together, in default of either the other,

2. Married daughter having or likely to have a son,

3. Son's son, 4. Daughter's son, 5. Son's son's son, 6. Barren or sonless widowed daughter,

7. Stepson, 8. Stepson's son,

9. Husband, 10. Brother, 11. Mother, 12. Father, (to property other than gifts by the parents,)

And to Property given by either of the parents,

9. Brother instead of husband, 10. Mother, 11. Father, 12. Husband :

2nd to Yautuka or nuptial presents,

1. Unaffianced daughter, 2. Betrothed daughter, 3. Married daughter having or likely to have male issue,

4. Son, 5. Daughter's son, 6. Son's son, 7. Son's grandson,

8. Stepson, 9. Stepson's son,

10. Husband, 11. Brother, 12. Mother, 13. Father, if the marriage was celebrated in an approved form,

10. Brother, 11. Mother, 12. Father, 13. Husband, if in a disapproved form :)

To both descriptions of Stridhan, after the above mentioned relations,

14. Husband's younger brother, 15. Husband's brother's son, 16. Sister's son, 17. Husband's sister's son, 18. Brother's son, 19. Son-in-law :

20. Father-in-law, 21. Husband's elder brother, 22. Other Sapindas :

To Maiden's Stridhan,

1. Brother, 2. Mother, 3. Father.

ORDER OF SUCCESSION TO THE PROPERTY OF MALE.

1-3. Puttra or male issue limited by commentators to three degrees only (but unreasonably); they take *per stirpes* the nearest excluding the more remote in each line :

4 Widow, 5 Daughter having or likely to have son, 8 Daughter's son,

7. Father, 8. Mother, 9. Brother, 10. Brother's son, 11. Brother's son's son, 12. Father's daughter's son ;

13. Paternal grandfather, 14. Grandmother, 15. Their son, 16. Their Grandson, and 17. Their Great-grandson (in the male line,) and 18. Their Daughter's son ;

19. Paternal Great-grand-father, 20. Great-grand-mother, 21. Their son, 22. Their Grandson, and 23. Their Great-grandson (in the male line,) and 24. Their Daughter's son ;

25. Maternal grand-father, 26 his son, 27. Grandson, and 28. Great-grandson (in the male line ;)

(29-61 theoretically) Sakulyas,

(62-208 theoretically)—Samánodakas,

209 &c. Bandhus or cognates such as the Brother's daughter's son, the other maternal relations and the parents' maternal relations and the like, the same as in the *Mitákshará*, save and except the four daughter's-sons and the four reciprocal maternal relations mentioned above.

The text enumerating nine cognate relations is cited ; they are the three cognate first consins of the man himself and of both parents ; of them, three are placed before the Sakulyas.

DAYATATWA

OF

RAGHUNANDANA.

CHAPTER I.

1. *Om!* salutation be to Ganesa. Having prostrated himself before Vāsudeva, the Lord of the universe, eternal, whose essence consists of omniscience and beatitude, the fortunate Raghunandana discusses the principles of the Law of Heritage.

2. In this treatise are briefly expounded, the determination (of the meaning) of Partition of Heritage; also the Distribution effected by the father; likewise Partition by brothers; Exclusion from shares; Partibility and Impartibility; the Removal of doubt regarding the fact of partition having been made; the Distribution of what was concealed; Woman's property; and the Right of succession thereto; and the Heirs to the property of a sonless man.

3. First, (the meaning of the term) Partition of Heritage (is discussed).

4. On that subject Nārada says:—"Where the division of the paternal property is instituted by sons, that topic of litigation is, by the wise, called Partition of Heritage." "Property" means wealth; "paternal" signifies acquired through the relation of paternity; "where" relates to "the topic of litigation".

5. This term "Heritage," by derivation, signifies what is given. Here the use of the verb (*dā*) is secondary ; since there is a similarity (of the secondary with the primary meaning of the term) in the consequence, namely that of constituting another's right of property after annulling the previous right of a person who is dead or gone to retirement or the like. But there is no abdication on the part of the deceased, and the like, in the form of an intention, such as, "This property is no longer mine", which has the effect of putting an end to one's right of property.

6. Likewise, from the use of the term "Heritage" to signify one's property, is inferred the cessation of the right of the previous owner. And to that property accrues others' right, dependant on relation to the former owner, by reason of the text of Baudháyana, which says "when there are sons, the property goes to them". The meaning is, if there are sons at the time of the cessation of the father's right, the property which was the subject of that right descends to the sons.

7. As for the text of Gautama, however, cited in the *Mitákshará*, namely,—“Property is taken by reason of ownership through birth alone: this is said by the sages,”—that also is to be construed in the following way:—inasmuch as it is through the relation of mere birth,—which is the cause of sonship, which is stronger than any other relation,—that the son's right to the property of the father accrues at the time of the cessation of the father's right, the son and not any other relative, should take that property:—this is intended by the sages.

8. Nor can it be argued that even while the father's right continues, the son's right accrues, at the time of his

birth, to the property of the father : for, this meaning would be inconsistent with the text of Devala, which says,—“ When the father is dead let the sons divide the father’s wealth ; for, sons have not ownership while the father is alive and free from defect.” “ Free from defect” signifies, not degraded.

9. Accordingly, Nārada, in the commencement of (the chapter on) partition, says : “ If the father be lost, or no longer a householder, or his temporal affections be extinct.” “ Lost” means degraded ; “ no longer a householder” signifies, having quitted the order of a householder.

10. Therefore the son’s right to the father’s estate accrues when the father’s right of property is destroyed by death, degradation, or adoption of an order other than that of the householder ; and when his temporal affections are extinct, that is, even though the right of property remain, if the father be devoid of wish for the wealth belonging to him.

11. Here destruction of the right of property by reason of degradation is to be understood (to take place) on disinclination to expiation, because the capacity for atonement, which can be performed with one’s own wealth only, is predicated in the Srutis, even of the degraded.

12. By the extinction of desires is meant, the cessation of desires which is not identical with that temporary absence of desires, which may co-exist with the right of property.

13. Here it should be remarked that the right of property, being once extinguished by reason of the

cessation of desires, will not again revive with the revival of desires.

14. Hence, because in the text of Devala (§ 8) it is affirmed that the son's right to the father's property does not arise while the father is alive, therefore the text of Gáutama which says that—"Property is taken by reason of ownership through birth alone :—this is said by the sages,"—is to be interpreted thus :—because immediately after the extinction of the father's right, the son's right is generated through birth, consequently by reason of ownership the son takes the property of his father ; not however immediately after birth, while the father's right remains.

15. In the text of Nárada which is first quoted, (§4) the terms "father" and "son" indicate any relatives. Accordingly Yájñavalkya, having premised Partition of Heritage, says :—"The wife and the daughters, also, both parents brothers likewise and their sons, gentiles, cognates, and a pupil and a fellowstudent : on failure of (each) preceding among these, each next in order is heir to the estate of one who departed for heaven leaving no male issue. This rule extends to all classes.—From what follows, it appears that the word "each" is understood before the term "preceding."

16. Consequently the term Heritage is used by usage to signify that wealth in which right of property of the owner's kindred, dependant on relation of sonship &c. to the owner, arises on cessation of his right.

17. The phrase,—“dependant on relation of sonship &c.” is inserted (in the above definition) to distinguish that right which is dependant on purchase. The phrase “on cessation of his right” excludes the wife's right to

her husband's property, contemporaneous with the husband's right.

18. Some,*allege that Partition which takes place by reason of the co-existence of other relatives (who have an equal right of succession) is a particular ascertainment of the right of property, or making of it known, which has arisen in lands, gold &c., and which extends to a part only, but which is unfit for special use and appropriation because grounds of discrimination are wanting, by casting of lots or otherwise which determine that a particular chattel belongs to a particular person.

19. But this (definition) is not accurate. For how may it be certainly known, since no text declares it, that the lot for each person falls precisely on that article which was already his.

20. Again if wealth be gained after the father's demise, by a brother riding one of two horses, which belonged to the father, it is universally acknowledged, that two shares of it appertain to the acquirer ; and one to any other coheir. In such a case when the original property is subsequently divided, if that very horse be obtained by the acquirer, then according to the opinion of those who affirm partial rights, the horse was already his ; why then should another brother share the wealth gained by him ? But if the horse be obtained by another, equal participation (by the two co-heirs only) of wealth so acquired would be proper, since it is gained by the personal labor of the one and by the work of a horse belonging to the other.

* The allegation is made by the author of the *Dáyabhāga*.

21. But in fact, Partition is the adjustment by lot or otherwise into right over a specific portion, of that right which did, by reason of the sameness of relation of the co-heirs, accrue to the whole property, upon the extinction of the right of the previous owner.

22. Thus, even the accrual and extinction of rights over the entire estate are to be admitted, in the same manner, as in the case of the re-union of co-heirs, the destruction of rights over portions, and the production of rights over the entire estate, are acknowledged.

23. This too is (in a manner) acknowledged by the author of the *Dáyabhága* who himself writes:—In the following text of *Vrihaspati*, namely,—“He who being (once) separated dwells again through affection, with his father, brother, or paternal uncle is termed reunited;”—because the father, the brother, the paternal uncle and the like, are from their birth likely to be united as regards the property acquired by the father or the grandfather; they alone may become re-united, when being once separated they annul, through mutual affection, the previous partition with the agreement to this effect, that the wealth which is thine is mine, and what is mine is thine, and remain like one householder in any transaction. But not an association of merchants who, unlike the coparceners, are by the mere union of stocks formed into a partnership, nor the mere union of estate of separated coparceners without the stipulation based upon affection (are to be looked upon as instances of re-union.)

24. By reason of the right being common, the text of *Kátyáyana*, which says,—“A coparcener is not liable for the use of any article which belongs to all the undivided

relatives,"—becomes consistent in its literal sense ; inasmuch as his own right extends over every article ; accordingly, there can be no theft in such a case, as will be shewn hereafter. (chap. viii.)

25. Similarly also, by the text of Nárada, namely,—“Separated, not unseparated, brethren may reciprocally bear testimony, become sureties, bestow gifts and accept presents,”—the prohibition of mutual gift &c. amongst undivided coparceners becomes logically consistent ; because, (in such a case) there is an impossibility of gift and acceptance, inasmuch as the acceptor, had a right to the property given, even before a gift of it was made. The text is to be understood in this way, in the cases of bearing testimony and becoming sureties.

26. All the coparceners are entitled to the fruits of all acts, either temporal or spiritual, which are performed with the use of the joint property ; since their right is common. This is affirmed by Nárada,—“Among undivided brethren, religious duties continue common ; but when partition takes place, their religious duties also become different.”

27. Vyása ordains : “Let no one without the consent of the others, make a sale or gift of the whole immoveable estate, nor of what is common to the family. Here, from the use of the adjective “whole,” it appears that the right of each parcener accrues to the entire estate.

28. Therefore, when there are two persons equally related to the deceased, each of them considers the property left by the deceased to belong to himself as well as to the other co-heir. Gift and the like by the one for

his own purpose, is prohibited, should the other's consent be wanting.

29. Therefore it is established that the right does not accrue to a fractional portion.

30. Vrihaspati lays down a special rule with regard to the allotment of shares :—"All the sons take equal shares of the property of their father ; but of these he who is learned and virtuous deserves a larger share ; Since a person becomes father by that son who has in the world acquired a fame in literature, science, heroism, acquisition of wealth, knowledge of theology, charity, and commerce."

31. Vrihaspati also speaks of partition by use at successive periods :—"A single female slave should be employed on labor in the house (of the several co-heirs) successively according to the number of shares."

32. Here there is clearly the supposition either of the production and the destruction of different temporary rights of a single person over a single individual ; or of the temporary cessation of different rights of all.

33. A text of Kátyáyana cited in the Kalpataru and the Ratnákara declares that (the law of) partition may be different in different places and the like :—"Partition of Heritage is to be regulated by the law which may obtain in a country, among a class, among an association (of persons such as those carrying on a particular trade, or practising a particular mechanical art), and in a village : Bhrigu (has ordained this)." "Has ordained this" is understood.

CHAPTER II.

PARTITION MADE BY THE FATHER.

1. In the next place (is discussed) the distribution made by the father. (On this subject) Háríta (says),—"A father during his life may, after distributing his property, retire to the forest, or enter into the order suitable to an aged man; or he may remain at home, having distributed small allotments and keeping a greater portion: should he become indigent, he may take back from them." "The order suitable to an aged man," intends, retirement or the order of Bhikshus or ascetics.

2. By this text, the father is authorized to distribute a small part, and to reserve the greatest portion of the wealth.

3. Vishnu (ordains),—"When a father separates his sons from himself, his own will regulates the distribution: but in the estate inherited from the grandfather, the ownership of the father and the son is equal."

4. As regards even his self-acquired property, the unequal distribution by his own will should be guided by such reasons as the existence or absence, of filial piety, of large family, of inability, and of the like, (of any son.) This is affirmed by Kátyáyana,—"But let not a father distinguish one son at a partition made in his lifetime, nor capriciously exclude one from participation without sufficient cause."

5. But when there are none of the reasons enumerated above (a father may not make an unequal distribution.) This is declared by Nárada,—"A father who is afflicted with disease or influenced by wrath, or

whose mind is engrossed by a beloved object, or who acts otherwise than the Sástras permit, has no power in the distribution of the estate." "Beloved object," intends, the son of a wife on whom he dotes, and the like.

6. But should the sons themselves request partition, in that case, Manu declares the absence of unequal allotment,—“If the undivided brethren do, with one accord, desire partition, then the father shall, on no account, make an unequal distribution.”

7. The father, if unwilling, shall not share with his sons his paternal property, which was seized by strangers, but which he recovered. This is ordained by Manu and Vishnu,—“If the father recovers paternal wealth (seized by strangers and) not recovered (by other sharers nor by his own father), he shall not, unless willing, share the same with his sons,—it was acquired by himself.” The construction is, that he shall not share it with his sons, because it was, as it were, acquired by himself.

8. But as regards the case of recovery by any other (than the father), the law is propounded by the text of Sankha which is hereafter cited: (§ 11). This follows from the logical interpretation of two provisions, one of which is general and the other special.

9. This however refers to immovable property.

10. But in gems and the like, though not recovered by him, the father alone has ownership, as Yájñavalkya intimates,—“The father is master of all the gems, pearls and corals without exception: but neither the father nor the grandfather is so, of the

whole immovable property," Since "the grandfather" is here mentioned, the text must relate to his wealth.

11. In like manner, the following text of Sankha refers to a case of recovery by brothers and the like,—
 "When one parcenar alone, by his exertion, recovers land which was lost before, the others take in proportion to their shares, after setting apart a fourth for him."

12. Here the recoverer should, after appropriating a fourth share for himself, take an equal share of the remainder with his brethren, otherwise the shares might become inequitable.

13. When the father effects the distribution, he should allot to his sonless wife a share equal to that of a son, because Vyása declares,—
 "But the father's wives, who are without male issue, are declared to be entitled to equal shares with his sons; and all the grandmothers are declared to be equal to mothers."

14. This rule applies when Strídhana has not been bestowed. This is affirmed by Yájnavalkya,—
 "When the father (by his own choice) makes all his sons partakers of equal shares, his wives, to whom Strídhana has not been given by their husband or father-in-law, must be made participants of shares equal to those of sons."

15. In order to the consistency of the texts of Vyása and Yájnavalkya, the phrase "father's wives" in the text of the former (§ 13) is to be construed, "when the father distributes his property, his wives."

16. Nor can it be said that the converse is the case here; because the logical rule of interpretation is, that

“When a provision of law is clear in itself, it should not be controlled by any other.”

17. Therefore in a case of partition made by the sons, the step-mothers (without male issue) are not entitled to any shares.

18. When Strídhana has been given, the husband should allot to his wife half the share of a son. This appears to be the law (from the combined effect of the following texts of Yájnavalkya and Baudháyana); for Yájnavalkya observes in a case of marriage,—“To a woman, whose husband marries a second time, let him give her an equal sum, (as compensation) for the supercession, provided no separate property have been bestowed on her: but if any have been assigned, let him allot half (the share of a son)”; and Baudháyana says,—“What is affirmed of even one among many who have a common property, the same is to be extended to every one, since they are considered similar.”

19. When partition is made, by the grandsons, of the property of their grandfather, a share ought to be allotted to the grandmother, in the same manner as a share is given to the mother (when paternal property is divided.)

20. Vishnu says,—“But in the property left by the grandfather, the father and the son have equal ownership.” Also Yájnavalkya ordains,—“The ownership of the father and the son is the same in land or in a corrody or in chattels which were acquired by the grandfather.” The author of the Kalpataru defines ‘a corrody’ to be, what is granted by the king and the like, receivable periodically from a mine or similar fund:

‘chattels’ from their association (with land) here means biped (i. e. slave) ; because another text affirms,—“ Although immoveables and bipeds have been acquired by a man himself, a gift or sale of them should not be made by him without the consent of all the sons.”

21. According to these texts, in regard to the land or a corrody or slaves acquired by the grandfather, as the father has right over these by reason of his being the person who presents oblations at solemn obsequies, so if his right cease by death or other cause, his sons have a right, notwithstanding their uncle, to so much, as should have been their father’s share.

22. For the same reason the text of Kátyáyana quoted in the Ratnákara declares,—“ If an unseparated son dies, his son should be made participant of his father’s share ; he, who has not received maintenance from the grandfather, is entitled to get his father’s share from his uncle or uncle’s son.”

23. During the lifetime of the father, the grandsons are not entitled to any share, inasmuch as they are then incapable of presenting funeral oblations to the grandfather.

24. Similarly on the extinction of the right of the proprietor’s grandson, his great-grandsons become participant’s of his (the grandson’s) share only. But they get no share during the grandson’s lifetime.

25. Or the above texts may admit of the following interpretation, namely, that as the father is at full liberty to allot unequal shares, when he is distributing his self-acquired property : the same is not the case here (i. e. when distributing his paternal estate.)

26. But these texts do not intend equal ownership of the father and the son. Because two shares of the father are declared by the following text of Nárada—
 “Let the father making a partition reserve two shares for himself: when her husband is dead, the mother is entitled to an equal share with her sons.”

27. Nor can this refer to the self-acquired property of the father; because as to that the unlimited discretion of the father declared by Vishnu in the text,—
 “His will regulates the division of his self-acquired property,”—ought not to be restricted to two shares; also because it would be contradictory to the text of Háríta which ordains,—“He may remain at home keeping the greater portion to himself.”

28. But the text of Nárada (§ 26) refers to the property of the grandfather and other ancestors.

29. Also the following text, cited in the Mitákshará, refers to the property left by the grandfather,—
 “By favour of the father apparels and ornaments are used: but immovable property may not be consumed (even) with the father’s indulgence”—because the self-acquired immoveable property, granted by the father, may, of course, be consumed (by the sons); otherwise an objection would arise in the shape of an inference of a different radical revelation.*

* The meaning is this. The text viz., “But immovable property may not be consumed even with the father’s indulgence” refers to the grand-father’s property, and not to the self-acquired property of the father. For the father’s unlimited authority over his self-acquired property is declared by innumerable texts. Consequently there is no reason, why the son might not consume the father’s self-acquired property even with his indulgence. If it be argued that this text itself intends to put a restriction to the unlimited power of the father over his self-acquired property in that case an objection would arise, in the shape of an inference of an opposite revelation. This objection cannot be comprehended unless the following doctrine of Hindu revelation be taken into con-

30. Vrihaspati declares that the distribution of an estate left by the grandfather or other ancestor takes place only when the mother is past childbearing,—“On the demise of both parents, participation among brothers is allowed; and even while they are both living, it is right, if the mother be past childbearing.” Here the term mother includes also a stepmother; because of the parity of reason, namely, the probability of the birth of other sons.

31. Because it is affirmed that “if the mother be past childbearing,” therefore the text refers to the property left by the grandfather, but not to the estate of the father; for as to this, provision is made for the share of one who is born after partition. As Vrihaspati declares,—“The younger brothers of those, who have made a partition with their father, whether children of the same mother or of her rivals, shall take their father’s share. A son born-before partition has no claim on the paternal wealth; nor one begotten after it, on that of his brother. As in the property, so in the

sideration. The Hindus believe that their law is based upon revelations which were not recorded by the sages who were inspired therewith. But they handed down these to their disciples who traditionally remembered the purport, but not the letter of these revelations. The sense of these revelations was, by the remembering sages expressed in their own language which was recorded. Hence Hindu law bears the designation of Smṛiti which signifies “what is remembered.” Therefore the subsequent Hindu writers classify their revelations under two heads namely the direct and the inferential. By the direct are included the four Vedas consisting of the Mantra and the Brahmana, and the Upanishads. Under the inferential are comprised those that are deduced from Smṛiti or the texts of Hindu law, and from the customs and usages which are observed from time immemorial, by the learned world, but which are not expressly prohibited.

Now, if the argument that a restriction was intended by the above text to be placed upon the unlimited authority of the father over his self-acquired property be correct, then a revelation is to be inferred to the following effect; that a person has not unlimited authority over his self-acquired estate. But from the texts, which lay down that a person has an absolute right of disposal over his self-acquired property, a contradictory revelation necessarily follows. This would be absurd. Therefore the interpretation put by the author upon the above text is perfectly consistent.

TRANSLATOR.

debts likewise, and in gifts, pledges, and purchases, they have no claim on each other, except for acts of mourning and libations of water." "Begotten after partition," signifies, one that is conceived after partition.

32. Yājñavalkya says,—“When the father makes a partition, let him separate his sons (from himself) at his pleasure; and either (dismiss) the eldest son with the best share, or (if he chooses) all may be equal sharers.” In this text, the phrase “at his pleasure,” refers to self-acquired property: “with the best share,” means, a share joined to the twentieth part set apart for the eldest; the best and equal shares refer to the grandfather’s estate; for, thus it would be consistent with the proposition which is first laid down.

33. Likewise, the following text of Gotama refers to the estate of the grandfather, because it says,—“if the mother be past childbearing,”—“After the demise of the father, let the sons share his estate: or when he is alive, if the mother be past childbearing, and he desire partition.”

34. Therefore also, because death of the father is indicated by the phrase ‘after the father’, and because the desire of the father alone is expressed by the passage,—“while he is alive if he desire partition,”—consequently it is established that the distribution of the grandfather’s estate may take place at the desire of the father and not at that of the sons.

35. Likewise, the text of Devala which says,—“They have no ownership while the father is alive and free from defect,”—and the text of Baudhāyana which declares,—“Partition takes place by permission of the father,”—are

without distinction applicable as well to the father's property as to the estate left by the grandfather.

36. Should however the estate of the grandfather be accidentally distributed even before the mother is past child-bearing. (To meet that contingency) Vishnu says,—“Those to whom the father has allotted shares, should allow a share to one who is begotten after partition.” This text does not refer to the property of the father, because in that case it would be inconsistent with the text of Vrihaspati cited before: (§ 31).

37. Referring to the twelve kinds of sons, Devala says,—“All these sons of one destitute of true issue are held to be entitled to the inheritance: but should a true legitimate son be afterwards born, they have no right of primogeniture: such among them as are of equal class (with the father) shall have a third share as their allotment; but those of a lower tribe must live dependent on him, supplied with food and raiment.” “Entitled to the inheritance,” means entitled to a full share. Of these, other than the true sons, those that are of the same class with the father are entitled to a third share when there is a true son.

38. As to this again, Manu lays down, a particular rule,—“The legitimate son and the son of a wife participate in the property of the father (in the way specified above), and the ten remaining sons are successively entitled to a share of the property as well as to the membership of the family.” By reason of his being the propagator of the family and the giver of the funeral oblation which is due to the proprietor, the son of an

appointed daughter in the first place, and after him the Dattaka son, becomes entitled to the inheritance and to the membership of the family. "Successively" (or in other words) in succession, that is, in the absence of the first of these, the next in order are entitled to the inheritance and to the membership of the family.

39. Yājñavalkya declares the participation by the son of a female slave of a Sūdra,—“ Even a son, begotten by a Sūdra on a female slave may take a share at the desire of the father ; but if the father be dead, the brethren should make him partaker of half a share ; one who has no brothers (begotten by the father on a wife) may inherit the whole property in the absence of the daughter's son.” “ At the desire” means, at the choice of the father ; “ a share” means, a share equal to that of other sons.

40. When however there is a daughter's son, he gets an equal share with the son of a female slave ; and this is reasonable, because the one is begotten by a woman who is not wedded, and the other is a legitimate descendant.

41. Manu states the distribution (of property) between a true son and the issue of the wife begotten without due authority,—“ If there be two sons, a legitimate one and the son of the wife, who are claimants through the same (person), each shall take the property which belonged to his father ; and not the other.” “ Claimants through the same,” means, claimants begotten on the same mother. The meaning is, let each receive the wealth of him from whose seed he sprung ; and let not the other who sprung from the seed of another person take it.

42. As regards also the woman's property, let the son of each father take that which was bestowed on her by his father ; and not the other. Accordingly, Nárada says,—“ If two sons begotten by two fathers, contend for the wealth of the woman, let each of them take that which was his father's ; and not the other.”

CHAPTER III.

PARTITION BY BROTHERS.

1. Partition by brothers after the demise of the father is next explained. On this Devala says,—“ Let the sons divide the father's estate on the demise of the father.” “ The father's estate” signifies, the property inherited from the father. Nárada says,—“ Whatever remains after the father's gifts are given, and his debts liquidated, should be divided by the sons, so that the father might not remain a debtor.” ‘ The father's gifts’ signify what the father promised to give. It appears from the passage ‘that the father might not remain a debtor,’ that in case of inability (to liquidate the father's debts at the time of partition) it ought to be acknowledged before the creditors that the debts shall be paid off after partition.

2. Here (it should be remarked that) while the mother is alive, partition by uterine brothers is not compatible with moral duty ; as is intimated by Sankha and Likhita,—“ Since inheritance is the basis of the family, the sons are not independent while their father is alive, also while their mother is in a similar predicament.” For

the same reason Vyása says,—“For brothers a common abode is ordained, so long as both parents are alive ; but religious merit of them, if separated after their decease, increases.” The meaning is, because a separated brother performs the ceremonies enjoined by the Vedas with the wealth appertaining to himself alone, consequently there is an increase of religious merit of that one alone.

3. If however (the paternal property) be distributed (while the mother is alive,) then the mother is entitled to participation. This is declared by Kátyáyana,—“On the demise of the father, the mother too partakes of an equal share with the sons.”

4. Participation of an equal share too is only when the mother has not got woman's property (Strídhana) but if she has, a half share is to be allotted to her. This follows from the text cited before (Ch II, § 17).

5. Vrihaspati describes two modes of partition either with or without specific deductions (of a twentieth part for the eldest, and so forth),—“For co-heirs two modes of partition are ordained : one in the order of seniority of age, and the other by allotment of equal shares.” The phrase ‘in the order of seniority of age’ intends, specific deductions.

6. But the absence of specific deductions among the Súdra class, will be hereafter mentioned.

7. Although equal division is in conformity with the Sástras, still the alternative of specific deductions, taking place out of an excess of reverence towards the seniors in age, is not contradictory, in the same manner as partition or non-partition is optional (with the co-heirs).

8. On this Manu says,—“But the eldest alone may take the paternal estate in its entirety : and the rest may remain dependent on him, as they did on the father.” Also Nárada says,—“Or the eldest brother may, like the father, support all the others, if they be willing ; or even the youngest brother, if capable (may do so) : for rank in a family is proportional to ability.” The middlemost of course may be here inferred from the analogy of the staff and cake.

9. This analogy is as follows : to gnaw the staff was difficult for the rat ; but if that was accomplished, the eating of the cake which was attached to it is inferred, because it is the easier ; so, in other cases, according to their circumstances, if one of associated things be true the other may be rightly inferred.

10. Consequently as there is no distinction, Nárada says,—“He, who being engaged in the management of the family, performs its business, should be honoured by the brothers with (presents such as) food, apparel and conveyances.”

11. Vyása praises one who acts in that way,—“During whose life Bráhmanas, friends and relatives gain their maintenance, his life is fruitful : for, who does not live for his own sake ?”

12. In Harivansa, Nárada addressing Indra describes the evils springing from a contrary conduct,—“O, Destroyer of Bala ! mutual disagreement among brothers and friends causes only the delight of enemies : in this no doubt, (can exist.)”

13. Here (it is to be remarked that) Nárada declares a common abode by the consent of all (the co-heirs).

14. But partition is not so. This is indicated by Kátyáyana, who, after having commenced, (the subject of) partition, says,—“The wealth of those that have not attained to maturity, as also of those that have gone to a distant place, should without expense be entrusted to the relatives, who are friendly disposed to them.” “Those that have not attained to maturity,” means, the minors.

15. If one of the co-heirs by reason of his own ability, decline to take his share of the property inherited from the father or other ancestor, something should be given to him, be it only a *Prastha* of rice, on his separation, for the purpose of obviating denial in future, on the part of his son or other heir. This is ordained by Manu,—“If any one of the brethren has a competence from his own occupation, and desires not the property, he may be debarred from his share, by giving him some trifle in lieu of maintenance.”

16. Kátyáyana says,—“The visible objects such as a house, a field and a quadruped should be distributed : on suspicion of some hidden property, some test is ordained.” “Test” signifies, divine test (such as ordeals by the balance and the like).

17. This text is rendered clear (by the following text),—“Bhrigu declared, that visible objects such as household furniture, conveyances, those (quadrupeds), that are milched, ornaments and workmen should be distributed : on suspicion of some hidden treasure,

resort must be had to *kosha*." "Household furniture," means the pestle and the like; "workmen" indicates, slaves; *kosha* signifies, a particular ordeal, and its meaning is to be found in the Divya-Tattwa (*i. e.* the author's treatise on the ordeals); the rest is well known,*

18. Nārada says,—“For those, whose forms of initiation have not been, in the prescribed order, performed by the father, these ceremonies must be completed with their paternal property. But, if no wealth of the father exists, the ceremonies must, without fail, be performed by the brothers already initiated, contributing funds out of their own portions.”

19. To the daughters however property sufficient to defray the expenses of marriage should be given, as is said by Devala,—“Wealth sufficient for marriage should be allotted to the daughters out of the estate of the father. And the legitimate daughter of one without male issue is, like the sons, entitled to the heritage.” Vishnu says,—“But of maiden daughters the ceremony of marriage should be performed, according to one's own wealth.”

20. Thus, the texts also, which ordain the allotment of a fourth share (to a maiden daughter), are to be construed to signify the allotment of property sufficient for marriage.

* The divine tests are described also in the Mitāksharā, Vyavahāra Section, Chapter VIII. The following text of the Mitāksharā in which the term *kosta* occurs, enumerates the divine tests : तुषाघ्रापी विषं कीचो दिव्यानीह विप्रददये ।

Mr. Mac-aughten translates this text in the following way : The balance, water, fire, poison and sacred libation are the divine tests for purgation (or the removal of suspicion in a doubtful matter.) Here the term *kosta* is rendered “sacred libation,” which signifies the water in which the idol worshipped by the person whose truthfulness is to be tested, is bathed ; the person is then ordered to drink a portion of that water.

21. The following text of law cited in the *Dwaita-nirnaya* declares that the ceremonies of marriage may be performed even by relatives other than the father,—“Let the father himself or any other in his absence, according to the (recognized) order, perform the eight initiatory ceremonies such as that relating to conception and the like.”

CHAPTER IV.

EXCLUSION FROM INHERITANCE.

1. In the next place, those that are excluded from inheritance (are determined.) A'pastamba says,—“All co-heirs who are indued with virtue are entitled to the property. But he who dissipates his wealth by vices, should be debarred from participation, even though he be the first born.” The meaning is, even though he be the first born son.

2. The same opinion is propounded by Vrihaspati who says,—“Though born of a woman of equal class, a son destitute of virtue is unworthy of the paternal wealth : it is declared to belong to such kinsmen as are versed in the Vedas and as offer *pinda* to him (or them). “Offering *pinda* to him” means, offering funeral oblations to the owner ; therefore is said “versed in the Vedas ;” “destitute of virtue” means having defects inconsistent with virtue. In the *Ratnākara* the last line of the text of Vrihaspati is explained as follows,—“as offer *pinda* to them,” mean, “as accord food and raiment to those destitute of virtue.” In this view too, it appears as a matter of course, that the funeral oblations are offered to the owner.

3. "As a man passing over water on a bad raft, sinks, so a person with a bad son becomes immersed in the deepest darkness."

4. Kátyáyana says ;—"Property is created for (the performance of) religious ceremonies ; therefore property should be entrusted to persons who are worthy of property, and not to women, to the ignorant, and to the vicious."

5. The term "women" in the above text signifies female Sapindas other than the owner's wife and the other women, with regard to whose succession, there are special provisions.

6. Also,—“A son who is devoid of science, heroism, and the like, who is destitute of devotion and charity, and who is wanting in (religious) observances, is similar to urine and excrement.”

7. Sankha says,—“He who takes the property of the deceased without performing the funeral obsequies, should without fail perform the expiatory rite, which is ordained for the different castes in atonement of murder.”

8. Devala declares,—“When the father is dead, an impotent man, a leper, a madman, an idiot, a blind man, an outcast, the offspring of an outcast, and a person wearing the badge (of religious mendicity), are not competent to share the heritage. Food and raiment should be given to them excepting the outcast. But the sons of such persons, being free from similar defects, shall obtain their father's share of the inheritance.”

D

“An idiot” is one incapable of performing religious duty; “a blind” signifies one who is born blind, by reason of the text of Manu which says,—“Likewise those that are deaf and blind from their birth;” “a person wearing the badge” is one who had assumed hypocritical mark of austerity.

9. Nārada ordains,—“An enemy to his father, an outcast, an impotent person, and one who is addicted to vice (or has been expelled from society) take no share of the inheritance, even though they be legitimate ; much less, if they be sons of the wife.” “An enemy to his father” is one who abuses him by beating and the like while he is alive, and who is unwilling to perform his funeral obsequies when he is dead. The term of which the translation is “one who is addicted to vice” literally signifies, one stained with sins. But the author of the Kalpataru reads it as *apapātrita*, and explains it to mean one who is excommunicated by his relatives, on account of heinous crimes, such as murdering the king and so forth. The author of the Prakāsa, having read it as *Upapātakt*, expounds it as signifying one who has committed minor sins.

CHAPTER V.

EFFECTS LIABLE OR NOT LIABLE TO PARTITION.

1. In the next place are discussed partibility and impartibility. On this Vyása says,—“What a man acquires by his own ability, without relying on the patrimony, he shall not give up to the coheirs, nor that which is acquired by science.”

2. Kátyáyana describes the wealth acquired by science,—“What is gained through learning, by the solution (of a difficulty) after a prize has been offered, must be considered as acquired through science, and is not distributed (among coheirs.) What has been obtained from a pupil, or by officiating as a priest, or for (answering) a question, or for determination of a doubtful point, or through display of knowledge, or by (success in) disputation, or for superior (skill in) reading, the sages have declared to be the gains of science, and not subject to distribution. The same rule likewise prevails in the arts. The excess of price (of the common goods) over the current one, and that which is gained through skill by winning from another a stake at play, must be considered as ‘acquired by science,’ and not liable to partition. So Vrihaspati has ordained.”

3. The author of the Dáyabhága makes the following explanatory comments on this text :—“If you solve this well, I will give you so much money ;” after such an offer, if one solves the difficulty, and obtains the prize, it is not subject to distribution : “From a pupil,” from a person instructed by the acquirer : “by officiating as a priest,” received as a fee or gratuity from a person employing him

to officiate at a sacrifice ; these are fees not presents, for they are similar to wages : so a question relative to science being resolved, if any one through satisfaction, give anything which had not been previously offered : also what is obtained by clearing the doubts of one by whom an offer has been thus made,—“To him who removes my doubts on the meaning of this passage of the Sástras, I will give this gold” ; or it may signify a fee such as the sixth part or the like, received for a correct decision between two litigant parties, who apply for the determination of a dubious and contested point : likewise, what is received as a present and the like, for displaying his knowledge in the sacred ordinances and so forth : so in a contest between two persons, respecting their knowledge of sacred ordinances, or in any other controversy whatsoever concerning their respective attainments, what is gained by one surpassing the other : likewise where a single article is to be given, and there are many competitors, what is received for reading in a superior manner : also what is gained by painters, goldsmiths and other artists, through their skill in the arts and so forth : in like manner what is gained by beating another at gambling. All this is exempt from being shared by the rest of the coparceners. Therefore whatever is acquired by any (skill or) science, belongs to the acquirer, not to the rest. Only to show this, Kátyáyana has stated at large.

4. Nárada says,—“He who maintains the family of a brother studying science, shall take, be he ever so ignorant, a share of the wealth gained by science.” From the singular number in the verb “maintains” it appears that if a person, by his own expense or bodily exertion, maintains

the family of his brother, while he is studying science (or art,) then he has a right to the property acquired through science (or art). "Ignorant" means, illiterate.

5. A text of Kátyáyana cited in the Kalpataru, in the Mitákshará, and in the Dípakaliká, says,—“Wealth gained through science, which was acquired from a stranger, while receiving a foreign maintenance, is termed acquisition through learning.” “From a stranger” means, from one different from the families of the father and the mother.

6. On this (point) he again lays down a special rule,—“No part of the wealth which is gained by science, need be given by one versed in learning, to his unlearned coheirs, but such property must be yielded by him to those who are equal or superior in learning.” The term “in learning,” which occurs only once in the text, is to be construed with both ; consequently a share is to be allowed to one equal in learning, and to one superior in learning, not to one inferior in learning, nor to one without learning. ‘Versed in learning’ means, learned.

7. Another special rule is laid down, (by the same sage),—“The property of brethren who have acquired learning from the family or the father, also that gained through heroism are liable to distribution. So Vrihaspati has ordained.” Of this text the following explanation is given in the Kalpataru and the Ratnákara,—“That property, which is gained through knowledge and courage, by brethren who have acquired the learning (or skill) from the family, (that is to say) from his own family (or in other words) from the paternal grandfather, uncle and the like, or from the father, is subject to distribution.”

8. Kátyáyana again ordains,—“The father is entitled to a moiety or a double share of a son’s acquisition of wealth.” “A son’s acquisition of wealth” signifies, wealth acquired by a son. This follows from the following rule (of grammar), namely, “An affix to a verb, which transforms the verb into a verbal noun, some times bears the sense of a participle past passive.”

9. The father’s participation of a double share takes place when the acquisition is not made with the use of the paternal property, or when it is made with the use of a brother’s property. The acquirer, however, takes a double share. But when the brothers’ wealth is used, then each of them also takes a share, as is intimated by a text of Vyása, which will be hereafter quoted (§ 18). The father’s participation of a moiety, however, takes place according to the Dáyabhága, when the father’s property is used or when the father is endowed with excellences. When no other’s property is used, then the father takes a double share, the acquirer also as such is entitled to two shares, the rest get nothing : but when a brother’s wealth is used, he also takes a share. This is the explanation of the distinction between a double share and a moiety.

10. Kátyáyana again declares,—“The commons, the carriage road, clothes, and any thing that is worn on the body, should not be divided ; nor what is requisite for use or intended for arts : Vrihaspati has declared.” “Requisite for use” is what is fit for each person’s use, as books and the like, which should not be shared by the learned &c., with his ignorant co-heirs. The same explanation is given in the Dáyabhága, Madanapárijáta and others.

11. Yājñavalkya says,—“Whatever is given by the parents (to any child), let that become solely his property.” The great Doctor Sūlapāni (offers the following explanation),—“Whatever ornaments and the like are given to a son or daughter become exclusively his or hers.”

12. Nārada says,—“Both what is gained by valour, and the wealth with a wife, as well as what is acquired by science these three (sorts of property) are exempt from partition ; so also any favour conferred by the father.’ “The wealth with a wife” signifies, the wealth received at the time of receiving the wife, that is, at the time of marriage : this meaning is indicated by the following text of Bharadvāja,—“And what is received with the wife.” If “excepting” be read, instead of “both” (in the text of Nārada), then the text “excepting these three *which* are exempt from partition,” should be construed with “the rest shall be divided,” which passage occurs in a preceding text (of Nārada.) Therefore (the meaning would be unchanged viz.) these three are exempt from partition.

13. When an object, which is bestowed as a favour, forms the subject of gift to two persons in succession, it becomes the property of the first donee. This follows from the following text of Yājñavalkya,—“In all disputes (concerning property) the posterior act prevails. But in cases of pledge, gift, or sale, the prior act predominates.” Here the meaning is, that what prevails is valid.

14. In connection with this also, it is to be understood, that an act of pledge prevents the use of the property by the owner according to his own will ; but it does

not cause the destruction of the owner's proprietary right. Therefore an act of pledge, whether prior or posterior, is controlled by the predominant acts of gift and sale, which are completed by the extinction of the previous owner's proprietary right.

15. To this effect is the following text of law cited in the Ratnākara and others,—“If after making a bailment or pledge, a pledge or sale be made, then the posterior act prevails.” The construction is, that if after making a bailment a pledge be made (of the same thing), or if after making a pledge a sale be made, then the posterior act is valid. The term sale includes gift, by reason of the destruction of the previous owner's proprietary right (being similar in both cases.)

16. Thus also, if the pledge be not redeemed by reason of death or the like, of the seller or donor, it may be redeemed by the buyer or donee, because a right equal to that of the former owner has been generated by the sale or gift. In such a case if a dispute arise as to the title, then the buyer or the donee (who is admitted as such) is required to prove his (vendor's or donor's) possession and not the source of his title.

17. Sankha and Likhita declare,—“No division of a dwelling-house takes place; nor of water-pots, ornaments, and things not of general use; nor of women, clothes and channels for draining water. Prajāpati has so ordained.” If one of the co-heirs constructs a house or garden within the site of the dwelling place, and

another does the same in a different part, in that case what is constructed by each becomes his property. So in other cases also.

18. With regard to the property acquired (by one of the co-heirs) through the use of joint-stock, a special rule is propounded by Vyása,—“The brethren participate in that wealth which one of them gains by valor or the like, using any common property such as a weapon or vehicle : to him two shares should be given ; but the rest should share alike.” It should be observed that the term “brethren” in this text, includes also the uncle and the like. The following explanation is given in the Dáyabhága,—“If the joint stock be used by the acquirer, shares should be assigned to each coparcener in proportion to the amount of his share (in the joint stock), be it little or much, which has been used.”

19. Nor should it be alleged that by the following text of Vyása one coparcener has no power to give, mortgage or sell any property,—“A single parcener may not, without consent of the rest, make a sale or gift of the whole immovable estate, nor of what is common to the family : separated kinsmen as well as those who are unseparated are equal in respect of immovables ; for, one has no power over the whole, to give, mortgage or sell it.”

20. Because the right of property over the joint estate is not distinguishable from that over any other thing, and this right is nothing else but the capacity of dealing with the property according to pleasure.

E

21. The text of Vyása embodying a prohibition, however, is intended to show that a moral offence is committed, if, by an exercise of the right, the property be transferred to a person of bad character ; since the relatives would be troubled by such a proceeding :* and not that the sale and the like would be invalid. The above explanations (in §§ 19 to 21) are given in the *Dáyabhága*.

22. The author of the *Vivádachintámani* expounds the text of Vyása in the following way,—“When the co-heirs are separated, but the estate, instead of being distributed by metes and bounds, continues joint among them, then because their property is still common, one has not power (of dealing with the same). But when the shares are separated, then, of course, the exercise of the power by one, is valid.”

But in fact the taking of permission after partition, is ordained for the purpose of obviating any doubt as to the property being divided or joint, and as to the boundaries and the like, in the same manner as the permission of the head of the village and of the like is taken.

23. Consequently the use of property without the sanction of the separated co-heirs, is valid.

24. The same doctrine is propounded in the *Mitákshará* by the following text,—“Land passes by six (formalities ;) by consent of towns-men, of kinsmen, of neighbours and of relatives, and by gift of gold and water.” “Relatives,” signify, daughter’s son and the like (who are sprung from a different family ;) since, kinsmen (*jñatis*) are separately mentioned.

* The author of the *Dáyabhága* indicates the same principle on which the law of pre-emption is based.

25. "By gift of gold and water." Since the mere sale of immovables is forbidden by the following text of Devala,—“In regard to the immovable estate, sale is not allowed, it may be mortgaged by consent (of parties interested :)” and since donation is praised, in the following text,—“He who gives and he who accepts land, both of them perform a virtuous act and are certainly entitled to go the heaven :” therefore if a sale must be made, it should be conducted for the transfer of immovable property, in the form of a gift, delivering with it gold and water (to ratify the donation). This explanation is given by Vijnāneswara.

26. But in reality, the prohibition of the sale of immovables is in respect of joint estate. As regards even that, if support is impossible without sale, then when a sale must be made, it may, at the desire of the buyer, be conducted in the form of a gift, in order to obviate any dispute with the co-sharers.

27. Therefore the figurative predication of gift by Háríta in the following text,—“And what is given to a benefactor,” refers to a (sale in the form of) gift to a benefactor who saves from distress (by paying the consideration).

As to gifts made to any other benefactor, Daksha states the religious merit arising from them,—“What is given to the mother and father, to a friend, to a disciple, to a benefactor, to the poor, to an orphan, and to the learned, becomes fruitful.”

28. Therefore Nárada says,—“Should they give or sell their own share ; they may do all that they please ; for, they are masters of their own wealth.”

29. Yājñavalkya says,—“He who recovers hereditary property which had been taken away, shall not give it up to the coparceners ; nor what has been gained by science.” He who recovers, with the sanction of the other copartners, property inherited from the father or grandfather, which had been forcibly taken away by strangers shall not yield it to the other co-sharers.

20. Sankha lays down a special rule regarding land,—“Land (inherited in regular succession) which had been formerly lost, but which a single (heir) recovers solely by his own labour, the rest may divide according to their due allotment, having first given him a fourth part.” In the *Ratnākara* it is affirmed that this text is not consonant to reason, because it is not cited in the *Smṛiti-mahārṇava Kāmadhenu*, *Pārijāta*, and others. This is not (tenable), because it is quoted in the *Dāyabhāga*, *Mitāksharā* and the like.

31. In the *Mitāksharā* a special rule is laid down regarding ancestral property which had been lost but recovered,—“Though immovables or bipeds (slaves) have been acquired (i. e. recovered,) by a man himself, a gift or sale of them should not be made unless convening all the sons ; they who are born and they who are yet unborn, and they who are actually in the womb, all require the means of support : the dissipation of their (hereditary source of) maintenance is censured.”

32. To this an exception (is mentioned),—“Even a single (coparcener) may make a gift, bailment or sale of immovable estate at a time of danger, for the sake of the family, and specially for a religious purpose.” “Bailment” signifies, mortgage.

33. Manu declares that gift, mortgage, or sale for the purpose of the family is valid even when made by a slave,—“Even the most dependant may make any transaction for the sake of the family ; the master (remaining) either in his own country or a different one should not refuse his sanction.” Kulluka Bhatta writes the following gloss on this text,—“While the master is in that place or in a different one, even a slave may contract debts and the like for the use of the family ; the master should sanction the same.”

34. Vṛhaspati clearly ordains,—“The master of the house is liable to pay for what is taken for the sake of the family, by an uncle, a brother, a son, a wife, a disciple, and a dependant.”

35. Manu says,—“The coparceners though separated should, from their own (share), pay for what has been taken and expended for the purpose of the family, should the taker abscond.” “From their own” signifies from their own property.

36. Kātyāyana declares,—“What is taken for the use of the family in time of need or disease, or by reason of distress, is known as done through danger, as also for the marriage of daughters, and what is done for the benefit of the departed ; all this done by a relative is the master’s due.” The family must, at any rate, be supported. In this text, the genitive in the phrase “the master’s due” signifies the agent, therefore the meaning is “should be paid for *by* the master.” This explanation is given in the Ratnākara.

37. The following is extracted from the *Dāya-bhāga* :—*Hārīta* says,—“While the father lives, sons have no independent power in regard to the receipt, expenditure, and bailment of wealth. But if he be decayed, remotely absent, or afflicted with disease, let the eldest son manage the affairs as he pleases.” So *Sankha* and *Likhita* explicitly declare,—“If the father be incapable, let the eldest manage the affairs of the family, or with his consent a younger brother conversant with business. Partition of the wealth does not take place if the father be not desirous of it. When he is old, or his mental faculties are impaired, or his body is afflicted with a lasting disease, let the eldest like the father protect the goods of the rest, for (the support of) the family is founded on wealth. They are not independent while they have their father living, nor while the mother survives.” These two passages forbidding partition when the father is incapable of business or when he labours under a lasting disorder, direct that the eldest son should superintend the household, or a younger son who is conversant with business.

38. Consent however may be inferred from the absence of prevention. This follows from a text of *Kātyāyana* cited in the *Prāyaschittaviveka*,—“When the master does not prevent the gift of his own property by a co-sharer or even a stranger, then the gift is in effect, made by himself. This is ordained by *Bhrigu*.”

39. To this effect is the following aphorism of the logicians, namely,—“The opinion of an opponent, if not contradicted, becomes admitted.”

40. Thus, such a gift becomes valid, by reason of the absence of dissent.

CHAPTER VI.

ASCERTAINMENT OF A CONTESTED PARTITION.

1. The determination of a doubt regarding the fact of partition having been made, is next explained : Sankha ordains,—“Should a doubt arise on the subject of partition of the wealth of kindred, the family may give evidence, if the matter be not known to the relations sprung from the same race.” “A doubt on the subject of partition of the wealth of kindred” intends, a doubt on the subject of partition of what is liable to be distributed among the kindred, i. e. a doubt regarding the fact of a partition having been made, or a doubt regarding the legality of a distribution which has already been made : “the family” i. e., the cognates, and only in their default, a stranger may give evidence.

2. Vrihaspati describes a deed of partition,—“If the brethren who are separated, do, of their own accord, execute an instrument of distribution (at the time of separation) : this (instrument) is called the deed of partition.”

3. A text of Vrihaspati cited in the Vyavaháramátriká declares,—“Should a village, a field and a garden be written in (conveyed by) a single instrument, all these become enjoyed by the possession of a single portion.” “Instrument” signifies, a writing and the like.

4. But in the absence of enjoyment of even a single portion, there is a loss of the whole of what forms the subject of sale and the like. This is declared by the same (sage),—“Title to immovable property which is received at partition, or by purchase, or which is ancestral, or granted by the king, becomes completed

by enjoyment, but is lost through neglect (of enjoyment.) He who enjoys unmolested (the property) as soon as it is received, has his title completed, but loses it, if he neglects." What is received at partition, by purchase and the like, passes to the coparcener, to the vendee, and to the like, when followed by possession, but loss arises if enjoyment be neglected.

5. Nárada says,—“Gift and acceptance of gift, cattle, grain, house, field and attendants must be considered as distinct among separated brethren; as also diet, religious duties, income, and expenditure. Separated and not unseparated brethren may reciprocally bear testimony, become sureties, bestow gifts, and accept presents. Those by whom such matters are publicly transacted with their co-heirs may be known to be separate even without a deed of partition.”

6. For the same reason Yájnavalkya says,—“Brethren, also husband and wife, likewise father and son, cannot, when not separated, bear testimony, become surety, or contract debt,” i. e. reciprocally.

7. Although the absence of partition (between husband and wife) is indicated by A’pastamba,—“There is no partition between husband and wife; (and there is union) likewise in fruits of pure and impure acts”; also in discussing wife’s right, her right is declared to extend during his lifetime to every property belonging to her husband; also in the Sráddha-viveka it is declared,—“That property lies between husband and wife,” i. e. belongs to two masters, namely, husband and wife: still, husband and wife are enumerated in the above text of Yájnavalkya because it is ordained in the following text of the same sage, that when the father

distributes shares among his sons, he should allot one to a sonless wife,—“Should the father make his sons participators of equal shares, he should allot like shares to his wives.”

8. “The wife and the son and the slave, these three are incapable of holding property.” From the declaration of incapability of holding wealth as in this text, it is argued that the expression of the absence of partition (between husband and wife,) by A’pastamba, is to indicate the wife’s right to every Vedic ceremony, she being an indispensable associate.

9. This argument is not tenable. Because in the latter half of the same text which runs as follows,—“What they acquire becomes his property, whose they are,”—is ordained the absence of independence of the wife and the rest, regarding even their self-acquired property without the permission of the husband and the like ; also because there is a separate enumeration (of religious acts) in the latter part of the text of A’pastamba, viz.,—“(and there is union) likewise in the fruits of pure and impure acts.”

10. Therefore, as the prohibition, namely,—“There is no partition between husband and wife”—implies that, but for it, partition might have taken place ; consequently the common right of both over the same property is indicated.

11. Otherwise, in the absence of the common right of both, partition itself would be impossible ; consequently, there would not have been the prohibitory proposition.

12. This is also the meaning of the unity (of husband and wife) declared in the Laghuhárita,—“Because she attains to unity (with her husband) through clarified butter, sacred text, burnt offering, and religious observances.”

F

CHAPTER VII.

THE SHARE OF ONE WHO WAS ABSENT AT THE TIME OF PARTITION.

1. Allotment of a share to a relative returning after a long residence abroad, is now discussed. On this Vrihaspati declares,—“If a man leaving what is common to the family, reside in another country, his share must no doubt be given to his male descendant when he returns. Be the descendant third or fifth or seventh in degree, he shall receive his hereditary allotment on proof of his birth and name. To the lineal descendant, when he appears, of that man whom the neighbours and old inhabitants know by tradition to be the proprietor, the land must be surrendered by his kinsmen. The enjoyment by strangers for three generations no doubt creates a title. The same is not true of descendants of the same family, until the discontinuance of Sapinda relationship. But a house, a field, a shop, and the like, belonging to a friend, a relative or a kindred, enjoyed by one who is not the owner, are not lost through that enjoyment. A thing enjoyed even for a long time by one related through marriage, by one versed in the Vedas, by the king or his minister, does not however become his property.”

“Common to the family” signifies property which is common to the family ; “strangers” means those that are different from those that are descended from the family.

“One related through marriage” is the son-in-law.

These explanations are found in the Vivádachintámani.

2. Nárada says,—“That cannot be taken away which has been enjoyed though without title, by the three (ancestors) previous to the father, and which has descended in succession through three generations.”

In this text “previous to the father” signifies three (ancestors) beginning with the father, by reason of the text which says,—“The fourth shall take.”

3. Vyása distinguishes enjoyment,—“When the father, grandfather and great-grandfather are alive, the enjoyment by them during their joint lives is recognized as that of one generation.”

Simultaneous enjoyment, though extending to a period of sixty years, is not tantamount to an enjoyment of three generations ; since, as in that case only the great-grandfather is independent, the enjoyment is considered to be his. Then if it be asked what denomination does that enjoyment bear ? This is answered by the passage “is considered that of one generation.”

4. Vyása describes what is to be considered as an enjoyment of three generations,—“When the great-grandfather enjoys, and after him his son, and after them the father, then a person’s enjoyment is said to extend to three generations.”

5. As to the period to which the enjoyment of each should extend, Vyása declares,—“When the owner enjoys without obstruction for a period of twenty years, that enjoyment is said to extend to one generation ; twice that period is called as extending to two generations, thrice that period, extending to three generations. In

such a case the origin of title it is not necessary to enquire."

Here "without obstruction" implies, in the presence of the opposite party.

The enjoyment for sixty years is in unison with what is expressed in this text ; therefore neglect for a longer period determines the right.

6. Vrihaspati too says,—“He who purchases land shall, when his right is contested, prove in a court of justice both his title and possession : but his son shall prove only (perfect) possession, his grandson or any other remoter descendant need prove nothing (but simple possession).”

7. Yājñavalkya ordains,—“He, by whom an acquisition of property is made, must when sued, recover the same (by evidence of title;) but neither his son nor grandson (need do the same;) for, in their case possession is the most essential (evidence.)

8. Kātyāyana describes the possession which is (legally) perfect (for the purpose of dispensing with the evidence of title),—“Possession is held to consist of five elements, namely, the source of right, long period, the absence of interruption, the absence of adverse claim, and the presence of the opposite party.”

CHAPTER VIII.

PARTITION OF CONCEALED PROPERTY.

1. The distribution of that, which was concealed at the time of partition, but is afterwards discovered- (is now discussed). On this Kátyáyana says,—“If the father be deceased, let the sons meeting together divide, with their brethren, whatever was concealed by any of the co-heirs. Effects which are withheld by them from each other, and property which has been ill distributed, being subsequently discovered shall be distributed in equal shares. (So) Bhrigu (has ordained).”

Because the phrase “subsequently discovered” is inserted in the text, therefore without the discovery by means of human proof, of anything concealed, neither can a redistribution be made, nor can recourse be had to divine proof (or ordeal). Otherwise, there cannot be a perfect distribution in any case, if divine proof be not resorted to ; since, through the influence of the witch Suspicion, some effects may be deemed to lie somewhere concealed. The phrase “ill distributed” shows redistribution of what has been imperfectly distributed.

2. The following text of Manu, Nárada, Vrihaspati and Kátyáyana, refers to a case of perfect distribution,—“Only once may a distribution of shares take place, only once may a maiden be given (in marriage), only once may the same article be given (by an owner) : these three may occur but once.”

3. Likewise the following text of Vrihaspati cited in the Ratnákara, namely,—“Whatever has been enjoyed by a co-heir as his share, shall not be interfered with : should he, who has signified his assent to a distribution, litigate

again, the king shall adjudge his own share to him, and shall punish him, if he persists in litigation"—refers to an optional inequality in the shares, but not to an imperfect distribution caused by error and the like. This is indicated by the insertion, in the text, of the term "assent."

4. From the phrase "subsequently discovered" (§1) it appears that the distribution takes place of that alone (which is subsequently discovered) : but what has been once divided, need not be distributed again.

5. The phrase "in equal shares" is inserted (§1) with a view to obviate any such argument as that by reason of his concealment, no share or a small share should be allotted to him who withheld.

6. "Bhrigu" (§ 1) i. e. 'has ordained', to which the accusative is the meaning of the whole sentence.

7. Biswarúpa, Haláyudha and others offer the following explanation (of the text of Kátyáyana), namely,—Inasmuch as the distribution of what is subsequently discovered, follows from the very fact of there having been no distribution of it, the text (§ 1) was intended (by the sage) to show that the offence of theft is not committed in such a case.

8. What they intend is, that the import of the verb "to steal" is inapplicable to a case of concealment by a co-heir. Because it is clear from the term "another" in the text of Kátyáyana which says,—"Stealing is defined to be the taking of another's property,"—that the ownership of another must be exclusive of the

ownership of the taker. As for instance, if the Mudga be unavailable, then the Másha would be the substitute for it : consequently, the use of the Másha is prohibited by the text,—“The Másha is not fit for sacrifice.” Here the prohibition refers to the thing composed of the constituent parts of the Másha alone, but not to that formed of the constituent parts of both the Másha and the Mudga. Similarly, in this case too, theft is committed by the taking of effects belonging to another exclusively, but not by the enjoyment of joint property which is common to himself and the others. Also because, of what is common and what is exclusive, what is exclusive is the sooner understood.

9. Consequently theft is committed by stealing property, distinctly knowing it to belong to another, and not by using another's property mistaking it for his own. This is the opinion of Jinendra and the authors of the *Dáyabhága* and the *Práyaschitta-viveka*.

10. Their assertion, that the appropriation of another's property by mistaking it for his own, is not theft, appears unsatisfactory, for it is at variance with the following story of Nriga in the *Bhágabat*,—“A cow belonging to a certain eminent priest, strayed into my herd of kine, and being confounded with them was given by me, ignorant of the circumstance, to a man of the sacerdotal order. The owner seeing her led away, claimed her for his own ; and the other replied, she was mine by gift, Nriga gave her to me. The priests contending addressed me, setting forth their claims : You are the giver, said the one ; the lawless taker, said the other. Hearing this, I was

confounded. For that sin I was transformed into a lizard, since which time I have seen myself, O Lord ! in this degraded form."

11. But if many rings belonging to divers persons be mixed together, it is no theft if one sell another's ring by mistake for his own, in consequence of their similarity ; for, they were placed together under the conviction, that, in the case of many articles which have no discriminative mark, as cowries and the like, belonging to different persons, being intermixed, no offence is committed if they are reciprocally used by a sort of barter : else a person would not do so under the apprehension of offence. But if through dishonesty anything is so placed for profit, then theft is committed.

12. The following passage of the Matsya-purána relates to a case like this,—“The man who, through ignorance makes a sale of another man's chattels, is faultless ; but one that knowingly does so, merits punishment as a thief.” This text intends that punishment shall not be inflicted upon one who does so through ignorance.

13. Therefore, theft is the disposal of property which is the subject of the exclusive right of another person, without such person's consent, and with the intention—“this is mine, and shall be disposed of according to my pleasure.”

14. Sometimes it is mental, consisting of the intention only. In other instances it is corporeal, as an actual gift or sale or the like.

15. But such a theft is not possible in the case of the property of the undivided brothers and the like : for then it cannot be distinctly ascertained "this is mine and that is another's."

16. To the same effect is the following text of Kátyáyana,—“Effects which have been stolen by a co-heir, he shall not be compelled by violence to restore. A coparcener cannot be made liable for the enjoyment of any article which belongs to all the undivided kinsmen.” Here “stolen” is used metaphorically : he should be persuaded to restore by gentle means, but not by violence. Should an unseparated kinsman consume a greater portion, he shall not be required to refund the excess.

17. Thus also, there is no offence in taking a hidden treasure which is found ; for, it is a thing of which the owner is lost. So Manu declares,—“When the king finds a treasure he shall bestow half of it to Bráhmanas. But a learned Bráhmana (finding treasure) shall appropriate the whole of it, because he is the lord of all. If treasure is discovered by any other, the king takes a sixth of it. But a discoverer who gives no information to the king, and is detected, shall be bound to disgorge it to the king, and shall moreover be liable to punishment.”

18. Such is not the case with associated traders : for, no text indicates it. On the contrary, it is directed by the following text of Yájnavalkya, that a fraudulent partner shall be dismissed without profit,—“Shall turn out a deceitful (partner) profitless.” Traders have not, as in the case of inherited effects, a right vested in several persons with respect to the same chattel. But, by reason of intermixture their right of property in the goods is only uncertain.

CHAPTER IX.

STRIDHANA OR WOMAN'S PROPERTY.

1. Strídhana or woman's property is now described. On this Kátyáyana says,—“The wealth which is earned by mechanical arts, or which is received through affection from a stranger, is subject to her husband's dominion ; the rest is pronounced to be the woman's property.” What is received from a stranger, that is from a person not sprung from the family of her father, mother or husband, and what is earned by mechanical arts are subject to the husband's control. Hence though the goods be hers, they do not constitute woman's property, because she has not independent power over them. But a woman's right is complete in other descriptions of property, excepting these two ; for she has the sole power of making gift or other alienation.

2. Manu and Vishnu declare,—“The heirs should not divide an ornament worn during her husband's lifetime : they are degraded if they partake of it.” Medhátithi explains this text in the following way : —An ornament or the like though not given by the husband, but put on with his sanction, becomes the property of the wife by that act alone.

3. Kátyáyana says,—“That which is received by a married woman or a maiden, in the house of her husband or father, from her husband or from her parents, is termed the gift of affectionate kindred. The independence of women who have received such gifts is recognised in regard to that property : for it was given by the kindred for their maintenance and to soothe them. The power of women over the gifts of their affectionate kindred is declared

by all the sages, both in respect of donation and sale according to their pleasure." What is obtained from kind relatives of her father, mother or husband is called the gift of affectionate kindred. "To soothe them" that is, out of kindness towards them.

4. Nārada says,—“What has been given by the affectionate husband to his wife, she may, even while he is dead, consume or give it away according to her pleasure, excepting immovable property.” From the adjective “given by the husband,” it appears that mmovable property, other than that given by the husband, may of course be given away.

5. Otherwise, it would be contradictory to what Kātyāyana says, namely,—“according to her pleasure, even in immovables.”

6. Kātyāyana cited in the Kalpataru and Ratnākara declares,—“She who is malicious, or shameless, or dissipator of wealth or adulterous is not entitled to woman’s property.”

7. Yājñavalkya says,—“A husband is not, if unwilling, bound to make good the property taken by him at a time of famine, or for the performance of a religious ceremony, or during illness or while under restraint.” “Restraint” is, when the creditor and the like (forcibly) obstructs the preparation of food.

8. But (if taken) in any other circumstance, the following rule propounded by Kātyāyana is to be followed,—“Neither the husband, nor the son, nor the father, nor the brother, is entitled to the appropriation or disposal of woman’s property.”

CHAPTER X.

SUCCESSION TO WOMAN'S PROPERTY.

1. In the next place succession to woman's property is explained. On this Devala says,—“A woman's property is common to her sons and maiden daughters, when she is dead ; but if she leave no issue, her husband shall take it, her mother her brother or her father.”

2. Here equal right of sons and maiden daughters is indicated by the conjunctive compound (sons and maiden daughters).

3. In default of the one, the property goes to the other.

4. On failure of both of them, the succession devolves, with equal right, on the married daughter who has a son, and on her who is likely to have one, for they are capable of conferring spiritual benefits on their mother through the instrumentality of their sons who can present funeral oblations to the manes of their maternal grandfather, which are shared by the deceased. This is declared by Sâtâtapa,—“The mother partakes of whatever is, after the ceremony of Sapindîkarana, presented to the manes of the ancestors.”

5. So also Nârada says,—“On failure of the son the daughter inherits : for she equally continues the lineage.”

6. Consequently, on default of daughters of this description, succession devolves on the son's son.

7. On his default the property goes to the daughter's son, since the daughter's son is, in the following text of Manu, declared to be similar to a son's son,—“Also the

son of a daughter delivers him in the next world like the son of a son :” and since it is logically consistent ; for, the married daughter is debarred from inheritance by the son, therefore the son of the debarred daughter, should be excluded by the son of the person who bars her claim.

8. On his default, the son’s grandson (succeeds), because he presents oblations which she (the deceased proprietor) partakes of.

9. On failure of these, the barren and the widowed daughters succeed to their mother’s property ; since they too are her children.

10. On their default the property devolves on the husband.

11. This however does not refer to the property which was given by the parents ; for to that the brother succeeds (in preference to the husband.) To this effect is the following text of the senior Kátyáyana,—“Immovable property which has been given by the parents to their daughter, descends always to her brother, if she die without leaving issue.”

12. But to the property received by the mother at the time of her marriage, the maiden and the married daughters succeed notwithstanding the sons, by reason of the text of Vasishta which says,—“Let the females share the nuptial presents of their mother.”

13. “A woman’s separate property goes to her daughters, maiden and those not actually married.” From this text of Gotama, it follows that the nuptial

presents descend first to the maiden, that is, unaffianced daughters ; in their default, to those daughters, that are affianced but not actually married : on failure of these, they appertain to the married daughters implied by the term "and" ; because it is first generally laid down, "A woman's property goes to her daughters," but the concluding portion namely "maiden and those not actually married," is intended to shew the order of succession.

14. Manu clearly says,—“Property given to the mother on her marriage (yautuka) is exclusively the share of her unmarried daughter.” Here the word “yautuka” is derived from the verb “yu” signifying “to unite :” and the union of husband and wife arises from marriage, since this is indicated by the following sacred text (recited at the time of marriage),—“What is thy heart, let that become mine, and what is my heart let that become thine.” The reading “Yautaka” is equally correct. The latter is adopted by Váchaspati-misra and Ráyamukuta.

15. The time of marriage means, time previous and posterior to the actual time of marriage. This is described in the Treatise on Marriage, to begin from the Sráddha for prosperity, and to end with the ceremony of prostrating before the husband.

16. As for the passage of Manu,—“The wealth of a woman which has been in any manner given to her by her father, let the Bráhmaní daughter take : or let it belong to her offspring :” since the text specifies “given by her father”, the meaning must be that property which was given to her by her father, even at any time other

than that of the nuptials shall belong exclusively to her daughter ; and the term Bráhmaní signifies any daughter. Or, the text may signify that the Bráhmaní damsel being daughter of a contemporary wife, shall take the property of the Kshatriya and other wives dying childless, which had been given to them by their fathers. The precept, however, which directs that the property of a childless woman shall go to her surviving husband, does not here take effect.

17. On default of these, the son succeeds : since Manu says,—“On failure of daughters, the inheritance goes to sons.”

18. Similarly also other texts declaring the succession of daughters previous to that of sons refer to this description of woman's property.

19. On failure of sons and the others, a woman's nuptial presents go to the husband, if the marriage ceremony was of any of the five forms beginning with the Bráhma : but if it was of any of the three forms beginning with the A'sura, the property appertains to the mother ; and on her default, to the father.

20. As is declared by Manu,—“It is admitted that the property of a woman married by the ceremonies called Bráhma, Daiva, A'rsha, Gándharva and Prájápatya, shall go to her husband, if she die without issue. But her wealth given to her on marriage in the form called A'sura, or in either of the other two (Rákshasa and Paisácha) is ordained, on her death without issue, to become the property of her mother and father.”

21. Baudhāyana declares the order of succession to the property of a maiden,—“The wealth of a maiden, let the uterine brothers themselves take : on failure of them, it shall belong to the mother : or if she be dead, to the father.”

22. Since, order is expressed in this text, therefore in the previous text (§ 20), “the mother and father” succeed in the order in which they are read, but not jointly, agreeably to the conjunctive compound.

23. Vrihaspati says,—The mother’s sister, the wife of the maternal uncle, the wife of the paternal uncle, the father’s sister, the mother-in-law, and the wife of an elder brother, are pronounced to be similar to the mother. If they have no issue of their body, nor son (of a rival wife) nor daughter’s son, nor son of these persons, the sister’s son and the rest shall take their property.

24. Both sons and daughters are included by the term “issue of the body :” by “son” is meant the son of a rival wife ; for a passage of law declares,—“If among all the wives of the same husband, one brings forth a male child, Manu has declared them all, by means of that son, to become mothers of male issue.” Nor is the term “son” meant to be in apposition with “the issue of the body ;” for it would be superfluous, and the sister’s son or any other remote heir would have the right of succession, although a son of a contemporary wife be living : “son of these persons” comprises the son’s son and the rival wife’s son’s son, but not the son of a daughter’s son ; since he does not present oblations to the manes of her husband, which she partakes of.

25. Here agreeably to what has been said before, the rival wife's son and grandson succeed after the heirs down to the daughter's son. But it should not be asserted that they take, also on failure of the heirs beginning with husband and ending in father, mentioned before ; because the husband and the rest have no capacity to present oblations which are enjoyed by the deceased proprietress.

26. Therefore, on failure of the heirs down to the grandson of the rival wife, who are indicated by the term "nor" in the phrase "nor son of these persons," (§ 23) ; and also on failure of the heirs beginning with husband and ending in father, who are mentioned in the following text of Devala, namely,—“A woman's property, when she is dead, becomes the common inheritance of her sons and daughters ; in default of children, let her husband, mother, brother or father, take ;”—the succession to woman's property devolves on her sister's son, her husband's sister's son, her husband's brother's son, her brother's son, her son-in-law and her husband's younger brother, in preference to her father-in-law, her husband's elder brother and the like. Since, there is no other way of reconciling the texts.

27. On this subject, because the following text of Manu, in the Chapter on Inheritance, declares,—“To three ancestors must libation of water be given at their obsequies ; for three, is funeral oblation of food ordained ; the fourth is the giver of these oblations ; but the fifth has no concern in them ;” and Yājñavalkya declares,—“Among these the giver of oblations is the heir ;” and in the text of Vrihaspati (§ 23) the sonship of the sister's son and the rest, is indicated by the passage, “are pronounced similar to the mother :”

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28. And because the only reason for setting out in the Chapter on Inheritance, the capacity of presenting oblations, is, to show that the preference as regards succession, depends on the capacity of conferring a greater amount of spiritual benefit, on the deceased proprietor :

29. And because Sâtâtapa ordains,—“A sister’s son (should present oblations) to (the *manes* of) his maternal uncle, and a maternal uncle, to his sister’s son ; and Pinda should also be offered to the father-in-law, to the spiritual preceptor, to a friend, to the maternal grand-father, as well as to the wives of these persons, likewise to the mother’s and the father’s sister : this is a settled rule amongst those who are conversant with the Vedas :”

30. Therefore it must be admitted that the order of succession among these six (sister’s son &c.) is regulated by the different degrees of benefit derived from their oblations ; since, the order indicated by the sense is of greater weight than the order of reading. Otherwise, succession would devolve, last of all, on the younger brother of the husband, contrary to the opinion and practice of venerable persons.

31. Therefore, first of all, the husband’s younger brother succeeds to the property of his elder brother’s wife, because he is a Sapinda, also because he presents oblations to her and her husband, as well as to the three ancestors to whom her husband was bound to present oblations.

32. On his default, the sons of the husband’s younger and elder brothers succeed ; because they are Sapindas,

and because they present oblations to her and her husband as well as to the two ancestors to whom her husband was bound to offer oblations.

33. On their default, the succession devolves on the sister's son ; because though he is not a Sapinda, still he presents oblations to her and three Pindas to her father and his two ancestors, to whom her son would have presented funeral oblations.

34. In his absence, the husband's sister's son succeeds ; because he presents oblations to the three ancestors of her husband, which her husband would have offered, and because he presents oblations to her and her husband. He is postponed to the sister's son, because, they respectively occupy the places of the husband and the son, and because the husband is inferior to the son, hence it is reasonable that their superiority and inferiority should be similarly determined.

35. On his default, a woman's property goes to her brother's son, because he presents oblations to her, and to her two paternal ancestors beginning with the father, to whom her son would have presented oblations.

36. On his default, the son-in-law succeeds to the mother-in-law's wealth ; because he presents oblations to her and to her husband.

37. The succession devolves in the above order : the passage "sister's son &c." (§ 23) enumerates the heirs but not the order of succession.

38. On failure of these six, the father-in-law or the like succeeds, according to his proximity of Sapinda relationship.

39. It must not be supposed that the text "mother's sister &c." (§ 23) is applicable when there is a failure of the Sapindas : for, in this enumeration of heirs, the husband's younger brother, his son and the son of the husband's elder brother are included, but the husband's father and elder brother who are more proximate are omitted.

CHAPTER XI.

SUCCESSION TO THE ESTATE OF A MALE WHO LEAVES NO MALE ISSUE.

1. In the next place are determined the heirs to the estate of one, who leaves no male issue.

2. Yājñavalkya says,—The wife and the daughters also, both parents, brothers likewise, and their sons, gentiles, cognates, a pupil, and a fellow-student : on failure of the first among these, the next in order is heir to the estate of one who departed for heaven, leaving no male issue. This rule extends to all classes.

3. Likewise Vishnu says,—The wealth of him, who leaves no male issue, goes to his wife ; on failure of her, it devolves on the daughters ; if there be none, it belongs to the father ; if he be dead, it appertains to the mother ; on failure of her, it goes to the brothers ; after them it descends to the brother's son ; if none exist, it passes to the Sakulyas ; in their default, it devolves on Bandhus ; on failure of them, it goes to the pupil ; on his default, it goes to the fellow-student ; and for want of all these heirs, the property escheats to the king, excepting the wealth of a Bráhmāna.

4. In the above texts, the term "male issue" indicates sons, grandsons and great-grandsons ; because they equally present oblations in the Parva days.

5. Accordingly, in a text Baudháyana, after mentioning sons, grandsons and great-grandsons, says, "male issue of the body being left, the property must go to them."

6. That text runs as follows,—“The paternal great-grandfather the grandfather, and the father, the man himself, his brothers of the whole blood ; his son grandson and great-grandson by a woman of the same tribe : all these partaking of undivided oblations are pronounced Sapindas. Those who share divided oblations are called Sakulyas. Male issue of the body being left, the property must go to them. On failure of Sapindas or near kindred, Sakulyas or remote kinsmen are heirs.”

7. The meaning of the passage is this :—Since a person (when deceased) partakes of the funeral oblations presented to the three ancestors beginning with the father, through the union of oblations (effected by the ceremony called Sapindikarana) ; and since the three descendants present oblations to the deceased ; and since he, who, while living, presents an oblation to an ancestor, partakes, while deceased, of oblations presented to the same person, as participating in the offering at obsequies : therefore the middlemost (of the seven) who while living offered food to the manes of ancestors, and when dead, partook of offerings made to them, becomes the object to which the oblations of his descendants were addressed in their lifetime, and shares with them, when they are deceased, the food which must be offered by the

daughter's son and the like. Hence, those ancestors, to whom he presented oblations, and those descendants who presented oblations to him, partake of an undivided offering in the form of (*pinda*) food at obsequies. Persons, who do partake of such offerings, are Sapindas. But one distant in the fifth degree neither gives an oblation to the fifth in ascent, nor shares the offerings presented to his manes. So, the fifth in descent neither gives an oblation to the middle person who is distant from him in the fifth degree, nor partakes of offerings made to him. Therefore three ancestors from the grandfather's grandfather upwards, and three descendants from the grandson's grandson downwards, are denominated Sakulyas, as partaking of divided oblations, inasmuch as they do not participate in the same offerings.

8. It has been before observed, that this relationship of Sapinda (extending no further than the fourth degree) as well as that of Sakulya, is propounded relatively to Inheritance. But relatively to Mourning, Marriage and the like, those too, that partake of the divided oblations, are denominated Sapindas. This has been explained in the *Suddhitattwa*.

9. *Kátyáyana* cited in the *Ratnákara*, clearly states the order of succession of the son and the like,—“If an undivided son dies, his son should be made a sharer of the inheritance. He, who has not received livelihood from his grandfather, shall take his paternal share from his uncle or his son. But only the same share of property belongs to all the brethren (descended from the son.) Likewise also his (grandson's) son shall take. Succession devolves not on a more remote descendant.”

10. "Livelihood" means property sufficient for livelihood. The meaning of the text is as follows,—If any one of the brethren ceases to live, then his share should be allotted to his son; if the deceased leaves more sons than one, then his share should be equally distributed to them: likewise his (grandson's) son shall take; his (great-grandson's) son's share ceases.

11. This however relates to a case in which the sharers dwell together. As Devala declares,—“The rule is, that the redistribution of inheritance among unseparated or separated kinsmen who dwell together takes place down to the fourth descendant.” The redistribution, taking place among separated brethren who dwell together or are re-united extends, as in the case of unseparated ones, to the brother or his son or grandson, but excludes his great-grandson who is the fourth in descent.

12. The allotment of shares to those who are even seventh in descent as has been said before, (however,) relates to those that return from a distant place. (Ch. VII.) Consequently no contradiction is incurred.

13. Therefore on failure of descendants down to the great-grandson, the widow succeeds to the estate (left by her husband.)

14. As is declared by Kátyáyana,—“The wife may, after the death of her husband, use the heritage of her husband according to her pleasure: but shall, while he is alive, preserve it or entrust it to his family. The sonless (widow) keeping unsullied the bed of her husband and persevering in religious observances, shall with

moderation, enjoy (the property of her husband.) After her, the heirs shall take." "According to her pleasure," intends, for the purposes of religion.

15. Likewise Vyása ordains,—“O sweetfaced ! a woman, who is always assiduous in the performance of religious observances, conveys (to a region of everlasting bliss) both herself and her husband abiding in another world.”

16. A text of law cited in the Madanapárijáta is as follows,—“Whatever is most desirable in the world, and whatever was most liked by the husband, should be bestowed on a meritorious man, by a woman desirous of gratifying her (deceased) husband.”

17. “Keeping unsullied the bed of her husband” intends, one who knows no other man than the husband. Accordingly, in that part of the Harivansa which treats of religious observances, it is said,—“O auspicious Arundhati ! of unchaste women, all good acts consisting of gift, fasting and merits, likewise all religious observances are fruitless.”

18. Also Brihan-Manu says,—“Let the sonless wife, keeping unsullied the bed of her husband, and persevering in religious observances, offer his oblations and take (his) entire share.” The term ‘his’ which occurs in the phrase “his oblations” is to be construed also with ‘share’ ; and since the term ‘his’ denotes the husband, therefore the wife takes the entire share *i. e.*, the whole estate left by the husband, and not so much only as is sufficient for her subsistence.

19. By the term "wife" (*Patnī*) is intended, the wife of the same class with the husband ; since it is expressed (in several texts) that "the senior wife takes the wealth.)"

20. Seniority (among wives) is described by Manu, thus—"When regenerate men take wives both of their own class and others, the seniority, honour and apartment of those wives must be settled according to the order of their classes."

21. Nārada ordains mere maintenance of wives others than those of the same class,—“Of brothers if any one departs without issue, or enters into a religious order, let the rest divide his wealth excepting the wives' separate property. Let them allow a maintenance to the wives (*stri*) for life, provided these preserve unsullied the bed of their lord. But if they behave otherwise, the brethren may resume that allowance.” ‘Departs’ means, dies.

22. Thus, as there is a distinction between a wife taken from the same class and one who is not so, texts like the following should be interpreted with reference to this distinction,—“Next let brothers of the whole blood or also equal daughters divide the heritage of him who leaves no male issue ; or let the existing father, or brothers belonging to the same tribe, or the mother, or the wife, inherit in their order ; but on failure of these, let the nearest of the kinsmen succeed.” ‘Equal’ means, appertaining to the same class ; ‘existing’ signifies, surviving.

23. In fact, however, the order mentioned in this text is not to be accepted in all cases ; since, that would be inconsistent with the text cited below, which bases the order of succession on the degrees of spiritual benefit, conferred upon the deceased proprietor. Hence it is that the terms 'or' and 'or also' are repeated in the text, on purpose to show that no importance is to be attached to the order.

24. On failure of the wife (*Patni*) the daughters (succeed.) Here by the plural number (§ 2) are included the maiden and the married daughters, also the daughter's son.

25. Now the order of succession among the maiden and the married daughters is indicated by the following text of Parásara,—“ Let the maiden daughter of one who dies without leaving male issue, take the inheritance ; on failure of her, the married one.”

26. In default of these, the daughters' son (inherits). Because in a text of Manu, namely,—“ In this world there is no difference in law between a son's son and a daughter's son ; since, their father and mother both sprang from the body of the same man,”—the daughter's son is declared to be equivalent to the son's son, consequently as the son's son succeeds on failure of the sons, so the daughter's son inherits in default of the daughters.

27. Accordingly, Vishnu cited by Govindarāja says,—“ In a family destitute of sons and grandsons, the daughter's sons inherit the estate ; for the son's son and the daughter's son are alike in the performance of obsequies of the ancestors.”

28. If there be no daughter's son, the parents (succeed). Of these, first, the father, and then the mother, succeeds, agreeably to the text of Vishnu, cited before, (§3).

29. In their default, the brothers (succeed.) Here too, the plural number is used (§ 2) for the purpose of showing that the succession is different according as the brothers are uterine (full), or consanguine, or re-united.

30. Hence, of an uterine brother and one born of the step-mother, though they are sprung from the same father, the uterine brother alone succeeds, but not the step-brother; because the former presents oblations to six ancestors which the deceased was bound to offer, but the latter offers oblations to the three paternal ancestors only.

30. According to the opinion of some, however, even a step-brother who is re-united equally succeeds to a brother's property, with an uterine brother. But if an uterine brother be re-united, he alone takes, and not a step-brother though re-united.

32. On this subject Yājñavalkya says,—(1) “ A re-united brother shall keep the share of his re-united co-heir who is deceased; or shall deliver it to his issue. But an uterine brother shall thus retain or deliver the allotment of his uterine brother. (2) A half brother, however, being again associated, may take the heritage; not a half brother (who is not re-united): or an (uterine brother) though not associated may obtain the property, and not the son of a different mother, who is re-united.

33. Vrihaspati describes a re-united (kinsman), thus,—“ He, who being separated, dwells again through affection, with the father, brother or uncle, is called, Re-united.”

34. Therefore, Re-union is the dwelling together through affection, after separation, of the father and the son, or of the brothers, or of the uncle and the brother's son, as the case may be : one forming re-union is called Re-united.

35. When a person, who is thus re-united, dies, his re-united co-heir should allot his share to his issue : on failure of his issue, shall take it himself, (§ 32).

36. The passage,—“ But a uterine brother shall thus retain or deliver the allotment of his uterine brother,” (§ 32)—is to be explained in the same way.

37. On this, a special rule is propounded by Yama,—“ Undivided immovable property goes to all (the brothers.) But never should separated immoveable estate be taken by half-brothers.” ‘All,’ that is, all the whole and half brothers. The inference which is deduced from the sense of this text is, that exclusive of immoveable property, everything (else) whether divided or undivided, appertains to the uterine (full) brother alone.

38. Manu clearly says,—“ Of these (re-united brothers) if the eldest or the youngest or any other be deprived (of his share) previous to the allotment of shares, or dies, his share is not cancelled.” “ Previous to the allotment of shares,” means, previous to partition ; “ be deprived of his share” *i. e.* by entering into a religious order, and the like.

39. As to who are entitled to that share, the same lawgiver says,—“ The assembled uterine brothers shall together equally divide the same (share) ; also brothers who are re-united, and sisters born of the same mother.”

40. Vrihaspati says,—“ When separated brothers dwell together through affection, then among these there is no specific deduction for seniority when re-distribution takes place ; should any co-heir enter into any religious order or die, his share is not cancelled, but is to be allotted to his uterine brother : if there be any sister she is entitled to a share of it. This is the law (regulating the succession to the property) of one without issue and having neither wife nor father (surviving him.) But if any one of the re-united brethren acquires property by means of science, heroism and the like ; two shares should be allotted to him, and the rest shall take equal shares,”

41. Here, it is to be understood, that the absence of the specific deduction for the eldest among the re-united brothers, refers to the three higher tribes ; because as regards the Sudras, there is *always* this absence of specific deduction for the eldest, (and not only after re-union).

42. This is declared also by Manu,—“ All the sons of the twice-born, who sprang from mothers of the same class, shall, after setting apart the specific deduction for the eldest, divide equally. But a woman of the same class only, and not of a different class, may become the wife of a Súdra. Those that are born of her become equal sharers, although there may be hundred sons.”

43. Kullúka-Bhatta comments on the term ‘ equal sharers’ in the following way,—become only equal participants *i. e.* shall not allow the specific deduction for seniority to any one.

44. This is also consonant with reason ; since, as in the text,—“To the eldest is to be allotted the twentieth part, and the best of all chattles, half of that to the middlemost, but a fourth to the youngest,”—Manu has generally declared the law of deductions, therefore the second half of the latter of the two couplets (§ 42) is declared in order to remove doubts as to whether the term ‘twice-born’ indicates all the tribes, (or stands for what it literally signifies.)

45. Nor can it be argued that the specific deductions hold good even in the case of Súdras ; inasmuch as the reason, namely, saving from the infernal region of the name of Put, is the same in all cases ; because that is not the reason, since specific deductions of the half and the fourth (of what is allotted to the eldest) are declared to be given respectively to the middle one and the youngest, though it cannot be held that they save from the same.

46. Nor can it be argued that as there is a distinction between the specific deductions and the shares, all that is prohibited by the declaration of equal participation, is not the specific deduction, but the unequal distribution among the Súdras, which has been mentioned before, as taking place among those born of mothers of different tribes ; because that object would be accomplished by the first half of the last couplet which says,—“But a woman of the same class only &c.” (§ 42).

47. Equal participation is ordained by Manu for the purpose of prohibiting specific deductions even amongst the twice-born ; for, he says, after the text,—‘All the sons of the twice-born &c.’ (§ 42),—“ But two-fold distribution among co-heirs is pronounced : one is

in the order of seniority, and the other an equal participation." Vrihaspati reads "is shown" in lieu of "is pronounced."

48. Here, (§ 41), (it is to be understood that) the right of the sisters extends to so much property as is sufficient for her marriage, because it is so declared by the sages as well as by the commentators.

49. By reason of the uni-residual (*Ekasesha*) compound the term father in the passage "having neither wife nor father surviving him," (§ 41), indicates both the father and the mother. Because Vishnu (§ 3) and other sages declare the succession of the brother, only on failure of the mother.

50. Now *Jímútaváhana* says :—The text "a re-united (brother) shall keep the share of re-united co-heir" (§ 32), is intended to provide a special rule governed by the circumstance of re-union after separation, and applicable to the case where a number of claimants in an equal degree of affinity occurs. Hence, if there be competition between claimants of equal degree whether brothers of the whole blood, or brothers of the half blood, or sons of such brothers, or uncles or the like, the re-united parcenar shall take the heritage : for the text does not specify the particular relation ; and all (these relations) were premised in the preceding text (§ 2, ; and a question arises in regard to all of them. Therefore the text must be considered as not relating exclusively to brothers.

51. But when there are a half brother re-united, and a uterine brother not re-united, and when there are a whole brother and a half brother both re-united ; then two questions arise, which of the two is to succeed in each case.

52. As to the first it is said,—“ A half brother however &c.” (§ 32) which signifies,—let a half brother, if re-united, take, but not a half brother merely as such : but a uterine brother though not re-united may take ; for the term ‘uterine brother’ which occurs in the preceding text is also to be construed with this latter proposition. Therefore when there are an unassociated uterine brother and a re-united half brother, they both succeed ; because the equality, of the relation of re-union, and of the status of a whole brother, is expressed by the first part of the text, (§ 32).

53. As to the second, it is ordained,—“ and not the son of a different mother, who is re-united,” (§ 32). The meaning is that when there is a whole brother re-united, the son of a different mother though re-united shall not take, that is, the re-united whole brother alone shall succeed ; since though they are equally re-united, still the whole brother as such is preferred.

54. The author of the *Dáyabhāga*, however, construes the second couplet of *Yājñavalkya* (§ 42) in the following way,—“The meaning of the first half (of that couplet) is, a half brother being re-united shall take the succession, although a whole brother not re-united exists ; but a half brother who is not re-united shall not inherit. The latter half of the text, is, in answer to the question,—Does not the whole brother inherit in that case ? Though not re-united, the whole brother (the term is understood) shall take the heritage, and not exclusively the son of a different mother who is again associated ; but it shall be taken and shared by both.”

55. The same construction is put upon the passage in the *Mitákshará*.

56. But the great Doctor *Súlapáni* in his *Yájñaval-
kya-Dípakaliká* reads the passage thus,—“But a half
brother, being again associated, shall not take the heri-
tage of a half brother ;” and offers the following explana-
tory comments,—A uterine brother though not re-united,
shall alone take the heritage, but not a brother born of a
rival mother, though re-united. Some explain the term
‘associated’ (occurring in the last part of *Yájñavalkya*’s
text, § 32) to mean one associated through the uterus,
that is, a whole brother. If the reading be, “one born
of a different mother shall not take the heritage,” then
the meaning would be, that one being a half brother
shall not take the succession. This text shows the
succession of a whole brother who is not re-united.
Consequently there is no tautology.

57. The authors of the *Ratnákara* and others say
that the reading which is found in the *Kalpataru* is
—“shall not take the heritage of a half brother.” But
this seems to be an error committed by the copyist ; since
the reading in the original text of *Yájñavalkya*, and in
such treatises as the *Mitákshará*, the *Párijáta* and the
Haláyudha, is,—“A half brother shall not take the
heritage ;” and the commentaries on that text are in
accordance with this reading.

58. If there be no brothers, the brother’s son
succeeds. But first of all, the son of a whole brother
takes the succession, because the property being devolved

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on him, conduces to greater (spiritual) benefit ; inasmuch as the mother of the (deceased) proprietor partakes of the oblations which the whole brother's son presents to his grand-father, according to the following text of Vrihaspati,—“The mother tastes with her husband the oblation consisting of food, which is reverentially offered (to his manes), and the grandmother with her husband, as also the great-grandmother with her husband.”

59. In default of the son of a uterine (full) brother, the son of a half brother succeeds.

60. On failure of him, the ‘gentiles’ (or agnates) succeed, (§2).

61. Because Manu declares,—“To three must libations of water be made, to three must oblations of food be presented ; the fourth in descent is the giver of these offerings ; but the fifth has no concern in them. The inheritance is his who is unremote of the kinsmen of him.” The gloss of Kullūka-Bhatta on the last part is to the following effect,—‘The inheritance is his who is unremote’, *i. e.*, nearest, ‘of the kinsmen’ *i. e.*, from among the kinsmen, ‘of him’ *i. e.*, of the deceased proprietor.

62. Also because Vrihaspati says,—“When there are many agnates, distant kinsmen as well as cognates, he who among these is the nearest, succeeds to the estate of one who leaves no children.”

63. Therefore, a successor to the inheritance is to be determined by reference to two considerations, namely, his comparative capacity as regards the offering of oblations, and his proximity of birth.

64. Accordingly, as on failure of the deceased proprietor's own lineage down to the daughter's son, others succeed, similarly in default of the brother's son, the father's lineage ending with his daughter's son takes the heritage.

65. In their default, the grand-father succeeds.

66. On failure of him, the grand-mother inherits. Since Manu ordains,—“The mother receives the inheritance of her son destitute of issue; and when the mother too is dead, the father's mother takes the property.” Therefore, as the mother succeeds on failure of the father, similarly the paternal grandmother is the heir, in default of the paternal grandfather.

67. In her default, the descendants of the paternal grandfather, down to his daughter's son, succeed in the same way, as has been seen with regard to the father's issue.

68. On the same principle, the paternal great-grandfather, the paternal great-grandmother, and the descendants of the paternal great-grandfather, down to his daughter's son, (succeed in the same order.)

69. On failure of (these) givers of oblations partaken of by the deceased (proprietor,) the ‘cognates’ (§ 2) such as the maternal grandfather, the maternal uncle and the like,—(are entitled to the inheritance.)

70. Among these too, if the maternal grandfather survive, he alone succeeds, in the same way as the father and the like.

71. If he be dead, then the maternal uncle and the like become heirs in the same order, since they present oblations to the maternal grandfather and the like, which the deceased (proprietor) was bound to offer.

72. On their default the 'Sakulyas' or the kinsmen of divided oblations become heirs. They consist of the three generations of descendants, beginning with the great-grandson's son, and also of the descendants of the paternal great-grandfather's father and the like.

73. It is in pursuance of the same principle (§ 63) that the author of the *Dáyabhága* says,—“Since the paternal uncle, like the son of the whole brother, offers oblations, which the owner was bound to present, to two ancestors, should not the succession devolve equally on the paternal uncle and the fraternal nephew of the proprietor? The answer is, the paternal uncle is indeed the giver of oblations to the paternal grandfather and great-grandfather of the proprietor; but the nephew is the giver of oblations to two ancestors including the owner's father who is principally considered; he is therefore a preferable claimant, and inherits before the paternal uncle.”

74. Likewise, when there is a paternal uncle, and a son of a deceased paternal uncle, of the deceased; in such a case although there is no distinction as to the presenting of oblations, which the deceased was bound to offer, to the paternal grandfather and great-grandfather, still the paternal uncle inherits by reason of his proximity of birth.

75. Because, the allotment of shares according to the proximity of birth is set forth in the following text,—

"Among the sons of different fathers, the allotment of shares is according to the fathers."

76. Accordingly, it is said in the *Mitāksharā* that the paternal grandfather, the paternal uncle and his son take the succession in their order.

77. Also in the *Vivāda-Chintāmani* it is stated regarding succession to the property of one who leaves no male issue, that on default of the brother, his son (succeeds), on failure of him the nearest kinsman (inherits.)

78. The term 'cognates' in the text of *Vrihaspati* (§ 62) shows that the cognates of the owner himself, and of his father and of his mother are, in their order, entitled to inheritance. And they are,—“The father's sister's son, the mother's sister's son, and the maternal uncle's son are considered to be the cognates of the owner himself. The father's father's sister's son, the father's mother's sister's son and the father's maternal uncle's son, are known as the cognates of the father. And the mother's cognates are her mother's sister's son, her father's sister's son and her maternal uncle's son.”

79. *A'pastamba* says,—“Either the disciples or the daughter shall use the property for religious acts in his welfare.” ‘For religious acts in his welfare,’ signifies, for religious acts such as the monthly oblations and the like which are enjoyed by him, that is to say, for his spiritual benefit.

80. Thus also when there is a possibility of the destruction of his property, although there may be heirs to

his property in distant places, still any one may apply the property of the deceased to the purpose of his funeral obsequies as well as to the purpose of his religious merit.

81. Because in the following text of Nárada, it is said that even a priest may become a substitute (of the heir),—"Even he who out of affection, acts, of his own accord, as a priest." This is explained at length in the *Suddhi-Tattwa*.

82. This is admitted by the author of the *Dáyabhága* when he says,—“The appropriation of the wealth of the deceased to his spiritual benefit, in the mode which has been stated, should, in every case, be contemplated.

83. Thus in *The Principles of Law* composed by the fortunate *Raghunandana Bhattáchárjya* the son of the great Doctor the fortunate *Harihara Bhattáchárjya*, *The Principles of Heritage* is finished.

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